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2Difference in practice? Questioning collective identity in Australian feminism/s
Kristie Brown
Introduction
Collective identity forms an integral part of New Social Movement theory, often considered a significant
distinguisher of ‘new’ from ‘old’ social movements (Burgmann 2003:5, Melucci 1995:41-43, Polletta &
Jasper 2001). Yet the definition and utility of collective identity is widely contested. When collective
identity is examined in terms of Australian feminism/s1, or the Australian women’s movement2 (Jordan,
1995:679), many theoretical and practical difficulties arise. One significant theoretical problem centres on
the propensity of collective identity to universalise women’s experience and oppression, widely critiqued as
privileging white, Western, middle-class women (Ang 1995, Benhabib 1999, Bulbeck 1988 & 1998, hooks
1981 & 2000, Mohanty et al 1991, Moreton-Robinson 2000). The mid-90’s saw young women pose a
further theoretical problem to collective identity, arguing that for them feminism is all DIY (Do It Yourself):
“There is no young feminist anymore. There is no one movement. There are young women in Australia who
call themselves feminists but who have almost nothing in common – politically, ideologically – with each
other. Contemporary feminism has become a philosophical and political ethos so accepted by a younger
generation of Australian women that they don’t even bother to explain it.” (Trioli 1996:9) DIY’s anthem of
individualism poses a stark contrast to collective identity.
But feminism, in all its various manifestations, is about struggle (hooks 1981:1-13). More explicitly, It is the
active struggle against women’s subordination and oppression, particularly, but not necessarily exclusively,
in relation to men. Feminism/s are political and practical. Feminism/s about social change. This is not to
suggest that theoretical contestations should be discounted, and it certainly is not to suggest that concerns
about collective identity are unimportant (on the contrary, their importance needs to be stressed). But it is
necessary to move beyond theoretical knots and refocus on the practical implications of these contestations
for feminist/s struggle.
Understanding collective identity: the feminist collective identity conundrum
There are many contentions that emerge when attempting to define collective identity,3 but this paper is
concerned with the difficulties posed to collective identity by feminism/s, specifically critiques of the
exclusionary nature of white, Western, middle-class feminism/s and new challenges posed by DIY
feminism. In this context, the major issue is unity: that is, to what extent does collective identity facilitate or
impede heterogeneity?
Perhaps the most prominent understanding of collective identity in terms of New Social Movement theory is
Alberto Melucci’s (1995). Melucci’s conceptualisation of collective identity is processual, that is, collective
identity is an “interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals” (1995:44) that “takes the
form of a field containing a system of vectors in tension.”4 (1995:50). Melucci stresses that collective
                                                 
1 Throughout this essay I will refer to feminism/s in order to express the various and diverse manifestations of feminism (see
Caine 1998:419). As Tong asserts, the aim is to “signal to the broader public that feminism is not a monolithic ideology, that all
feminists do not think alike, and that, like all other time-honoured modes of thinking, feminist thought has a past as well as a
present and a future.” (1998:1)
2 This paper will refer to Australian feminism and the Australian women’s movement interchangeably. Whilst it is acknowledged
that this is potentially problematic, historically the terms feminism, women’s movement (and occasionally women’s liberation
movement) have erratically superceded and dislodged each other to the extent that they are inextricable: the women’s movement
is feminism and feminism is the women’s movement. (See Caine 1998:419-420).
3 Is collective identity constructed through action or does in independently preexist? Are collective actors attracted to a collective
identity through self-interest or does interest result from collective identity? Is collective identity static or fluid? Is it constructed
by the group or by outside forces? (Polletta & Jasper 2001) Despite being presented dualistically, many of these contestations
should not be posed as either/or, but perhaps are a fusion of both or neither options.
4 These vectors are constituted by definition of the ends, means, and field of action; a network of active relationships; and
emotional investment (Melucci 1995:44-45).
3identity should not be reified, arguing that the constant renegotiation of the vectors precludes collective
identity from becoming “the monolithic unity of a subject” (1995:50). Yet Melucci’s position is self-
confessedly paradoxical. Despite the constant ‘tension’ of the vectors, “Collective identity is a learning
process that leads to the formation and maintenance of a unified empirical actor that we can call a social
movement.” (1995:49). The vectors appear to be a veneer that prevents stasis, as new definitions are formed
by “integrating the past and the emerging elements of the present into the unity and the continuity of a
collective actor.” (Melucci 1995:49) In later work Melucci does acknowledge that it is necessary to discover
“the plurality of perspectives, meanings and relationships which crystallize in any given collective action”
yet this plurality does not appear to transpose to collective identity (in Burgmann 2003:6).5
Notions of feminist collective identity are highly contested. In 1977 Robin Morgan explained that feminism
is based on the belief that “sexism is the root of oppression, the one which, until and unless we uproot it,
will continue to put forth the branches of racism, class hatred, ageism, competition, ecological disaster, and
economic exploitation.” (In Einstein 1984:127) On a less specific level feminism/s has generally found a
basis in the understanding that whilst feminists’ views may be heterogeneous, it’s unity lies in the collective
understanding that “all actions somehow address the oppression of women.” (Jordan 1995:682) Jeffreys
recollects the potency of this capacity to generalise of and for women: “the idea that all women were united
and could claim a common identity, even though in a shared experience of oppression, was empowering,
and had many real and important effects.” (1991:2)
But in recent times, feminists’ have moved away from unitary notions of collective identity, partly as a
result of postmodern critiques6 (Burgmann 2003:25). Benhabib explains that “the most important theoretical
issue to emerge from the feminism/postmodernism debates in the 1980s remains the problem of the subject.”
(1999:337) The problematisation of ‘woman’ as the subject of feminism/s has produced a feminist collective
identity conundrum. Gunew & Yeatman explain that “In its third decade, a dominant area of debate in
second-wave feminism concerns being able to deal with differences among women without losing the
impetus that derives from being a coherent movement for social change.” (1993:xiii) This conundrum
between collective identity, heterogeneity and political action has been variously articulated (Gamson 1995,
Jeffreys 1991, Polletta & Jasper 2001, Slagle 1995, Sudbury 2001). It is in critiques of the dominant white,
Western middle class nature of feminism and contentions from contemporary DIY feminists that the
feminist collective identity conundrum is particularly manifest.
Problematising collective identity: critiquing white, Western, middle class feminism
At its core, the problem with feminist collective identity is that:
“Not all women share the same experience of ‘being a woman’, nor is shared gender
enough to guarantee a commonality of social positioning…it is now widely
acknowledged that differences between women undermine the homogeneity and
continuity of ‘women’ as a social category: differences produced by the intersections of
class, race, ethnicity, nationality and so on.” (Ang 1993:58)
                                                 
5 Other theorists of collective identity take a similar approach to Melucci, relying either implicitly or explicitly on a homogenous
basis of unity. Jordan argues that if collective actions are not “articulated into a unity…then there is no such thing as a social
movement, only a range of collective actions” (1995:676) Burgmann states that “there is an important sense in which social
movements only matter inasmuch as they are living subjects who act as unified entities, who act as coherent forces for change.”
(2003:6). Taylor and Whittier suggest that the construction of collective identities can be understood in terms of boundaries,
consciousness and negotiation. Boundaries highlight the differences between the marginalised group and the dominant culture.
Consciousness is the means by which marginalised groups make collective meaning of the structural, cultural or systemic bases of
their oppression. And negotiation is the process of resistance to domination. (Slagle 1995) All of these factors “emphasise the
unitary aspects of collective identity and ignore significant differences of identity and interest” (Rupp & Taylor 1999:365-6)
6 Although the questioning of ‘women’ is largely attributed to postmodern critique, it should be understood that black women
were critiquing the exclusionary nature of feminism (based on a restricted understanding of ‘woman’) well before this. (see Lovell
1996: 301-2)
4A total rejection of any common factor between women renders feminist/s practice impotent. As a political
movement it has no place from which to speak, and no one to represent. Yet the differences that Ang is
referring to cannot and should not simply be ignored or added on as separate but related elements of gender
oppression. But at the same time, gender oppression is real, and in the same way that class and ethnicity
cannot be simply compounded into gender, gender cannot simply be compounded into anything else (or
nothing).
It has been widely acknowledged that up until at least the 1990s feminism was almost entirely predicated on
the experiences of white, Western, middle class women (Bulbeck 1988 &1998, hooks 1981 & 2000, Jeffreys
1991). Both bell hooks (1981 & 2000) and Chilla Bulbeck (1988 & 1998) argue that it is in feminists’
resistant distinction between gender and race oppression that black women7 have been excluded from
feminism. “Women’s issues and women’s subordination (unless one is a white middle-class woman) cannot
be separated from race and class oppression. To argue for the autonomy of feminist movements is to argue
for continuing oppression of some women (black, working-class, third world) for the benefit of others
(privileged, western, white, middle-class)” (Bulbeck 1988:127). Further, hooks comments that “the struggle
to end racism and the struggle to end sexism were naturally intertwined, that to make them separate was to
deny a basic truth of our existence, that race and sex are immutable facets of human identity.” (1981:13)
When feminism/s attempts to deal with these differences in a practical or political level we are faced with a
very clear and difficult conundrum. Feminism/s must somehow account for the differences between men
and women, as well as the differences between women. Feminism/s must move away from a collective
identity based on a unitary homogenous understanding of ‘women’, yet it must do so without undermining
its own politics and practice. Jeffreys explains that “The recognition of differences between women poses a
formidable and paradoxical task for feminist theory.” (1991:1)
Doin’ DIY: collective identity problems continued
DIY feminism totally rejects collective identity. DIY is about individual practice: young women have
internalised feminist ideology to such an extent that they simply expect equality (Trioli 1996: 11). Yet Bail
argues that this individualistic base does not preclude feminist practice:
“DIY Feminism shows that the disparate voices of young women add up to a cultural and
political movement with numerous banners. While there were many differences among
second-wave feminists and disagreements about the direction of the women’s movement,
efforts were generally directed towards presenting a united front. Now feminism is
largely about individual practice and taking on personal challenges rather than group
identification…feminist thinking has not been diluted. This diversity of views has made
feminism stronger. The do-it-yourself spirit of this generation has changed the face of the
women’s movement. It’s now ready for action on many fronts.” (1996:16)
DIY feminist’s outright rejection of collective identity raises pertinent questions about the changing nature of
Australian feminism/s. Integral to DIY is a general rejection of ‘feminism’ the word (Bail 1996:4). Flew et al
explains that this taps into a wider issue of the global diversity of feminist/s thought: “not all women activists
call themselves feminists, and…where women do take the concept of feminism on board, the term has
different meanings within (as well as between) different contexts.” (1999:396) A unitary collective identity
makes little space for DIY feminists or changing contexts, a problematic and unnecessary exclusion.
Yet rejecting collective identity is not as simple as Bail presents. Mansbridge (1995) attempts to reconcile
collective and individual identity arguing that “being a feminist does not require membership in a feminist
organization, but only a sense of accountability to an ideal of feminism. Its behavioral requirements differ
                                                 
7 I use ‘black women’ in the political sense, referring to the plethora of women who are marginalised because they are not white.
It is definitively acknowledged that this involves an extremely heterogeneous group of women who in no way experience
homogenous forms of oppression. The term is used instead as a statement of the combined race and gender oppression common to
these women (see Sudbury 2001:33 for further analysis). I am also reminded of Gayatri Spivak’s comment that “The person who
knows has all the problems of self-hood. The person who is known somehow seems not to have a problematic self…only the
dominant self can be problematic; the self of the other is authentic without a problem.” (Spivak in Bulbeck 1988:79)
5across social and historical contexts, but the core collective identity continues to shape an individual’s sense
of self.” (Polletta & Jasper 2001) But there is no accountability beyond the individual in DIY, in particular,
there is no feminist accountability. Feminism/s form becomes morphed to the extent that it is unrecognisable,
impeding any clear understanding of feminism/s or feminist/s action. If there is no feminist movement, then
who will push for women and who will protect gains? (Burgmann 2003:162)
Making sisterhood stick: working the conundrum8
Sum eloquently states that “the challenge for feminist scholarship is to realise women’s multiple voices
without losing all of the analytical power of the category ‘women’” (2000:136)
Ang argues that the white, Western, middle-class premise of feminism necessitates partiality which “implies
that feminists must emphasise and consciously construct the limits of its own field of political intervention.”
(1995:73) Ang argues that attempts to include ‘other’ women in feminism/s leaves feminism itself
uninterrogated. Instead, Ang suggests that we “start from point zero and realise that there are moments at
which no common ground exists whatsoever, and where any communicative event would be nothing more
than a speaking past one another.” (1995:60). Ang totally rejects the possibility of a feminist collective
identity, but she does not deal with the practical implications of feminist ‘partiality’. Whilst it is agreed that
false notions of homogeneity in feminism/s must be avoided, feminist/s practice that is predicated in
‘partiality’ and ‘limitations’ would consistently seek to undermine itself. One cannot argue for rectification
of any kind of oppression or discrimination against any woman (or group of women) if the premise from
which one speaks is necessarily incomplete or lacks foundation. So while the issues that Ang articulates are
important, her solution is problematic in failing to theorise the practical dimension of feminist/s politics.
Another theoretical ‘resolution’ to feminist/s heterogeneity is simply to validify and accept difference: “The
point is neither to subsume other women under one’s own experience nor to uphold separate truth for them.
Rather, it is to allow them to be while recognising that what they are is just as meaningful, valid, and
comprehensible as what ‘we’ are.” (Mohanty in Flew et al 1999:401) This positions advocates a series of
collective identities that are separate but interact on a basis of equality that diffuses difference: “Equal
partnerships are built on mutual respect and an acknowledgement that it is possible to have an equal
exchange of ideas, with both parties learning equally from each other.” (Flew et al 1999:402) The proposal
of equality between groups and a respect for difference is a lovely idea, if a relativistic one, but it fails to
interrogate the practicality of dealing with difference. It assumes that people fit into neat and unproblematic
categories of ‘we’ and that the interactions between these categories are not contested or contradictory.
While it attempts to validify claims of difference, it is predicated on a contradictory notion of simplistic
collective identities.
The practical nature of feminist/s politics requires some notion of collective identity, a collective identity:
sisterhood must stick. To start we need to refocus on the similarities between women. Bulbeck comments
that “patriarchal structures are universal on the planet; there is no society where women are not subordinate
to men at least in some respects.” (1988:4) Therefore, “future possibilities for building global links are more
likely to be found through looking for commonalties of resistance rather than through assuming a sameness
of oppression.” (1998:402) This recognises gender as a social disadvantage, but does not presume it to be
the social disadvantage. A feminist collective identity that binds on similarities encompasses “those who see
gender as a major category of analysis, who critique female disadvantage, and who work to improve
women’s situations.” (Rupp & Taylor 1999:364)
                                                 
8 In discussing feminist collective identity I am overwhelmingly aware of my own subject position. As a white, Western, middle-
class woman, I am aware of the potential for self-interest in attempting to ‘make sisterhood stick’. Yet I do not believe that these
categories prevent me from theorising about the practice of feminism. Spivak argues that white women have a responsibility to
investigate and contemplate the position of Third World people and that they should both learn and critically reflect on their own
position as researcher. (in Bulbeck 1988:80). Similarly, Bulbeck asserts that “ white women must discover how their own
speaking position camouflages or inflects what they ‘see’ when studying third world women. As a result white women and third
world women will speak differently about the third world.” (1988:80) At the same time, I am aware of the paradox that  “If we
speak [only] for groups of which we are a member, in the upshot each individual may speak only for herself. If we refuse to speak
for others, we may refuse a powerful platform from which to support struggles against oppression” (Bulbeck 1998:208)
6Importantly though, an understanding of women cannot be disassociated from ‘difference’, particularly race
and class. Bulbeck comments that “The impediments to an international feminism are the differences
between women. The results of colonialism, slavery, racism, and imperialism seem to create hierarchies of
oppression, hierarchies in which some women benefit from the oppression of others.” (Bulbeck 1988:148)
Thus finding a way to “put a politics of difference into practice” requires not only that racist and
exclusionary presumptions are challenged and dismantled, but white race privilege itself must be
interrogated (Moreton-Robinson 2000:351).
One of the major contentions to emerge when conceptualizing feminist collective identity is the focus of
liberation: that is, is feminism about liberation for women or liberation for all? Bulbeck notes that feminism
focuses on fighting patriarchal forces, and, as such, on the relationship between men and women (1988:151).
Yet this does not preclude feminisms’ capacity to encompass an innate consideration of how class, race,
ethnicity, sexuality, location, religion or disability “intersect, reinforce and recreate each other” (Jeffreys
1991:5). Feminism/s should have at its core the liberation of all people, liberation for many women will not
be achieved by fighting sexist oppression alone, liberation has significance only if it takes place within a
feminist movement that has as its fundamental goal the liberation of all people.” (hooks 1981:13)
Rather than ‘partiality’ feminism/s requires flexibility. The flexibility to recognise and support difference
and contradiction, and the flexibility to adapt with context and time. Rather than exclude the individualistic
practice of DIY, feminism/s must counter it by encompassing it. And rather than implement practice and
ideology onto women, it must be constituted by the struggles of women. All women.
Feminism/s must reclaim sisterhood, sisterhood based on solidarity and the connections between women.
Bulbeck argues this is analogous to a patchwork quilt, “the web and quilt are made of threads that by
themselves are not strong. When stitched together, however, the web and quilt are strong, integrated and eye
pleasing wholes.” (Bulbeck 1988:153)
Conclusion
I’m with bell hooks, “sisterhood is still powerful” (hooks 2000:18). We just have to use it.
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8Public Land, Collective Identity and the State
Kristine Cruden
This conference paper aims to focus on an organisation which is part of the greater environment movement
and to use it as a case study to examine two aspects of social movement theory.  The organisation that will
be used as an example is PPL or People for Public Lands.  I will look at the views of different theorists of
social movements regarding the establishment and maintenance of ‘collective identity’ within a group and
test this against PPL.  I will also look at the relationship between social movements and the ‘state’ (referring
to Australian State and Federal Governments in this case) as expressed by different theorists and test these
theories against the practice, actions and motivations of PPL.  ‘Identity’ is a feature that most theorists agree
is present in social movements and necessary to their continuing viability.  Identity, along with culture and
communication, are key features of the new social movements (Nash, 2000: 102 and 103).  I will investigate
the way ‘collective identity’ occurs in social movements and melds together people of “different
orientations” which “involve multiple actors” in order to remain cohesive and effect public opinion in favour
of their cause (Melucci, 1995: 43).  For some social movement theorists the ‘state’ is somewhat irrelevant to
the activities and purpose of social movements.  PPL particularly focuses its activities at trying to influence
the ‘state’.  This examination of issues that are aspects of social movement theory is done in a specific
environment.  It is undertaken on a city based social movement in a Western liberal democracy and the
conclusions may not be applicable in other situations.
Who or What is PPL?
PPL was established in September 2001.  Their charter states that they are “a coalition of community action
groups, environmental organisations and local councils whose charter is to protect and preserve significant
public lands in public ownership for present and future generations” (Protectors of Public Lands Charter,
2001: 1).  Their charter goes on to say that: “public land belongs to the people”; that it is “held in trust for
the people”; and that all public land of ‘significance’ should be retained in public ownership.  The land is of
‘significance’ if it has “environmental, heritage, natural, cultural, social, historic, scientific, aesthetic,
ecological or indigenous value” and that the public benefit of retaining the land in public ownership is
greater than the benefits obtained to the public from the sale of the land
(www.nsw.nationaltrust.org.au/ppl.html).
This statement of what PPL stands for, and the land it believes is ‘significant’, still leaves a lot of
unanswered questions.  However, I think the intention of the organisation is relatively clear – to stop the sale
of State (meaning State and Federal Government) owned land and buildings that may be useful to the public.
One of the interesting things about this organisation is that it is made up of over forty (40) other groups
ranging from the Australian Conservation Foundation and the National Trust to the Friends of Quarantine
Station and the Rockdale Wetlands Preservation Society, and includes nine (9) metropolitan local councils
(www.nsw.nationaltrust.org.au/ppl.html).  This is, however, an extremely Sydney-centric organisation.
Their intention is primarily to protect the lands through legislative changes and to achieve this through using
social action and civil society debate to put pressure on the ‘state’.  While their aim to keep public land in
public ownership could place them in a socialist framework, their means of achieving this does not seek to
transform the existing power structures.  It places them, as Meyer and Tarrow would put it, as a group that
does not aim to change the system but wants to influence it (1998: 2).  The make-up of PPL is such that it
involves a diverse group of actors from a wide variety of organisations.  The development of a ‘collective
identity’ in these circumstances, on the surface, would seem difficult.  So did PPL look at the new social
movement’s textbook and say this is how we’ll do it?  If they did they may have had difficulty, as there are
differing views on what is required to establish a ‘collective identity’.
Collective Identity
According to Melucci ‘collective identity’ is the process of “repeated activation of the relationships that link
individuals (or groups)” that produce an “interactive and shared definition” (1995: 44).  Burgmann, too,
9believes that a group identity develops when individuals undertake action “directed toward the demand for
change”, but for her this is more a consequence of that prime desire than it is in Melucci’s view (Burgmann,
2003: 5).  Nash, like Melucci, writes that social movements are “more concerned with aspects of culture,
lifestyle and participation … rather than in claiming socio-economic rights” (2000: 102).   Most other social
movement theorists agree that culture and identity are important in the framing of social movements even
though they may have disagreements about their primacy.  PPL is made up of organisations with diverse
interests – some are interested in wetlands, some are interested in heritage sites.  It would seem that the
development of a ‘collective identity’ in these circumstances may be difficult.
It could be argued that class is a major factor in motivating the groups rather than ‘collective identity’.
Almost all the groups are situated in relatively affluent parts of Sydney.  The participants in these activities
are mostly well educated and well connected (see www.nsw.nationaltrust.org.au/pplmemgroup.html).  The
group has gained the support of the National Trust, the National Parks Association, the Sydney Harbour and
Foreshores Committee and a number of Councils.  But is this a class struggle or a struggle for cultural
identity?  Because the group wishes to retain public land in public ownership this seems somewhat
supportive of the idea of a class struggle.  Is this the middle class trying to retain their property values?  PPL
are not struggling for the retention of public land in working class areas (with the exception of the ADI site
and possibly another at Newcastle Harbour), they are struggling to retain land in predominantly middle class
areas.  A lot more could be said on the issue of class, but I will move on to look at whether aspects of culture
are a more likely basis for development of ‘collective identity’ within PPL.
A list of the groups that belong to PPL shows that they are extremely diverse
(www.nsw.nationaltrust.org.au/ppl.html).  However, by framing their objectives as broadly as retaining the
ownership of public lands in the hands of the public they have left space for very broad agreement.  Apart
from their interest in public land the cultures of the separate groups also have a number of things in
common.  Almost all groups share a concern for and interest in the environment and ecology.  In addition,
many of the groups share an interest in heritage and history.  In the groups where heritage and history are
not of prime importance these interests do not conflict.  In addition, it is reasonable to assume that many of
their members may also share an interest in these issues.   Finally, while the indigenous values of the sites
may not be the prime motivator of many of the groups in wishing to preserve public lands it is an aspect of
concern that many groups share.  So while all of the groups no doubt have their own cultural concerns none
of their concerns conflict or are likely to cause disruption to the framing of a ‘collective identity’ within PPL
as an organisation.  The groups themselves have all undertaken different sorts of protests and activities
which fit with Melucci’s thesis of “repeated activation of relationships” and may be reasonably thought,
along with their initial common concerns, to have developed ‘collective identity’ within their groups (1995:
44).
PPL as a group has also undertaken activities, which would assist the development of ‘collective identity’
within that organisation.  They have successfully encouraged member groups to attend rallies in support of
some of the other groups.  In the recent NSW State election PPL and its member groups invited all
candidates to sign a ‘pledge’.  The pledge asked candidates to “take all reasonable steps to follow and
implement the Charter [of PPL], support the passage of the Legislation, and help preserve significant public
lands in public ownership and control for present and future generations”
(www.nationaltrust.org.au/ppl.html).  In addition, PPL organised a rally, which was reported in the media,
where candidates who had signed the pledge were acknowledged.  Many of the constituent groups attended
this rally with their own banners and placards supporting their own causes as well as supporting PPL as a
whole.  Since the commencement of PPL two or three of the constituent groups have won their struggles and
the land in question has now been committed to remain in public ownership (see Callan Park [Special
Provisions] Act 2002 [NSW]).  To further support the argument that PPL has developed its own ‘collective
identity’ many members of these constituent groups who have won their struggle have gone on to remain
involved and active in PPL.
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It would be helpful here to also discuss some issues of the individual versus collective identity along with
the discussions covered by Burgmann, Inglehart, Martinez-Alier and others regarding ‘postmaterial values’
and the new middle class (Burgmann, 2003:18; Inglehart, 1997; Martinez-Alier, 2000: 153).  As time will
not allow that discussion I will now look at an issue I think is crucial to an activist organisation like PPL and
that is the interaction between social movements and the ‘state’.
Relationship to the ‘state’
For Melucci social movements are “above all, concerned with contestation in the cultural realm” they are
not concerned with “control through the state in citizenship rights” (Nash, 2000: 140 & 141).   Melucci
gives primacy to culture and importance to “struggles in civil society” (Nash, 2000: 138).  PPL are
concerned with cultural contestation and engaging with civil society through their rallies, petitions and
debate of their issues in the media.  However, one of their primary objectives is to gain legislative changes
by the ‘state’.  This is where I would take issue with Melucci that social movement struggles are primarily
concerned with the cultural realm.  As Nash writes, “social movements have always also engaged with the
state to a greater or lesser extent” (2000: 145).
While there is no arguing that these struggles are culturally based Melucci’s somewhat blinkered view of
involvement with the ‘state’ is not supported by many other social movement theorists.  Most theorists
would agree that the role of the ‘state’ has diminished in importance since the expansion of globalisation.
However, it is still a site of conflict for social movements (see Burgmann, Epstein and others).  “Most
people no longer accept the leading role of the state” (Touraine, 1995: 266).   Epstein says that new social
movements do not want political power or to restructure the economy but they are concerned with the
“defence and construction of community” (1995: 3).  She believes that class polarisation is increasing and
that social movements should not turn away from class as a means for change.  While the issues of class
were discussed earlier and remain unresolved PPL are certainly concerned with the defence of the
community.  Indeed, they have framed their struggle partly around the ties that the local communities have
to their land and that the wider community has to retain public ownership of public assets.
For Burgmann social movements may operate “within formal political channels” and are “directed toward
the demand for change” (2003: 4 and 5).  PPL, by gaining public support and by encouraging election
candidates to sign pledges supporting their charter, are clearly operating through “formal political channels”
(2003: 4). Meyer and Tarrow, too, say that social movements do not want to change the system but they
want to influence it (1998: 2). Indeed social protest is a “perpetual element in modern life” (Meyer and
Tarrow, 1998: 4).  Clearly, social movements are desirous of change and this is sometimes done via
interaction with the ‘state’ even if theorists like Melucci fail to acknowledge it.  Indeed, Nash says that
Melucci’s theory does not mean he has to ignore this aspect of social movements (2000: 145).
Touraine believes that, over time, social movements work towards general social transformation by gaining
control of ‘historicity’ (Nash, 2000: 133-135).  PPL specifically wishes to change government policy
regarding its handling of publicly owned land.  To do this they have raised the issue in the streets, in the
media and civil society.  Writers like Amanda Lohrey say that the environment movement has been
effective, at least but not only, within Western liberal democracies, in changing society’s values to support
environmental concerns (2002).  Groups like PPL have capitalised on this to push their case.  But it is surely
a chicken and egg situation?   It would difficult to establish whether the circumstances for social
transformation came as a result of the activities of environment movements or if the circumstances for social
transformation enabled the environment movement to be successful. However, the constituent groups of the
environment movement (like PPL) have no doubt contributed to this “control of….‘historicity’” as Touraine
calls it, which may lead to this transformation within their communities by challenging the norm of, in this
case, selling-off public assets when they are no longer needed for their original use (Nash, 2000: 133).
Touraine says conflicts are about “decision-making” and what PPL is trying to do is to change the method of
decision-making in relation to public lands (1974:17).
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Conclusion
The brevity of this presentation has allowed only a brief investigation of the issues raised.  However, the
conclusions I draw are that ‘collective identity’ is surely not an end in itself for social movements and
engagement with the ‘state’ can be productive in achieving change.  Finally, while the jury is still out on the
direct connection between social movements and general social transformation the work of social
movements no doubt contribute to that transformation.
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“Your movement’s making me sick!” The recent interaction of culture, civil society and the peace
movement
David Cummings
As Castells and Melucci have postulated, we are increasingly living in an age of information, a networked
society, in which symbolic messages jostle for our attention. Cultural identity is imagined, whereby
movements, organizations and individual agents battle to manipulate our perspective on what we believe,
and what we identify with. Social movements have to increasingly work with these precepts if they are to
achieve their ends, and I will try to look not just at some examples of what happened around the U.S.- Iraq
War, but also what positive direction social movements can assume in creating a cultural discourse in future.
Cultural identity has taken centre stage, and for an example we only have to look at the direction taken by
the Bush Administration and Pentagon prior to and during the Iraq attack, as one commentator said: “… the
stoking of jingoism, the ‘we-ism’ in the crowd, the intimidation of dissent – and the fear factor is there too.
The American flag acreage on display everywhere is a clear manifestation that we are dealing with psyops
targeting the home population. … Given that the war didn’t have an accepted justification, the propagandists
opted stress the ‘support our troops’ refrain, paralleling the ‘support our team’ chant. …When one watches a
sports game there is no need to think about the ‘why’ of anything; it is only an issue of ‘supporting our
team’...” 9
Whilst the Pentagon and Whitehouse had primed their audiences, the rest of the world’s electronically
connected population was unwilling to accept this course of action without interrogation. From the earliest
public indications of an impending attack on Iraq, international civil society reacted with outrage and
skepticism at the pretences for the proposed incursion across sovereign boundaries.
This occurred on two fronts based on historical references. As William Blum points out in his exposé of the
United States, since 1945 it has helped democracy with the attempted overthrow of 40 foreign governments
and attempted suppression of over 30 popular movements throughout the world.10 Previously, the U.S. had
been able to label its enemies under the guise of fighting Communism, but this time it rang hollow, and
smacked of imperialism.
Positive reaction to networked social movements
International mainstream media initially viewed the stated reasons for attacking Iraq with a healthy degree
of skepticism. Social movements such as the Win Without War11 coalition and United for Peace and
Justice12 countered the Bush Administration’s view through networked information resources and co-
ordinated international action such as protests, petitions and email campaigns that fed popular discussion.
What had been in recent tradition playing well to a U.S. audience, was virtually ridiculed by the rest of the
world. In succession, all except the last of the following reasons for attacking Iraq were defeated, inasmuch
as they failed to register within global civil society as plausible reasons to attack Iraq:
1. Iraq was disobeying the U.N. Resolution to document its inventory of WMD
2. Iraq was supporting terrorists
3. Iraq represented a regional/global security threat
4. Saddam Hussein was a madman/tyrant/dictator
5. Iraq had WMD, and was likely to supply them to terrorists
                                                 
9 The Hydra’s New Head: Propagandists and the Selling of the U.S.-Iraq War, Paul de Rooij, Counterpunch, 14/5/2003 at
http://www.counterpunch.org/rooij05142003.html
10 William Blum, Rogue State, Zed Books, London, 2002. p2.
11 www.winwithoutwarus.org
12 www.unitedforpeace.org
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6. Our troops will be fighting, so you’d better support them
It was consistently clear that Australian society did not support a war in Iraq, with poll after poll showing
that the public did not support the use of military, particularly Australian military, force to disarm Iraq – for
instance after Colin Powell’s address to the United Nations citing U.S. “evidence” of Iraq’s wrongdoing,
and again after John Howard’s impassioned case for war (the first time he admitted that Australian troops
were committed) over two-thirds of the surveyed population were still against war13.
The peace movement was winning the battle on the basis of fact, historical reference and appeals to
Australians’ sense of consensus, diplomacy and not being the aggressors in any conflict. Arguments also
played well in relation to our distrust of authority and the potential for an increased terrorism backlash. The
traditional questioning of U.S. motives, sharpened by recent impositions of lamb quotas, steel tariffs and
agricultural subsidies added to the conclusions that the story did not add up.
When the Australia-wide Walk Against the War coalitions took to the streets between February 14th and 16th,
they gathered massive public participation of over 500,000 people. This action was part of The World Says
“No” to War action, which had 10-million participants acting globally, and was the largest recorded global
action ever recorded.
The marches drew people from enormously diverse backgrounds, but they all identified with an Australia
that was not part of an invading force. As a dairy farmer from Victoria said during the Melbourne protest on
February 14th: “I just got sick of watching and whingeing about it… I had to do something about what is
happening in this world.”14
The size of the turnout to the February 16th march drew widespread positive publicity, including commercial
television networks and daily press coverage. The ninemsn.com.au poll of February 17th asked “Were you
moved by the weekend’s massive peace protests?” with 37,000 people, 58% agreeing. This continued the
sustained pressure that had been mounting on the Howard government, not the least of which was coming
from the media, smelling lies and keen to press the Prime Minister for an admission that Australian troops
were already committed to combat alongside the U.S.
Consistent with New Social Movement theory, there was a righteous and positive feeling amongst those
who had protested, that they had made a strong statement rejecting violence.
It was actions such as The World says “No” to War marches and Win Without War’s collection of over 1-
million signatures on e-mail petitions of peace within a 5-day period15 that undoubtedly helped persuade the
more democratic of the U.N. Security Council members to hold firm on a peaceful resolution of Iraq’s
disarmament.
Whilst this coalition had overwhelming unity on peacefully demonstrating against war in Iraq, it did so
without actually drawing together a cohesive identity – were these people opposing the war on the basis of
lifestyle? Because the U.S. only wanted oil? Because the U.S. was an imperialist? Or for the preservation of
life? Was it a trade union front? Or a bunch of hippies? Or was it trendy middle-class café society? This lack
of identity lent the Prime Minister additional credence when he referred to it as “the mob”, and it was
undoubtedly true that the collective action represented the perspectives of numerous movements all pushing
for one outcome of their differing agendas.
                                                 
13 E.g. after Colin Powell’s presentation of U.S. evidence to the U.N. to justify war with Iraq, the www.ninemsn.com.au poll
asked on 6/2/2003: “Does Powell’s evidence convince you that war is necessary?” “No” 43,207 (71%), “Yes” 20,773 (29%).
14 Arun Pradhan, Almost 1 million Australians march against war, Green Left Weekly, 19/2/2003 at
www.greenleft.org.au/back/2003/526/526p3.htm
15 Emergency Appeal to U.N. Security Council, at www.winwithoutwarus.org/html/action.past.html
14
This action was successfully built-upon on the 18th of March when protesters climbed then painted the “No
War” slogan onto the main sail the Sydney Opera House just prior to the commencement of hostilities. This
was a massive symbol to the worldwide peace movement, with syndicated news coverage (such as BBC,
CNN, Yahoo, Sky News, etc.) dispersing the sense of solidarity amongst the movement. Adding to the
comic sense of occasion and coverage was the sheer durability of the tiling paint applied!
In the local civil context, this again appealed the Australian anti-authoritarian streak – it was pure
larrikinism, with intent. It was peacefully carried out, and the protesters readily “surrendered” to the Police
Rescue Squad, and duly showed contrition. Were it not for the outright embarrassment caused to the anti-
terrorism authorities, it would have been readily adopted into popular folklore, however it did rankle
conservative elements of the state and media.
On Wednesday, 19th of March Greenpeace initiated another excellent action when it symbolically placed the
Prime Minister under house arrest at Kirribilli, dressing-up vehicles and themselves as U.N. Officials, and
pointing out his detention for breaches of articles 2(4), 42 and 51 of the UN Charter. This action was again
beautifully timed to work-in with breakfast TV and radio programming, and did not cause any civil
disturbance, yet strongly demonstrated Australia’s contravention of U.N. principles and commanded
coverage because of its pure spectacle.
Unfortunately by this time Federal Cabinet had approved the decision to commit Australian troops to war,
which tactically shifted the momentum back to the government’s favour – with voters urged to support the
troops even if they did not support the decision committing them to war.
It was at this point that social movements’ collective action started to be counterproductive in making a
positive changes to public perception on the war in Iraq. Protesters failed to take account of the mood swing
that would occur now that troops were actually committed to war, or failed to take account of the way their
actions could be used against the movement in general.
Examples of negative outcomes in civil society
In this age of media symbolism and compression of stories into mere seconds, protestors have to be super-
aware of how their actions will be portrayed, and how hegemonic interests can portray their actions – they
have to be aware of Castells’ “real virtuality” whereby what we see is what is real:
The Books Not Bombs student protest in Sydney on March 27th occurred with the war well under way, and
surrounded by considerable public debate as to whether secondary school students should be allowed to
strike and march. Police Commissioner Dick Adams had lied to the media the previous day, saying that the
student organisers had not obtained a permit for the march, and saying that they expected trouble. This was a
situation ripe for exploitation by the Police and media, knowing that they would potentially be dealing with
young, earnest but inexperienced protestors, who could be provoked into “offensive behaviour”.
The Walk Against the War Coalition was forced to condemn the Books Not Bombs protest, passing a
resolution which in part stated "The lack of positive co-operation . . . to provide effective marshals and
sound equipment and to abide by the agreed plan for the protest led to the injury of students and the
diversion of public attention from the war to 'student violence'."
Thus the lead up to the following Books Not Bombs protest on April 2nd generated more hysteria and debate
about further violence and the democratic worth of protests - from the Police, NSW Premier, parents groups
and the Lebanese Muslim Association of Australia - than it generated about the positive message of peace 16.
The intended message was twisted into conventional debates about ethnicity and student troublemakers.
                                                 
16 'Student' march to defy Police, Kara Lawrence & Rachel Morris, The Daily Telegraph, 2/4/2003
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Overall, the Books Not Bombs episodes had very negative consequences for the ability of the peace
movement, and organised social movements generally, to communicate through protest marches, with
renewed calls for strict controls on protests in future.
The Greenpeace protest on Sydney Harbour had a similar unfortunate effect  – which, given the response to
the Books Not Bombs protest, should have been anticipated. It was a case of the best of symbolic intentions
failing to align with the cultural identity and meanings of society in general, resulting in a good cause having
a negative effect with virtually all sections of the mainstream media condemning the action. The Sydney
Morning Herald later commented:
“…In Australia, the rearguard action of behalf of Saddam's regime was fought by Greenpeace… Last
Tuesday, as HMAS Sydney was leaving Sydney Harbour en route for duty off Iraq, where it will protect the
shipping that will bring most of the humanitarian aid to Iraq, a flotilla of 20 small craft and motorised
rubber dinghies broke through a cordon of water Police craft and sailed in front of the warship…
Greenpeace activists had dragged a heavy chain across the passage where HMAS Sydney was sailing,
which would have caught and wrecked the propellers, immobilising the ship… Greenpeace operates like the
fedayeen. Under the flag of feel-good, save-the-planet environ-mentalism is a harder-edged organisation
which financially supports corporate-hating, military-loathing, anti-globalisation, anti-capitalist
fundamentalists whose highest priorities are neither green nor peaceful.17
The Herald had been amongst the more impartial to the peace movement, indicating that activity such as this
can not only alienate the usual ideologically-opposed segments, but can also have a counter-productive
influence on those that are normally sympathetic. It actually marginalises the movement more, because in
making its statement, it is attacking symbols that form part of Australian social identity.
Avoiding counter-productive movement
These cases indicate that Australian civil society does not react well to the following:
1. Blocking the movement of armed/Police/emergency services that are “doing their job” – Mass media
(especially talkback radio) in Australia, and Australia’s “ANZAC spirit” (I use it advisedly) mean
that these groups are accorded great nobility in doing their jobs, and also ironically assume the status
of “Aussie battler”.
2. Endangering or injuring armed/Police/emergency services personnel – this is frowned upon by most
elements of civil society in Australia, and will almost certainly lead to wide perceptions of the
protesting group being labelled as trouble-makers. Whilst this in itself can be aspirational for
members of the group, it is hard in a mediatised age to see it being beneficial for their cause.
3. Likely to cause serious damage - and even worse serious cost - to the taxpayer – nothing stokes the
flames of ignorance and outright rejection (ie. Talkback radio and the Murdoch press) more than the
idea that the public is paying the price of someone else’s indulgence.
4. “Extremist behaviour ” that society finds hard to accept as civil – in addition to rioting and damage,
people sewing their lips together, people causing self-harm, laying chain in front of departing ships
(that will also cost the taxpayer money!) – whilst demonstrative of the depth of feelings held by
protesters, can alienate the movement with the wider public, especially if unsupported by
communication of their perspective.
                                                 
17 Here they lie, the heroes of evasion, Paul Sheehan, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14/4/2003
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5. Taking radical action “after the horse has bolted” – there comes a point where “giving everyone a
fair go” gives way to “obey the referee’s decision”. Trying to obstruct state actions when the to do so
is to make a moot point.
Moving forward using networked communication
Social movements must take a positive posture on the issue of cultural communication – Why? Because
established hegemonies such as the U.S. Department of Defense are actually deploying additional resources
to the psychological warfare and media management sectors –these institutions see the fundamental need to
manipulate culture through communication networks such that its agendas are part of its subjects’ imagined
worlds. Mixing the metaphors of Castells, and The Matrix, people and movements have to enter and
participate in the Matrix/programmed society in order to define themselves and society itself.
Accordingly I would suggest that the following actions are more likely to receive positive acceptance and
aid the incorporation projects into social discourse, with particular reference to Australian culture:
1. Action where visual communication is clear, and unable to be misrepresented. Clear symbolism must
be used to minimize the scope for distortion of a movement’s agenda by ill-informed or ill-
intentioned media - The message must basically be obvious, and the less variance in the message, the
better.
Think back to what you remember most about the peace protests, and amongst others you will undoubtedly
recall the “John Howard kissing butt” sculpture – whereby the little on a leash dog ran up the backside of
George W. Bush. – It was a vividly clear symbol, it got widespread coverage, it was in keeping with a
culture of larrikinism and satire, but it didn’t harm or damage anything except the fatuous notion that the
Australian government was acting independently of U.S. policy.
2. Work with the cultural vernacular – use the elements and symbols that are already laden with social
significance. Springboard the movement’s agenda by attaching it to other widespread existing
beliefs.
Consider the nature of our national icons and clichés – sport; the “ANZAC spirit”; “Aussie ingenuity”;
brutal honesty; distrust of politicians/authority; larrikinism, sarcasm and irony; “a fair go”; and a “sunburnt”
or “clever” country – and consider how to appropriate them for the movement. How can the movement
leverage these images to plant strong symbolic seeds?
3. Social movements must provide thoroughly researched, reasoned information to the public – it must
be credible, it must be rigorous, and it should aspire to have a longer memory than corporate media.
Our society operates on information, and everyone wants to feel that there is a rational reason for
holding a position.
Within this most recent context, many within society were prompted by the debate to go and find additional
information on web-sites, or from organized movements – a great deal of credibility for the anti-war case
was built simply by referring to the historical foreign policy interventions of the U.S. in the middle-east, the
fact that it sold chemical and biological weapons ingredients to Iraq, the fact that it had assisted Iraq to use
them on Iranians, and that it had largely destroyed Iraq’s armed forces and WMD stockpiles during the 1991
war. Furthermore we could see the U.S. historical behavior regarding oil.
Ideally social movements and NGOs should turn institutionally-generated data to their advantage, creating
alternative interpretations and analyses to defeat the prevailing “right-thinking” views.
4. Web-based communication allows timely and cost-effective dissemination and collation of
information within networked movements, and facilitates movement of knowledge outside the
immediate collective.
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Social movements can leverage their resources by taking the collective knowledge of many individuals,
movements, NGOs and independent media outlets, and using it to influence and inform the subject
discourse. It can also facilitate low-cost global dialogue, co-ordination and mobilization.
5. Media needs to be spoon-fed information, and scrutinized for its ethics. The speed at which
investigative journalism must be conducted is such that the depths of issues are seldom reported,
with everyone looking for the current situation – the “what?” – rather than the “why?” Therefore the
full story, with digests needs to be fed to media outlets.
It is too easy to for media to give glib answers or comments that are largely unsubstantiated – in fact they
are doing this when they simply report the words of those in power. It is interesting to note that Paul
Wolfowitz (U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense) now candidly admits “For bureaucratic reasons, we settled
on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on”18.
Everyone else in the world was under the naïve impression that WMDs were the democratic reason for
going to war!
6. I would suggest that direct action should be witnessed or recorded by members of the movement
itself – corporate media cannot be trusted to either fully or fairly cover events. Furthermore it is
questionable whether Police forces can be trusted to do anything other than testify for the state, as
opposed to testifying the truth.
The March 27th Books Not Bombs protest is an example where independent verification was required to
disprove the allegations of the Police, the Premier and the corporate media. The only way to disprove such
versions of events is to “show people with their own eyes.”
7. Rational appeals to change social perspectives should be supplemented by emotional appeals that
increase empathy with the subject at-hand. Graphic, manipulative images are used every day by
capitalist forces, and should similarly be employed to break through to society’s consciousness – to
“imagine if you were in their shoes”.
In an increasingly fragmented, selfish world, people need to be reminded of others’ circumstances. By
reducing these messages to the level where they connect at an individual level, we can aspire to make
individuals search their feelings beyond the networked society, and to act according to their true selves.
                                                 
18 WMDs only ‘bureaucratic reason’ for war: Wolfowitz, remarks made to Vanity Fair July 2003 issue, reported in the Sydney
Morning Herald, 29/5/2003
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Civil Society & Social Movement Mobilisation
Robert Day
Both political opportunity and collective identity theories were developed, some years apart, to attempt to
explain social movement mobilisation, and the reason it occurred at certain moments is history and not
others. Both models present useful insights and analytical tools, but fail to present a complete picture of the
phenomena they attempt to explain. The theory of political opportunities structure (hereafter POS) has been
criticised for its dependence on rational and instrumental mechanisms in response to environmental
constraints. (For instance, Melucci 1995, p 46; Polletta & Jasper 2001, p 1 of 18) Meanwhile, “too often
collective identity has been invoked simply to fill gaps left by structuralist, state- centred, or rational choice
models, in the process reproducing the very dichotomies the concept is supposed to challenge.” (Polletta &
Jasper 2001, p 12 of 18)
The mass mobilisation of anti-war movements in the weeks preceding the recent invasion of Iraq by US led
forces highlights the weaknesses of both political opportunity and collective identity theories. Firstly, there
was no single collective identity that united protesters. Rather the mobilisation, particularly the larger
demonstrations, consisted of a large number of divergent groups that, in the Australian case, ranged from the
anti – Immigration movement to the ‘no-one is illegal’ [pro-refugee] collective. Moreover, as the leaders of
the countries involved had already expressed their intention not to be swayed by public protests the
possibility of achieving change, and thus the political opportunities, were far too slim for POS theory to
provide an accurate explanation of this particular mobilisation.
One of the greatest problems with both political opportunity and collective identity theories is that they take
a value neutral approach to social movement mobilisation. At the very least they assume that potential
participants necessarily agree with the social movement’s position from the outset. At the extreme they
impose rigid models of mobilisation based on instrumental criteria, such as increased opportunities or
feelings of commonality and compulsion as a result of identity, with no regard for the issue at hand and the
perceived value of the social movement’s position.
Polletta and Jasper argue that, “’Moral shocks’ produced, for example, by a photograph of a tortured animal
or the disaster at Three Mile Island can mobilise people who do not know the each other or organisers.”
(2001, p 7 of 18) This thesis provides a clearer explanation of recent anti-war mobilisation, people took to
the streets because they thought that the planned invasion was wrong, and they felt strongly enough to want
to do something about it. I have used italics here to emphasis the subjective and dynamic nature of these
elements rather than structural or instrumental focus of other models of mobilisation.
Naturally it would be foolish to think that the global, coordinated mass mobilisations against the war were a
result solely of individual value judgements, nor are they simply the aggregation of these personal feelings.
Rather such a substantial mobilisation requires that these individual thoughts and feelings are connected,
encouraged and developed. Moreover supporters must be convinced that they should participate in social
movement mobilisation and those who are unsupportive or uncertain must be convinced of the value of the
movement’s perspective and aims.
Davenport and Eads (2001) propose a useful model for explaining how this is achieved. They argue that
successful movements disseminate political messages throughout society that are diagnostic/ prognostic and
that highlight agency and identity. That is, they present an analysis of what is wrong in a given situation,
who is to blame, and what will happen if nothing is done, and emphasise the ability of individuals, through
social movements, to make a difference. (Davenport & Eads 2001, p 152)
The way these messages are received will have a substantial impact on the success of any given social
movement. “How successfully groups frame their identities for the public thus affects their ability to recruit
members and supporters, gain a public hearing, make alliances with other groups and diffuse opposition.”
(Polletta & Jasper 2001, p 10 of 18)
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Of course, social movements are not the only groups seeking to their perspective of the situation accepted by
society. To draw on the recent anti-war movement again; for months, even years, those in favour of the
invasion had been attempting to gather support for their action presenting messages about weapons of mass
destruction, human rights and democracy to name a few. Those who took to the streets in opposition to the
war had weighed up these messages, and those presented by the anti-war movement and had decided that the
anti-war movement’s analysis was more valid, and that the situation was important enough to justify their
mobilisation.
Thus, we observe that “the struggle between states and movements takes place not only in the streets but in
contests over meaning.” (Tarrow 1998, p 22) This perspective does not dismiss completely the theories of
collective identity or political opportunity, these contests over meaning will be shaped by the identities of
movements and individual citizens, as well as by the political opportunities available to different groups at
any given time.
This contest over meaning must take place in civil society because it is the common ground in which both
social movements and state elites have ties, and from which both draw support. As Alberto Melucci as
pointed out in any political contestation there is, “a public which has to side with one pf the play’s main
characters.” (1988, p 245) Moreover, social movements themselves inhabit and constitute civil society while
state elites, especially in liberal democracies but to a lesser extent elsewhere, rely on civil society to
legitimate their possession and use of power. Thus civil society “does not so much lie outside political
power but rather penetrates it deeply,”  (Casquette 1996, p 212) and his presents a substantial opportunity to
social movements.
This provides us with a more complete picture of social movement mobilisation people choose whether to
support a social movement, become actively involved in it, remain passive or even actively oppose it based
on how they interpret the range of messages and frames they encounter on the given issue in their everyday
experiences that is in civil society.
Of course, the reality is not as simple as a social movement and a group of elites presenting conflicting
messages. The two groups will adapt and change their messages in response to the other’s and the result of
contentious action. Moreover, any form of collective action, or even the presence of contentious political
messages, will result in a number of messages from third parties in support of, or opposition to, those
presented by the parties involved in the original confrontation. This contention may also inspire the birth of
related or counter-movements. This dovetails with the concept of ‘cycles of contention’ that is part of the
repertoire of political process theory, that “particularly if collective action succeeds, these opportunities
produce broader cycles of contention that spread from movement activists to those they oppose, to ordinary
interest groups and political parties, and, inevitably, to the state.” (Tarrow 1998, pp 23 -24. See also; Tilly
1999, p 268)
Meyer and Tarrow’s conception of the professionalisation of social movements further supports my
argument that successful social movement mobilisation is dependent of successful contention around
meaning in civil society. They argue that where no mass party or organisation exists movement campaigns
rely on a small core of experienced activists who draw in “a much larger penumbra of usually inactive
citizens.” (Meyer & Tarrow 1998, pp 16 - 18. Quote taken from p 18)Successfully ‘drawing in’ usually
inactive citizens requires overcoming competing political messages, and convincing people that the
campaign is worth fighting, it is the core of experienced activists that coordinates the contestation of
meaning in civil society .
The model of contention over meaning within civil society also helps to overcome one of the major flaws
within the theory of political opportunity structure. This theory assumes that potential activists and social
movements alike possess perfect knowledge of the opportunities available to them, and perfect mobility to
respond to them. Neither people nor movements possess this perfect knowledge, but it is conceivable that
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some activists will be aware of an opportunity, and that they will be able to mobilise supporters from other
movements and civil society at large by presenting a new series of political messages that identify this
opportunity and explain its importance. Furthermore the civil society model does not assume a rational,
objective choice as the basis for the decision to mobilise, but rather leaves room for people to make a
judgement not just on the opportunities available to them, but on their own feelings about the campaign they
are invited to embark on.
This model also allows for that fact that even when considering various frames and messages people do not
necessarily make entirely rational choices. Any number of irrational factors may influence a person’s
decision to engage in collective action, to remain neutral or oppose it, for instance prejudice, bias or
indifference. Moreover, as Sidney Tarrow has pointed out contentious politics is “culturally inscribed and
socially communicated,” (1998, p 20) therefore people’s response to the political messages of social
movements may be influence by these predetermined attitudes to specific issues or methods of collective
action.
Shared identity will naturally also play a role in the dissemination of, and response to the various messages
contained in civil society. Indeed as Melucci has argued, collective identity “cannot be separated from the
production of meaning in collective action.” (1995, p 42) Collective identity can be used to mobilise
previously unengaged groups by convincing them that the movement represents them or to draw on people’s
“affective connections” to group members in order to encourage or obliged them to become active. (Polletta
& Jasper 2001, pp 5-6 of 18. Quote from p 6.)
Nevertheless collective identity has its limits as a mobilising technique for social movements. Firstly, a
movement mobilised solely on the grounds of collective identity may have difficulty mobilising sufficient
support from civil society to achieve the desired change. “From the perspective of the fat acceptance
movement, for example, it would be desirable if more average-weight people perceived discrimination
against fat people from a more inclusive civil-rights perspective: that is, in terms of a violation of the rights
of fellow citizens which demands a collective response from society at large.” (Sturmer et al. 2003, p 9 of
12)The latter, broader based, alternative is not only more likely to result in greater support from civil society
but may also result in more significant social change if the issue successfully becomes seen as an issue for
all of society, not just over-weight people.
A movement mobilised by a too strictly defined collective identity can hamper its own success by reducing
the number of potential allies and its ability to co-ordinate with other groups. Ashok Swain, in a study of
social movements in different regions of the Indian state of Orissa, concluded that “strong communal ties
prevented [social movements] from coming together” in order to “expand and sustain [collective action] for
a decisive result.” (Swain 2000, p 43)On the contrary groups with looser internal ties, but links with other
groups were more able to achieve sustained and successful collective action. (Swain 2000, pp 34, 42, 43.)
Similarly, Polletta and Jasper cite a study of a strike by child care workers in Germany, that failed as a result
of “organisational insularity.” (2001, p 10 of 18)
Thus we can see that while collective identity may be useful in disseminating messages in civil society, it is
necessary to not only be heard but also to successfully engage groups and individuals beyond this collective
identity. This validates the model I have proposed of mobilisation being the result of contention over
meaning in civil society.
Of course this model raises questions about possible tensions between principle and strategy. I do not seek
to provide an answer to these questions here, rather to attempt a better explanation of how movements are
mobilised. Nevertheless, Polletta and Jasper have argued that it is possible to achieve a balance between
these two, and that indeed “Strategic choices are not simply neutral decisions about what will be most
effective … they are statements about identity,” (Polletta & Jasper 2001, p 8 of 18) which we have
established is an important aspect of the messages presented to civil society.
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Whether or social movements choose a more strategic approach to developing messages and means of
contention this model is important in that it shows that social movement mobilisation is not just the result of
opportunities or identity, but also of an analysis by members of the public of various messages presented by
social movements, state elites and other parties on a particular issue.
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Can an Australian Rap Fan be a Social Actor in the African-American Social Movements?
Jodi Fawley
I live in the Sydney North Shore suburb of Northbridge. In many ways it is a white middle class enclave,
comparable to places like Cabramatta that are identified with a specifically represented ethnic group. Gated
primarily by the inflated property prices, it is a location that marks a territory principally for the white
middle class.  It is not a place of  African-American movements. Or is it? Radio, television, film and Internet
increasingly constitute a large portion of the sonic and visual landscapes of our suburban lives. In our lounge
rooms and in our cars we are presented texts that take us beyond our local environments, into the places of
other nations.  This paper will explore the position of a fan of rap music, physically located beyond the
cultural and political circumstances that drive sustained action for the movements of African-Americans. It
will analyze whether such a fandom can indicate membership, as a social actor, in this group and in doing so
illuminate the boundaries of movement activity in an information society.
The primary action of rap music is the insertion of the voice of African-Americans into the racially divided
hegemonic culture. Kristal Brent Zook states: ‘Both the form and content of rap express black autonomy,
self-determination, and cultural pride’ (Brent Zook 1992, p263). This is the field of action. This movement
seeks recognition above all else, in order to disburse cultural discrimination and its material effects. Alberto
Melucci states that three orientations are required for collective action to occur. Firstly he states the actor
must have ‘a relationship to the ends of the actions (the sense the action has for the actor)’.   The fan can be
conceived as part of the process of change that allows the voice to be heard. Secondly Melucci states that an
actor must relate ‘to the means (the possibilities and the limits of the action).’  So the fan, through
acknowledgement actively confers recognition. The fan is spatially positioned to receive or hear that voice,
but delimited by geographical boundaries. Thirdly the social actor must have a ‘relationship to the
environment (the field in which the action takes place)’ (Melucci 1995, p44). Displacement from the field of
action is problematic in the sense that spaces of African-Americans are still a long way from the Australian
suburbs. However if the field of action that this movement operates in is an information or network
environment then the parameters of inclusion for an Australian fan consequently change.
In the global world there is an increasingly important relationship between the local places that we live and
the global influences in our lives. As Doreen Massey(1994) argues the local can now be filled with places,
spaces, and experiences that colour our lives and link us to origins beyond our specific locale. Our ability to
make global our local experience is dependent on the shift to an information society. Information networks
are more than just the infrastructures that allow information exchange. They allow a way of living that
collapses space and time and structures the environments that shape our lives (see Foucault 1998).  Manuel
Castells argues ‘the media, particularly the radio and the television, have become the audiovisual
environment with which we interact endlessly and automatically’ (2000, p362). Rap’s mainstream or core in
the twenty-first century is the popular format presented in forums such as televisual worlds, radio
broadcasting, and internet formats. In these places, which are the most likely to enter our local worlds, we
hear the voice of African-Americans. Rapper Chuck D, from the group Public Enemy has politically
positioned this music in this audiovisual environment in his statement that MTV is the Black man’s CNN
(Stapleton 1998, p222). This is strategic use of a communication tool to disseminate information beyond a
local experience and the fan is the active receiver of that information.
As the voice of such a community that engages in sustained political action there is no doubt that hip-hop
from within marginalized black groups signifies an important element of identity. It acts as an element of
identity formation in both its production and its consumption. The relationship between these two features
gave the movement a series of self proclaimed vanguard intellectuals (Gilroy 1993, p34) and a collective
group who sought to have ‘their territories acknowledged, recognized, and celebrated’(Rose in Neal 1999,
p136). The production of the music has seen distribution of the experience of African-American lives, from
the ghettoes and urban spheres and the types of power relations and oppression at play within that
experience.  This work generates a collective operating in a space ‘that directly assert and defend both
23
equality and the rights and freedom of the Subject’(Touraine 2000, p93). The fan acknowledges, recognizes
and celebrates these experiences making them a distinctive part of the collective.
The movement, as a cultural end in itself, seeks to create a counter space to the racialised contexts that still
operate in African-American lives (Gilroy 2001). By engaging with this musical form the recognition of the
problems and politics of this group is carved out. This draws this movement into comparison with other
cross border collaborative efforts that are ‘diffused across national boundaries and states’ (Tarrow 1996,
p52). In the same way that the internet is used in anti-global campaigns to reach a broad transnational base,
this music reaches the fan transnationally (see Ribeiro 1998; Smith & Smythe 2001; Uhlin, Piper &
Lindquist 2002).  The fan engages with music that is a political force demanding change, primarily African-
American change, in our Australian suburban spheres.
When fans engage with that experience they become part of the structure of a social movement.  Ron
Aminzade and Doug McAdam (2001) argue that if we were to dissect the membership of a social
movement, we would find that there is an enormous range in the degree to which participants engage and are
recognizably active in the movement. In fact for a movement to attain success ‘the largest single group are
emotionally only superficially and sporadically engaged by the struggle’(p27). Certainly fans fit into this
category. This is comparable to individual participation in the environment movement by actively recycling,
reducing and reusing. So for the fan of the rap artist, although not operating at the coalface of the
contentious politics, emotionally engaging with the music brings the individual into the spectrum of the
African-American movements.
There are a number of other circumstances under which the fan may become a social actor. As a concert
participant, the fan is comparable to the partaker in marches and rallies such as the traditional Palm Sunday
marches. In that space, a series of speakers address pertinent issues to the gathered crowd, capitalizing on
the physical presence of those engaged by the politics of the peace movement. Tricia Rose articulates rap
concerts as potent political spaces. She states: ‘rap groups use live performance settings to address current
social issues, media miscoverage, and other problems that especially concern black America’ (1994, p134).
Duncan Thompson argues, in reference to the politicisation of the environment movement and music
festivals, that the lyrics in these spaces are less important than the coming together or collectivity of the
event (1999, p46-7). In this way the fan becomes a social actor, a participant in the process of generating
resistance.
Physical separation is intrinsic to being a fan in Australia; so easy access to such political spaces that allows
a social actor to engage directly with the African-American movements is denied. It is true that the hip-hop
scene in Australia, as a transnational node, is thriving. Here a grassroots, or underground component,
operates with the black American style of music but reflects concerns of local urban youth. Tony Mitchell
refers to this as a ‘glocal’ subculture, a new hybrid formation, blending the two features to form something
new (Mitchell 1999, pp126-141). In this way the cultural code that African-American music challenges is
transferred to a new space. The marginalized voice, previously silenced in a dominant culture is now being
heard. In this space the fan can operate as a social actor for local resistance, but is removed from the core
African-American forum. Hip-hop and rap as a subculture spawned a range of other activities that are
symbolic of shared identity between varieties of social actors.
Dance, along with clothing style and body language, is one of the recognizable aspects of the hip-hop
subculture. However, does the Mosman ballet school’s street funk and hip-hop dance classes constitute part
of a shift in master codes (Kelly 2003, pers.com)?  In this way certain international forms are adapted to a
local sphere that entered through ‘electronics and telematics’ (Garcia Canlini 2001, p499). This changes that
particular cultural representation by changing the context, but retains some of its essentialism. It could be
said that white middle class children acting out a African-American rhythm or dance challenge a master
code. The use of these symbols of the African-American movements ‘implies cultural changes’ however this
is entirely dependent on ‘uses different actors assign to them’ (Garcia Canlini 2001, p497). An element of
engagement with the sustained politics does not occur when mimicry of dance, clothing styles or body
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language and expression are orchestrated. The agency of those involved needs to be activated toward the
common collectivity in order for true change to occur.
The size and shape of a social movement is an unbounded form. Social movements across time and space
can have a huge variety of organizations, subcultures, hardcore activists and single episode participants.
While at the centre sit perhaps very clear goals, or even not so clear goals, consciousness about action is
implicated in all of the situations reviewed so far. Melucci states that ‘collective identity presupposes, first, a
self-reflective ability of social actors’ (1995, p46). In this spectrum of who make up a social movement, the
fan of popular African-American music sits at the very edge or boundary. The largest single factor in
drawing a line between the fan and the boundary of the social movement is the question of self-
consciousness. Melucci states that ‘collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by
several individuals’ (1995, p44).  The problem here lies in whether the fan consciously commits to activity
that recognizes the change in which they are participating.
It is probable that most white middle class rap fans would not be able to articulate a position as a member of
the African-American movements seeking recognition. However the sheer numbers of fans and the
permeation of rap into mainstream pop music is indicative of the existence of a ‘submerged
network’(Melucci in Nash 2000, p139-140). This is a network that operates in the day to day of life rather
than as the militant activity of a social movement. Such a fan network is a vital part of quietly changing
ways of living (p140). These actors may not be able to place themselves in the movement, but their
belonging may be deduced through articulation as a fan that allows identification and acceptance by others
who share their views (p 139). The consumption of music that is in itself is contentious is at one level
empowering for the fans breaking from dominant codes. These voices of African-American situations have
spaces in which to operate that shift dominant ways of knowing.
This study of started with the question of whether the fan is a social actor. No definitive answer can truly be
given to this question. As shown here it is largely a matter of circumstance and consciousness that really
guide social action. The fan in the right place and the right time can easily be articulated as a social actor.
However that action more often than not is a dormant variety. The fan has much in common with other
momentary social actors. Instead of acting at the heart of the social movement, they act at the very edges and
the problem with defining the fan rests partially in the problem of defining what the boundary of the social
movement is in the first place. In most situations they are not likely to identify themselves as part of an
active movement. But as free loaders they perform a very important element is the success of change. They
make up the amorphous mass that drifts rather than drives society toward a different space than yesterday.
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The Dammed: Political Opportunities and Cycles of Contestation.
Rebecca Garden
The political process model establishes social movements as arising in alignment with the nation state, while
also looking at the role that the state plays in influencing or supplying opportunities for social movements.
This paper takes the political process model and seeks to apply it to global governance, while I do not argue
that the institutions of global governance such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO are the new nation states
of globalisation, I do argue that they, similar to states, create their own forms of subjectivity and
legitimation. Taking concepts from the political process model such as cycles of contention and opportunity
structures I will examine how the current global system provides opportunities for contestation. I will use a
case study the Narmada Valley Development Project in India to illustrate how the policies of global
institutions are providing opportunities for contestation. This paper examines the interaction between social
movements and the system of capitalism, arguing that this is not a static interaction but a dynamic process,
while also examining why this is not transferring into global cycles of contention.
One of the reoccurring themes in Political Process theory is that of political opportunities, Tarrow states that
one form of political opportunity can be policy specific opportunities, how the policy of a particular political
institution influences and structures collective action, moving social actors around a specific issue (Tarrow
1998). One such policy that has played a role in constructing opportunities or necessity for action is that of
the World Bank and IMF’s policy based lending or Structural Adjustment Loans. This policy is based on the
premise that neo liberal market ideologies are the best means for a country to improve its standard of living
and become ‘developed’; this means that when lending money these institutions attach conditions. These
conditions mean that governments must privatise national facilities such as water, education, hospitals and
energy, often leading to increases in prices and making it unaffordable for the most vulnerable members of
society. (Mosley, Harrigan & Toye 2001)
One such example is the Narmada Dam Project in India, a large infrastructure project financed by the World
Bank; this project lead to the displacement of indigenous tribes who live and subsist along the Narmada
River, whose homes were flooded to make way for the Sardar Sarovar dam. The Narmada Valley
Development Project in India is a World Bank funded project which aims to construct 30 large dams, 135
medium dams and 3,000 small dams along the Narmada River of which the $1.8 billion Sardar Sarovar Dam
is the largest (Smith 1999). In 1985 the national government borrowed money from the World Bank to begin
construction, with the aim of providing water to arid parts of India for drinking water and irrigation for
crops. The 140 metre high dam is in Gujarat, the main beneficiary of the irrigation scheme, but the 37,000
hectares that will be flooded by the reservoir lie mostly in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. While
numbers of those displaced vary between 100,000 and 20,000 those mostly effected by the dam are tribal
farmers, who when moved to less fertile land will find it difficult to maintain their previous livelihoods. (De
Selincourt 1993)
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The lack of remuneration offered by the government, mass displacement and the lack of consultation has
lead to the formation of the social movement Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada Movement) or
NBA. There has been grassroots support from those effected by the dam but also wide spread international
support by NGO’s such as AID/WATCH, Bretton Woods Project and 50 years is enough: U.S Network for
Global Economic Justice. In response to the rising height of the dam and issues over resettlement NBA
organised a variety of actions in February such as marches, dharnas (sit-ins) and fasts that continued
through the spring and summer. In July a seven year old girl died when she become mired in slit deposited
by dam construction. Also in July a small group of villagers and activists announced a satyagraha (non-
violent mass action) campaign, the group occupied two threatened houses, they stood in rising water and
refused to move, opposing the “unjust submergence” (The Sardar Sarovar Dam: A Brief Introduction 2002)
and had to be forcibly removed by police, once released they again reoccupied a building with the water
rising up to their necks before again being forcibly removed.
While the protests did not stop the building of the dam they did highlight how these large infrastructure
projects unequally impact on poorer members of society and the inadequacy of the regulations that govern
resettlement. Under pressure not just from the NBA but also from international NGO’s the World Bank was
forced to commission an independent review committee, the Morse Commission. This was the first
independent review of any of the Banks funded projects; the report endorsed many of the concerns raised by
the NBA and under intense international pressure the World Bank withdrew its funding for the project. Once
funding had been withdrawn the NBA petitioned the Indian Government for a review of the project that took
into account the concerns raised by the NBA, this resulted in construction being halted in 1995 at a height of
80.3m. In 1999 the court issued an interim order for the construction to continue with the height of the dam
raised to 88m, in 2000 this was again increased to a height of 90m, with construction authorised up to 135m.
(The Sardar Sarovar Dam: A Brief Introduction 2002)
As has been illustrated above the relationship between social movements and the institutions of global
governance is not static, but a dynamic one. While in this case the opportunity for action came about
because of the policies of the World Bank, the NBA also through their garnering of public support, use of
media and other communication mediums placed international pressure on the World Bank to alter its
policy. As Obrien and others argue “the operations of these institutions have ramifications for many
people…… It is little wonder that the people on the receiving end of these institutions’ policies are
increasingly mobilised to influence the structure and policies of the institutions themselves.”(Obrien et al.
2000) and this seems increasingly to be the case, either in Bolivia where the water had to be renationalised
or in the Narmada Valley where the actions of the NBA forced the World Bank, for the first time, to
publicly review its policies. Whether this is as Hardt and Negri argue, rather pessimistically, just the way in
which capitalism adapts and learns the boundaries of exploitation to its advantage or an example of the ways
in which social movements are effecting and changing the forms of global governance is yet to be seen.
(Hardt & Negri 2000)
Why then are these struggles not being transferred into wider cycles of contention?
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Tarrow argues that “people engage in contentious politics when patterns of political opportunities and
constraints change and then, by strategically employing a repertoire of collective action, create new
opportunities, which are used by others in widening cycles of contention.” (Tarrow 1998:19). This concept
looks at how social movements learn from other social actors; how forms of contestation are learned and
socially inscribed actions. I want to look not just at how forms of contention are learned and passed onto
other social actors but how and why social movements do not seem to be forming cycles of contention with
other social movement. This is not to say that movements are not communicating their struggles but why
these struggles are not being communicated into some form of global contestation.
Social movements provide optimism, they challenge and contest in a way that is in itself a challenge to the
system, yet these struggles are not being transferred into forms of collective challenge elsewhere. Why can’t
the NGA in India transfer its struggle to a movement facing similar issues of large dam infrastructure
projects in Uganda? They both challenge the same logic of capitalism and issues of indigenous displacement
are common to them both, maybe this is the triumph of capitalism. That issues of privatisation are increasing
becoming issues of survival; social movements are concerned about immediate issues of livelihood that they
are unable to move past the local and act globally. As New Social Movement theory argues social
movements are now focussed on issues of recognition and not redistribution as their driving force, this
emphasis on identity and recognition places struggles within a local context and space. When arguing for
recognition it becomes very hard to universalise these claims, even though they are made against similar if
not the same institutions of global governance. While movements organise collectively which is a challenge
to the concepts of neo liberalism they also act only in their own local context and are not able to connect
with other movements for sustained challenge.
Using several examples Negri and Hardt argue that even though communication facilities have increased,
social movements have become all but incommunicable. Many struggles are linked to regional concerns and
are not being translated into a global context, none of them inspire a cycle of struggle, and this leads to
social movements having a very short duration, or a duration based solely around their individual issue of
contestation. This may be because social movements are calling for a “new notion of the public, a new
construction of public space against the neoliberal mechanisms of privatisation that accompany more or less
everywhere the project of capitalist globalisation” (Hardt & Negri 2000) and as space is a localised identity
there is no perceived need to connect horizontally with other social movements, but to instantly contest on a
vertical global level. Social movements are organised, they form coalitions, use different mediums of
communication and forms of action, yet the system which they argue against in small local contexts does not
seem to be changing at the global level and is at the global level that the mechanisms of privatisation exist.
(Hardt & Negri 2000)
Using the political process as opportunity structure but new social movement theory as motivation helps to
explain some of the reasons why social movements are not forming cycles of contention. While the policies
of global governance are providing the opportunities in the form of policies of extreme privatisation, which
threaten the ability of communities to maintain traditional ways of life, and when this is threaten people are
mobilising to protect their ability to maintain ways of life. New social movement theory helps to explain
why this is not being transferred into a wider cycle of contention. With the emphasis placed on identity and
recognition as the driving force of social movements, and this can be seen to be the case in Narmada where
people were fighting for recognition of their way of life as being valid and not easily supplanted by a large
dam, this also makes struggles localised and hence incommunicable.
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The Genetic Engineering Network and New Social Movement Theory
Lyndal Halliday
Introduction
The worldwide resistance to genetic engineering (GE/GM) has become one of the fastest growing social
movements in recent years. Along with its counterpart, the movement against corporate globalisation,
people have been questioning developments in agriculture and challenging the institutions that seek to
impose the controversial technology. Opposition to GE has been particularly acute in Great Britain.
This paper will consider the theoretical underpinnings of New Social Movements (NSMs) and assess the
extent to which it accurately describes the UK based Genetic Engineering Network (GEN), one of the many
groups contesting the global agricultural system. I will begin by providing a brief overview of both the
Network and NSM theory before testing the attributes of NSM through GEN. I argue that while the Network
can be largely interpreted using NSM theory, there still remains some aspects of GEN that cannot be
explained by this field of social movement theory.
The Genetic Engineering Network
GEN is a UK based network of people and organisations broadly opposed to the imposition of GM
technology. The network was established in early 1997 out of a perceived need to set up common ground
and exchange information between the disparate groups organising across GE issues. GEN also seeks to
engage the general public in issues surrounding genetic engineering.
Groups working within the network include Corporate Watch, Earth First!, GenetiX Snowball, GenetiX
Food Alert, Five Year Freeze, the Green Party, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Women's Environmental
Network and Gaia Foundation. Also included are many organic retailers and farmers, and numerous local
groups and individuals organising in opposition to genetic engineering (www.geneticsaction.org.uk).
GEN aims to support, link and publicise all parts of the movement against GM technology. GEN also holds
monthly meetings in London and produces a bi-monthly newsletter, GenetiX Update, as well as running an
e-mail service and media database through its office in London (www.geneticsaction.org.uk).
The GEN web site includes a range of resources such as listing of trial sites, ideas for actions, setting up
local groups, an events diary, news, as well as an extensive list of links and contacts.
New Social Movement Theory
The term ‘new social movement’ is used to describe movements that have emerged in the West since the
1960s. In particular the peace, environmental and feminist movements have been identified as the leading
agents of social change, representing a shift away from the ‘old’ labour movement. Advocates of NSM
theory generally argue that this type of social movement has emerged out of a crisis in modernity and
focuses on struggles regarding symbolic, informational, and cultural resources and rights to specificity and
difference (Edelman:2001).
Questions as to what is new, if anything, about NSMs have been a constant in theoretical debates. However,
despite the lack of consensus, a set of “fundamental characteristics” (Gamson:1995:np) are commonly
drawn upon which are said to distinguish NSMs from other social movement theories. Pichardo breaks these
up into four categories; ideology and goals, tactics, structure, and participants (1997) which are the
categories I will use to explore GEN.
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GEN: the quintessential NSM?
Ideology and goals
The NSM paradigm states that contemporary social movements represent a fundamental break from
industrial era movements. Rather than focusing on economic redistribution and state power, NSMs
emphasise quality of life and life-style concerns or “post-materialist values” (Inglehart in Nash:2000:109).
This is primarily attributed to the shift away from industrial society and towards a “post-industrial society”
(Touraine:1974) were our “life worlds” have come under threat from the economic and political systems in
modern societies (Habermas in Nash:2000:107).
GEN very much represents these post-materialist values as a group organising around and contesting GM
technology. The movement’s rejection of industrial-scale agribusiness and the commodification of food in
favour of small-scale, organic and GM free agriculture is highly representative of life-style concerns and the
carving out of an “autonomous cultural sphere” (Halvorsen:1997).
Further to the ideology of NSM theory is the central feature of identity. The focus on identity is considered
unique in NSMs because identity politics express the belief that identity itself, its elaboration and
affirmation, is a fundamental focus of political work (Pichardo:1997). Melucci adds to this saying that
because society has become increasingly individualised, individuals must try give meaning to their lives
through social action (Nash:2000: 111). According to these arguments, GEN participants give meaning to
their lives and construct their collective identity through social action. GEN’s collective identity, the “we”
(Melucci:1995:43), has come to be ‘we oppose the imposition of GM technology’.
Tactics
According to Pichardo, NSMs prefer to stay outside of normal political channels, employing disruptive
tactics and mobilising political opinion, largely through the mass media, to gain political leverage (1997).
Highly dramatic and pre-planned forms of demonstrations replete with costumes and symbolic
representations are also common (Touraine in Pichardo:1997).
Disruptive and dramatic protests that have managed to mobilise considerable public support, through the
associated media attention, has been the dominant model for contesting GE food and agriculture in the UK.
‘Decontaminations’ ie hand weeding, of trial GM crops; crop circles; storming the offices of biotechnology
companies; dressing up as super heroes or mutant vegetables; retail actions such as ‘closing down’
supermarkets as contaminated sites or acting out customer information raids with faux scientists, giant corn
and loudspeakers; street theatre; and crop squatting (Thomas:2001) are just some of the actions that have
been employed by GEN members.
It is important to note here that GEN does not campaign or carry out actions on its own behalf. Instead, GEN
publicises the actions and lists a considerable number of ideas for action; the actions themselves are
conducted independently by groups and individuals involved within the Network. However I will say that
actions conducted by ‘members’ can, in some sense, be seen to be actions of GEN.
Another tactic, or perhaps strategy, employed by GEN reflects the centrality of information as argued by
theorists such as Touraine and Castells. Touraine maintains that the postindustrial society is an information
society (1974), similarly Castells asserts “information is the key ingredient” (in Waterman:1999:375).
Information and knowledge, or “historicity” (Touraine in Nash:2000:133), “is the process by which society
is produced as a result of conscious reflection and action”. Therefore, immediate stakes of the conflict
between social movements and the dominant class is control over information (Nash:2000:133).
GEN undoubtedly engages in this battle over “historicity”. The primary aim of the Network is for
“information exchange”, to be a “clearing house for information” (www.geneticsaction.org.uk). GEN’s daily
e-mail updates, its newsletter and the extensive information provided on their web site (including detailed
intelligence regarding trial crops) forms part of this. According to Thomas, GEN was one of the first groups
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to grasp the “value of information as currency in the real world and distribut it freely and effectively”
(2001:339).
Castells views the use of the Internet and the media to be part of  the basic strategy of NSMs. “An
informational guerrilla is not simply a guerrilla movement with informational technology… it is a guerrilla
within the media of GNC [globalised and networked capitalism]” (Waterman:1999:364). In the context of
GEN, both the Network itself and it’s ‘members’ can be described as informational guerrillas through their
engagement with the Internet and through active courting of the media via dramatic and symbolic protests.
Structure
It has been argued that an ideologically unique feature of NSMs is its self-reflexive character meaning that
participants are constantly questioning the meaning of what they are doing. This has led to conscious
choices of structure (and action) said to typify NSMs.  Thus NSMs have a tendency to organise themselves
in fluid, informal, loose and flexible ways; avoiding hierarchy and  bureaucracy (Nash:2000:102) as
alternative and oppositional to the perceived “dehumanising character of modern bureaucracy”
(Pichardo:1997).
The structure of GEN is evidently a typical NSM. “GEN remains principally a non-hierarchical networking
hub” (Thomas:2001:339) that has barely any structure to speak of. The structure of GEN is fed by its focus
(and vica versa) on information distribution and exchange between those that identify with the Network.
Moreover, the fact that GEN actively refers to itself as a network, reveals its conscious structure.
Consciously choosing to ‘network’ rather than any other type of organising reflects Castells writings on
networks where “Networking, decentred form of organisation”, mirrors and counters “the networking logic
of domination in the informational society” (in Waterman:1999:376).
Participants
There are two general views on who the participants of NSMs are and why they join particular social
movements. The first places the base of support within the “new middle class” (Offe in Bagguley:1992), a
recently emerged social stratum, generally educated, and “employed within the non-productive sectors of the
economy” (Pichardo:1997). The second view of NSM participants is that they are not defined by class
boundaries or a common structural location, but are marked by a common concern over social issues (Arato
and Cohen in Pichardo:1997).
In relation to participants of GEN, it is difficult to ascertain whether they form part of the new middle class
that some NSM theorists maintain. However, by GEN’s own admission, “the Genetic Engineering Network
is a network of people opposed to the imposition of GM technology” (www.geneticsaction.org.uk), we can
state that they have come together through common concern.
Problems
From the above analysis it can be asserted that NSM theory can account for the social movement GEN.
However, there are some aspects of the Network which are not adequately explained through NSM theory
analysis.
My concern with NSM theory in relation to GEN is two-fold; diversity and identity. NSM theory does not
sufficiently account for the diversity within GEN, nor does it explain the complexities of identity
negotiation.  How is a collective identity negotiated within a network like GEN and more specifically, how
are particular  elements of GEN’s diversity, that cannot, strictly speaking, be included as part of NSM, be
included in this NSM?
Touraine implies social movements have “personages” (Nash:2000:138) or are unified actors, however,
GEN consists of a multiplicty of actors both organised and individual with a limited unity. This
oversimplification on Touraine’s behalf can be resolved by citing Melucci ‘s work where he acknowledges
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contemporary social movements are inherently plural. However, Melucci and Touraine, dismiss activities
and organisations such as The Green Party, as part of the mainstream political process and therefore a public
interest group rather than a social movement (Nash:2000:148). If “co-option into the status quo” is “anti-
ethical to the radical changes social movements may achieve” (Touraine in Nash:2000:135) how does a
political party, such as the Green Party, become part of a NSM, such as GEN?
Further, how are the multiple and divergent pre-negotiated identities of the members of GEN able to come
together under the one banner? Particularily if the diversity between the actors involves different structures,
different participants and different strategies and tactics, to the point that, as mentioned above, some may
not actually fit NSM. Admitedly, Melucci does consider the formation of unity or collective identity from a
plurity of actors, however, Melucci relies on an understanding of identity creation to be fragile and on-going
(Halvorsen:1997), which does not explain actors such as Greenpeace or The Green Party that have
established firm and separate identities. If we are to accept that the identity construction of GEN is a fluid
and on-going process, how are the established identities of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Genetix
Snowball, Gaia Foundation, and the Green Party reconstructed to become GEN without deconstructing their
original?
Perhaps what is required are further attempts to combine and engage different social movement traditions as
argued by the editors of Social Movement Studies (Jordan et al:2002). Diani, for example, through his
synthesis of Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) and NSM, is able to account for greater diversity. Diani,
as outlined by Nash, repeatedly refers to social movement actors being engaged in “political and/or cultural
conflicts” at either the “systematic or non-systematic level” (in Nash:2000:148) and therefore are both RMT
and NSM. Again in a later work, a movement such as GEN is comprehensively explained by his definition
of a social movement “a network of informal interactions between a plurity of individuals, groups and/or
organisation, egaged in a political or cultural conflict on the basis of a shared collective identity”
(Diani:2000:np).
Conclusion
As the above analysis indicates, it is not that GEN cannot be explained by NSM theory, in truth GEN could
be regarded as a model NSM.  Yet, the conclusion remains that NSM does not explain the totality of GEN.
However, this is not essentially a critism of NSM theory, rather it illustrates a reality of social theorising and
social research in that, as argued by Giddens, there can be no single theoretical approach (1991:715).
Further, as Nash and Diani demonstrate alongside Jordan et al in the above analysis, diversity in theoretical
thinking provides a rich source of ideas that can be drawn upon in research and “stimulates imaginative
capacities essential to progress in sociological work” (Giddens:1991:690).
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The Baxter Convergence
Lucy-Ann Kelly
Using Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s Propaganda Model as a guide, this paper will examine the
mass media’s coverage of the Baxter convergence, a protest against the detainment of asylum seekers, over
the Easter weekend of 2003.  It will focus on how words, information and images are carefully selected and
arranged to discredit social movement agendas that threaten the interests of those in power in The
Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Daily Telegraph and The Sun-Herald.  The excessive and
negative coverage asylum seeker issues received in the week that followed the protest will also be discussed.
The Propaganda Model outlined by Herman & Chomsky (1994) is comprised of five ‘filters’ through which
news must pass before it reaches the public.  The first filter, ‘Size, ownership and profit orientation of the
mass media’, relates to the immense size, affluence and concentration of media ownership, and the selection
of news that does not conflict with the business interests of media corporations.  The second filter, ‘The
Advertising license to do business’, refers to the financial dependence of the mass media on advertisers and
therefore its need to attract audiences with purchasing power.  The next filter, ‘Sourcing mass media news’,
concerns the heavy reliance of the mass media on information from government and corporate sources as
they are considered credible and therefore not likely to mar the media’s image as an objective purveyor of
news.  This reduces the cost of investigating stories and protects the media from accusations of bias,
however, it gives the government and corporations considerable control over what is deemed newsworthy.
The fourth filter, ‘Flak’, refers to criticism of media stories.  Flak comes in many forms such as petitions,
letters and lawsuits, and may be very costly and damaging if a great deal is produced.  The final filter,
‘Anticommunism as a control mechanism’, is frequently employed, despite the end of the Cold War, to
mobilize the public against a perceived enemy.  These filters greatly narrow the range of news the public are
exposed to, marginalize dissent, and ensure the government and corporations convey their messages to the
public.
The way stories that feature victims are framed by the media is determined by their capacity to further the
interests of a dominant elite or threaten them.  Victims are depicted as ‘worthy’ or ‘unworthy’ depending on
how they might best be exploited for political or economic gain.  ‘Worthy’ victims receive detailed,
contextualized and sympathetic coverage, whereas ‘unworthy’ victims are often demonized and presented
out of context (Herman & Chomsky, 1994).
In the past, asylum seekers have been portrayed as both worthy and unworthy victims depending on the
political purpose they served.  The current flow of asylum seekers pose a threat to the powerful groups
behind the media because they are products of the global economic system from which these groups profit,
and therefore are presented as unworthy victims, and those who defend them as misguided troublemakers.
In accordance with Herman & Chomsky’s Propaganda Model, the quantity and quality of coverage the
Baxter convergence attracted was poor.  On the weekend, the event received no coverage in The Sunday
Telegraph, and very little coverage on p.34 of The Sun-Herald.  A relatively large article on the event
featured on p.5 of The Sydney Morning Herald, and p.1 of The Weekend Australia.  On Monday, the day
after the gathering at Baxter, the event was mentioned in a tiny article on p.6 in The Daily Telegraph, but
received more attention on p.2 of The Sydney Morning Herald and p.4 of The Australian.
News stories that feature social movements that threaten the interests of the dominant elite are invariably
presented in an “episodic” frame, which, as the term implies, depicts the story as a mere episode without
context, as opposed to a “thematic” frame which contextualizes the story (Smith & McCarthy, 2001).
Accordingly, in all newspapers, the Baxter protest was presented in an episodic news frame.  Most articles
centred on what took place at the protest rather than the reasons for it.  The headlines reveal that most of the
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articles focused on the clash between protesters and the police:  “12 arrested in desert protests”19;  “Dust and
froth of protest clash”20;  “Set them free:  protesters’ plea for asylum seekers ends in clashes, arrests”21;
“Four arrested in Baxter clashes”22;  “Baxter protesters divided, conquered”23;  “Mistake triggers raid on
refugee protesters.”24
Within the articles, words were carefully chosen and information strategically ordered in a way that
highlighted the protesters’ lawlessness.  The Sun-Herald (April 20, 2003) described the protesters’ presence
outside the Baxter Detention Centre as an “incursion” and their actions as “civil disobedience”, whereas
words with positive connotations were applied to the detention centre:  “Australia’s newest, largest and most
secure detention centre.”  It spoke of the protesters illegal actions and the arrests that followed.  Typically,
reference to a stock fence being broken came several paragraphs before ‘offenses’ such as “kite-flying” in
“prohibited airspace”, and possession of “bread and a breadknife”, an “offensive weapon.”
According to Thea Williams and Rebecca DiGirolamo of The Weekend Australia (April 19-20, 2003), “The
police prevailed” against “the hardcore group of protesters” who were accused of using “Rocks, pillows,
hands and insults” “against the South Australian mounted police and 200 Star Force special police.”  In this
article Baxter was referred to as a “holding centre.”  In Monday’s newspaper, the same journalists claimed
the “indecisive and disparate protesters” were “defeated” by the police who “outwitted and outmuscled”
them.  The peacefulness of the protest was attributed to the police’s handling of the affair, and therefore
justified their “heavy handed” actions, mentioned later in the article.  Furthermore, the article contained
incorrect information.  For instance, what was a discussion over when the protesters should rally was
described as a discussion about whether the protesters should rally.  Also, the Immigration Department’s
claim that detainees were unmoved by the event, that they “were watching CNN, having pillow fights and
playing pool at the height of the weekend protest” has been exposed as a lie.  This misinformation served to
portray the protesters as divided, and their actions as unnecessary and futile.  The article also mentioned an
event in which a camera tripod was mistaken as a firearm, which was the main focus of The Sydney Morning
Herald and The Daily Telegraph’s coverage of the protest on April 21, 2003.
Criticism of police actions and comments regarding the purpose of the protest were present in some articles,
however at the end.  The police were accused of creating a “climate of fear”25 and of heavy handedness26.
Also, in the second last paragraph of The Weekend Australian’s article on April 19-20, 2003 (p.1), Camille
Barbagallo of the “No One Is Illegal” group described the protest as “incredibly peaceful” and affirmed
“people have clearly shown here today that they are here for one reason, and that is to highlight the atrocities
going on in the Baxter detention centre.”
The media distorts information and sensationalizes aspects of a protest not only to paint protesters in a
negative light, but also to distract readers from the issues protesters aim to highlight.  An interesting aspect
of participating in an event such as this is observing the degree to which information is omitted.  The media
did not refer to the carnival atmosphere of the convergence, or the erection of a tent embassy outside the
detention centre.  They did not reveal that the government spent approximately $1 million protecting the
detainees from the protesters that weekend.  Nor did they focus on the appalling conditions inside detention
centres which have led to several suicides and suicide attempts.  They made no mention of the many
workers who have resigned from detention centres or the grim details of the statutory declarations they made
upon leaving.  They did not place into perspective asylum seeker statistics which reveal that the number of
asylum seekers who enter Australia is minute on an international scale, and that this number constitutes only
a fraction of those who are non-citizens in Australia without permission, the majority being ‘overstayers’,
                                                 
19 The Sun-Herald, April 20, 2003.
20 The Weekend Australia, April 19-20, 2003.
21 The Sydney Morning Herald, April 18-20, 2003.
22 The Daily Telegraph, April 21, 2003.
23 The Australian, April 21, 2003.
24 The Sydney Morning Herald, April 21, 2003.
25 The Australian, April 21, 2003, p.4.
26 The Australian, April 21, 2003, p.4;  The Sun-Herald, April 20, p.34.
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mainly from the UK.27  And they certainly did not focus on Australia’s economic and political connection to
the social conditions in the countries from which these people seek sanctuary, or the more economical and
humane alternatives to detention.
Apart from attempting to counter the impact of protesters’ actions within articles, the media use the careful
juxtaposition of articles and images to undermine their agendas.  In The Sun-Herald (April 20, 2003), the
very small article about the Baxter convergence with a title that focuses on crime (“12 arrested in desert
protests”), sits under a huge article entitled “Hong Kong in SARS grip as China owns up”, and a huge image
of a little Asian boy with a mask on below a sign which reads “Welcome to Sydney.”  In this way, readers
are encouraged to link criminality, ethnicity and migration.  The coverage of SARS itself is interesting in
terms of Herman & Chomsky’s Propaganda Model.  The excessive coverage this issue has received has
focused heavily on the deceitful and incompetent nature of the communist Chinese Government.  What is
more, on p.5 of The Weekend Australia (April 19-20, 2003), above a large picture of four men of Middle
Eastern decent laughing and smiling, with a caption “Time to Smile”, is an article concerning the release of
eight detainees over the Easter weekend.  It is unlikely that their release at this time was a mere coincidence,
but were it, the coverage these men attracted was no accident.
Discrediting protesters and the strategic arrangement of articles was intended to weaken the social
movement against the detainment of refugees, however, the most damaging counteraction to their agenda
came in the week that followed.28  A huge article entitled “New tide of refugees looms” occupied the front
page of The Sydney Morning Herald on April 23, 2003.  Practically the only fact in the article was that a
boat of 31 Vietnamese was not in Australian waters, or even international waters, but Indonesian waters.
The title related to the Immigration Minister, Phillip Ruddock, having “said he did not believe a fresh wave
of boat people was on its way” (my emphasis).  The boat was only “reportedly heading to Australia” (my
emphasis).  The issue of SARS was raised for no reason other than to instill fear in readers.  They were
“checked before the boat” was “put to sea” because “Officials were concerned that the passengers may be
carrying severe acute respiratory syndrome.”  This reference was complimented by a huge picture of a
doctor wearing a mask examining a group of Asian people, with the caption “Human cargo:  a doctor treats
a child on board the first of the boats bound for Australia, in the Indonesian Port of Banjarmasin” (my
emphasis).  Furthermore, Australia audaciously criticized its Asian neighbour for not doing what it refused
to (“Phillip Ruddock vowed yesterday to block a boat that left Indonesia on Saturday from reaching
Australian shores”), despite Indonesia being a smaller country with less space, and, unlike Australia, not a
signatory to the Geneva Convention.
This was the first of many articles that contained very few facts, and were designed to create fear and justify
the government’s actions and policies regarding asylum seekers.  The headlines, beginning with one that
sounds like a sequel to a horror film, include:  “The return of the boat people” (April 24, 2003);  “Boats
unlikely to reach shore, says Ruddock” (April 24, 2003);  “21 Vietnamese asylum seekers abandon perilous
voyage to Australia” (April 25, 2003);  “Boat people aground in Indonesia” (May 1, 2003);  “It’s not just
about boat people, but combating transnational crime” (April 28, 2003);  “Sailing for freedom” (April 26-27,
2003).  The last two articles focus heavily on people smuggling and highlight the media’s practice of linking
those who seek asylum to crime.
While the Baxter protest was presented in an episodic news frame, the flood of articles intended to counter
their impact were presented as a theme.  The articles were not only contextualized, they were placed in a
misleading context.  In attaching asylum seekers to crime, the media provide a rationale for the
government’s actions.  The greater attention given to transnational crime such as people smuggling and
terrorism, than to the protests against the detainment of asylum seekers, subtly informs readers that the
                                                 
27 Australia accepts approximately 1 asylum seeker per 2000 residents, whereas poor countries like Armenia, Jordan, Lebanon and
Guinea accept 1 for every 10 residents, and of the 58 649 non-citizens in Australia without permission in 2000-2001, 53 000 were
‘overstayers’ (Crock & Saul, 2002).
28 I examined only articles from The Sydney Morning Herald in the week following the protests.
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former represents a greater moral threat than the latter, and in this light, Australia’s detention policy,
although unsavoury, is seen as less reprehensible, the ‘better of two evils.’
The power of this form of propaganda lies in its subtlety.  Readers are not told what to think, but what to
think about.  The media does not directly accuse asylum seekers of being criminals (although it does frame
their actions as criminal where possible), it alludes to their criminality through the strategic choice of words,
information and images and their arrangement within the newspaper.  Helping readers arrive at a conclusion
is a far more effective form of indoctrination as they are under the misapprehension that they think
independently (Chomsky, 2002).
In focusing on the crime of people smuggling, the media divert readers’ attention from why the market
exists.  The growth in this market took place alongside the tightening of restrictions on legal immigration,
and a breakdown of protection for asylum seekers in ‘countries of first asylum’, a situation in which
Australia is implicated (Crock & Saul, 2002).  International support to countries that receive huge numbers
of asylum seekers has dwindled, while the number of those seeking asylum has risen dramatically (Crock &
Saul, 2002).29  Less attention is given people trafficking, where foreign women are being sold into forced
prostitution.  Clearly, political expediency determines what issues gain precedence over others.
Political expediency has always guided the government’s policies regarding refugees.  “The international
refugee regime was created by the leading Western powers and was acceptable only in so far as the system
served, or did not run counter to, their particular interests or needs” (Loescher & Monahan, 1990, p.9).
James Hathaway (in Fitzpatrick, 1995, p.46) acknowledges that “refugee law does not derive from a
commitment to humanitarianism or human rights, and has been, particularly since 1950, intimately linked to
the attainment by powerful states of their own national goals.”  The current flow of refugees threaten to
expose or accentuate the complicity of First World government’s in this global crisis.  In order to present the
victims of global capitalism as parasites, and us as their victims, the definition of ‘refugee’, an already
ambiguous term, has undergone change in recent years.  The Australian Parliament passed legislation to
narrow the interpretation of this term in September 2001 (Crock & Saul, 2002).  The interpretation of the
terms “non-political crime”, “persecution” and “particular social group” has been narrowed (Crock & Saul,
2002).  The victims of global capitalism are not considered victims of war, but with the needless loss of life
to hunger equaling “a Hiroshima explosion every three days” (George, 1990, p.223), it certainly seems that
way.  As hopefully this paper has demonstrated, it is a question of framing.  This is a new kind of war.  One
between corporations and humanity, in which police, heavily clad in expensive riot gear with batons and
machine guns, take on kite, balloon, placard, camera tripod and bread and breadknife wielding hippies.
So was the Baxter convergence, one struggle against the war on refugees, a success?  The answer depends
on one’s definition of the term.  If one views success in terms of the degree to which the media focused on
and aptly contextualized refugee issues, the protest was a dismal failure.  However, this expectation is
unrealistic.  If a successful protest is considered one that attracts media attention, albeit small, the Baxter
convergence was definitely efficacious.  However, if one considers the disproportionate negative coverage
of asylum seeker issues in the week that followed the protest to be a consequence of it, then perhaps it
weakened the social movement in defense of asylum seekers.  However, if success is measured in terms of
whether the protest was a source of hope to those inside the concentration camp in the South Australian
desert, then hopefully it was a triumph.
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‘Freedom to move. Freedom to stay.’ Space and struggle in the refugee movement and projects of
urban space reclamation.
Jeremy Kerbel
The space around us (walls, houses, schools, nations) is the product of a social process, and in our world,
this social process is integral to the functioning of capitalism. Capitalism produces hegemonic
representations, confining spatial practices and repressive spaces of everyday life (Lefebvre, 1991:33).
However, this production of space is beset with contradictions, such as the necessity for uneven
development, and the simultaneous weakening/strengthening of borders (for capital and people
respectively). These contradictions present openings for contestation of the dominant spatial order, and for
production of emancipatory counter-spaces. In this paper I hope to use examples from recent actions (in
which I have been involved), to map some of the contours of spatial resistance to capitalism. I will refer to
the refugee movement, the Baxter 2003 Desert Convergence, Reclaim the Streets, squatted social centres
and ‘urban redecoration’ projects. At first these actions may seem unrelated, but through the lens of spatial
production, I hope to show how they intersect in modes and purpose; how they challenge and transcend
capitalist production of space.
Contesting capitalist productions of space
The following actions are more than a symbolic criticism of the dominant spatial order. Rather they work to
directly challenge and undermine hegemonic representations of space and confining spatial practices. They
refuse to comply with, and indeed actively attack capitalist productions of containment, borders, and
‘property’.
To begin with, the refugee movement and the Baxter Desert Convergence: in April 2003, almost a thousand
people travelled from around Australia to protest at the refugee detention centre near Baxter, South
Australia. In some ways this convergence was located within and in other ways on the fringes of the larger
and more perilous ‘movement’ of ‘undocumented’ people who cross national borders. This movement of
refugees, numbering 50 million or more (Mitropoulos, 2002:1), challenges the way nation-state-space
secures free traffic of capital (often through war), while containing people. Consequently, this movement
also contests spatially produced inequality, where certain areas/countries are forever ‘undeveloped’ so that
the flow of capital remains profitable. The Baxter Convergence re-enacted and reflected the mobility of
refugees, by travelling to the ‘border’ (concretised by the detention centre) and assaulting it (the fence was
damaged, although to our disappointment, not breached).
As well as contesting borders, people ‘without papers’ undermine the separation of ‘politics’ and the
‘economy’. This spatial representation is of integral importance to capitalism: it covers up gross ‘economic’
inequality with an imaginary ‘political’ equality, and represents the market sphere (where exploitation
occurs) as ‘apolitical’ (Anderson, 2002:19). Refugees bring this economy/politics separation into crisis
when, for example they are judged economic migrants, but cannot be sent home because of the ‘political’
situation in their country; or their ‘economic’ circumstances have clear ‘political’ origins (as in the case of
people fleeing war in Iraq).
Specific hegemonic representations of place, are also contested. Detention centres are produced as non-
places: ‘Port Hedland is “not-Australian-society” in the same way the refuge seekers are “non-persons”’
(Hage, 2002:2). However, this spatial erasure/silence is smashed, firstly, by refugees who riot, knock
themselves unconscious, destroy buildings, set fires (in ‘fire-proof’ compounds) and escape from (maximum
security) prisons. Secondly, by protesters who journey across half a continent to ‘turn a no-place into a
some-place’ (as Kate put it, at the Baxter Convergence). This re-definition of place occurred as citizens of
the town Baxter, and of Australia, were once again reminded of the distasteful reality of Baxter detention
centre (and as the state was forced to mobilise vast resources (estimated at about a million dollars) to secure
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the camp). In this way, the Baxter Convergence was a fairly successful strike on the hegemonic
representation of the detention centres as non-places.
Movement/mobility, spatial divisions, and representations of place are also important dynamics in projects
of urban space reclamation such as Reclaim the Streets (RTS), Squatted Social Centres and urban
redecoration.
Transgression and mobility, are of key importance to projects of urban space reclamation. At RTS,
pedestrians dance on the street to challenge ‘car-culture’ (RTS 2003:1) and contest the spatial production of
cities as machines for work/consumption and the street as a ‘factory for producing traffic’ (Ley, 1989:48).
RTS transgresses the spatial divisions of the capitalist city where production, reproduction and ‘leisure’ each
has its defined sphere. RTS also involves a physical movement through the streets; a movement which is
(partially) unplanned and ‘irrational’ and attempts thus to assert free, human mobility. RTS is thus somewhat
similar to the Situationist dérive: a flow of physical acts, strolls, encounters which aim to reveal the ‘psycho-
geography’ of the city (Debord, 1958:5).
In this way, undocumented migrants, the Baxter Convergence and RTS each contests the spatial divisions of
the capitalist labour process. Moreover, each asserts human mobility as a major issue: ‘Freedom to move!’.
This prompts a (re)conceptualisation of spatial mobility as a privileged instrument in class struggle; and
labour mobility (vis-á-vis capital mobility) as ‘a potent weapon of class recomposition’ (Krasivyj, 1996:4).
Like the refugee movement, the Social Centre Autonomous Network (SCAN) in Sydney has contested the
politics/economy spatial separation. A SCAN action in March 2003 targeted a large building on William
Street, which had been a public housing estate for many years, but was cleared of tenants and sold for
redevelopment and gentrification. SCAN took action in the form of a banner drop and media campaign just
before the state election (sydney.indymedia.org, 17/03/03). As well as drawing public attention (with some
success) towards the price of housing in Sydney and the extreme rates of homelessness, the issue was
framed in terms of a loss of public space to privatisation: ‘our public space and land is constantly being
stolen and sold to corporations and others who profit from privatisation’ (scan.cat.org.au). This opposition to
privatisation and the refugees’ politicisation of ‘economic’ migration can both be seen as resisting the
‘institution of the market’ (McMichael, 2003:2). In this analysis, capital seeks to remove spaces from the
political sphere and place them in the economic sphere in a process of ‘marketisation’ or commodification.
SCAN has also contested capitalist spatial production through the development of a ‘caretaker lease’ in
conjunction with South Sydney Council in 2001. This allowed squatters ‘freedom to stay’ in an empty
building in exchange for performing caretaker duties – collective housing without ownership. This
agreement caused mild outrage amongst the mainstream press.
One final example of reclaiming urban space is ‘urban redecoration’. Breaking spatial silence is a key
concern here, just as it was for the Baxter convergence at the ‘non-place’ of the detention centre. The
buildings and walls around us cannot be treated as ‘an assumed and unproblematized background’ (Sewell,
2001:52), when someone has painted on them. And this is exactly what urban redecoration is about. A small
group of people come together on a given night and paint/stencil/write/paste beautiful and haunting political
art on inner city walls. After one recent action (sydney.indymedia.org, 30/05/03), neatly stencilled beneath
‘BILL POSTERS WILL BE PROSECUTED’ was, ‘BLANK WALLS ARE POLITICAL SILENCE’…
‘SO MANY PEOPLE DON’T GET HEARD ABOVE THE BILLBOARDYELL’. Thus the space of the
wall – a horizontal border- becomes (vertically) a frontier (Nandrea, 1999:111). A space of silence and
oppression becomes an open space for resistance. This temporary but effective contestation of dominant
spatial production, also creates for a few night hours a collective and rebellious liberated space… a counter-
space.
Counter-spaces
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In addition to contestations, many of the actions and collectives already discussed seek to produce liberated
counter-spaces. These counter-spaces can be understood as reclaimed ‘representational spaces’ – the spaces
of lived experience,
‘embodying complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or
underground side of social life, as also to art’ (Lefebvre, 1991:33).
Through the use of these spaces, we can counter the abstract space of capitalist exchange, and attempt to
invent not just free space, but an alternative mode of spatial production (Lefebvre, 1991:381). There are
(incomplete and imperfect) counter-spaces appearing and disappearing all the time: pirate radio, autonomous
women’s and queer spaces, world social forums, mobile street performances, cave clan, desert camps and
social centres…
The Baxter Convergence camp site was set up with difficulty, after being trampled once by police horses. At
its best the camp site was an example of collective and self-determined living, with a sharing of tasks such
as food preparation, toilet digging and protest. We experimented with forms of participatory democracy
(such as the ‘spokes-council’) and with pirate radio – ‘Radio Free Baxter’ aimed to hack the invisible
communication border. The magnificent, but (for us) strange desert environment as well as the logistics of
day-to-day necessities such as eating and poo-ing (the subject of much organisational discussion!) meant
that the camp site was a space lived more intensely than any sterile work or ‘leisure’ space. However, we
were also under constant surveillance (helicopters, plain clothes police inside the camp, night vision,
spotlights…) and were subject to constant low level intimidation (arbitrary arrests, horse charges, a SWAT
team armed with semi-automatic rifles…). Most painful of all was the denial of ANY contact with detainees
(who were under lockdown for the whole weekend) – this was in sharp contrast to the Woomera protest in
2002, where protestors and refugees communicated and touched through the fence (across national borders).
The Baxter camp site was an attempt at a counter-capitalist production of space, and was at times liberating
and empowering for those involved, but was ultimately deeply flawed and constrained.
‘The Grand Midnight Star’ is an abandoned wedding reception centre in Homebush. SCAN occupied the
majestic old art deco building in early 2002, and we weren’t evicted until almost a year later. During that
time the building hosted numerous meetings, forums, yoga workshops, children’s theatre, film screenings,
parties, gigs and more. Rather than a housing squat, the Midnight Star was a social centre – a free to use
public space for community and social movement groups. The Midnight Star was quite successful in terms
of SCAN’s attempt to create, ‘spaces beyond the boredom of work and consumption – spaces for creativity
and social change beyond the symbols of dissent like rallies and petitions’, ‘alternatives to the monopoly of
the money-system’ (scan.cat.org.au). Parts of Manuel Castells’ analysis may be helpful for understanding
the ‘community’ which produced the Midnight Star:
‘communes of resistance defend their space, their places, against the placeless logic of the space of
flows characterizing social domination…They use technology for people’s horizontal
communication… while rejecting the new idolatry of technology’ (1997:358)
However, perhaps because Castells has jettisoned the concept of class from his analysis, he tends to view
such communes as inherently defensive. In fact, the Midnight Star was a base for anti-capitalist struggle, a
fact that eventually led to its closure by the police – following the anti-WTO protests (when mainstream
media unfortunately discovered the Star). The Midnight Star had its difficulties, not least of which was its
detachment from its local neighbourhood (most of the people who used the space travelled out to Homebush
from the inner-west). However, for many months it was an inspiring and liberating counter-space.
While many find fault in the short lifespan of counter-spaces (hours, days or months), Hakim Bey
interestingly suggests that temporary autonomous zones and ‘failed’ insurrections actually present a
genuinely revolutionary hope. (‘Real’ revolutions in contrast, seem doomed to follow the cycle of rebellion,
reaction, betrayal and repression – Bey, 1991:99). The temporary autonomous zone is open, experimental
and refuses ‘the closure of the map’ (Bey, 1991:103). Similarly, Krasivyj, upholds mobility and openness as
the true marks of a space that ruptures territorial power (1996:4). In this reading, the counter-space’s fragile
lack of definition is its greatest strength.
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Challenges and questions
The rough outline I have presented of spatial opposition to spatial domination raises numerous questions and
challenges. First among these is the worrying complicity of space in the mechanisms of capitalist control. Is
a focus on space necessarily reactionary (vis-á-vis a focus on time)? Or as David Harvey asks, how can we
move beyond the ‘utopianism of spatial form’ (such as the ‘modern city’) and the ‘utopianism of social
process’ (such as Adam Smith’s ‘market process’) which are both problematic (1998:53)? His suggestion is
that we become collective and liberatory architects – who focus on space and time.
A similar challenge is presented by the spatial traps which capitalism represents as unavoidable: we are told,
for example, that local counter-spaces will inevitably become parochial, while transnational struggle is only
possible through elitist NGO summit-hopping. Negotiating the (imaginary) relationship between local place
and global space is a constant test for social movement projects. It seems that struggle must be grounded in
place, for that is where we are strongest. But in order to succeed we must avoid isolation, through
connecting counter-spaces in a network of class recomposition. Space may present an opportunity to bring
together a variety of struggles (the diverse ‘coalitions’ described by Lefebvre, 1991:381) into a unity around
place. But it may be difficult to ensure that this is a genuine unity through diversity not an abstract
homogenisation.
Perhaps the spatial sphere and target are less important than the quality of our material and subjective
spaces: the real challenge will be to produce spaces which are participatory and democratic (regardless of
wether this is at the local level or through a transnational ‘globalisation from below’) (Anderson, 2002:35).
Similarly, in a world where human rights (read ‘citizen rights’) are no longer guaranteed by a coherent
nation-state-territory, spatial subjectivity must be reinvented. Perhaps, as Georgio Agamben suggests, ‘the
refugee is the only thinkable political figure for the people of our time’ and could therefore be the origin of a
new stateless political community (1996:160). Yet this notion could equally refer to a banal but elitist
capitalist cosmopolitanism. We must grapple with these questions and challenges posed by the social
production of space, because they cut to the core of both capitalist domination and revolutionary opposition.
Conclusion
The movement of ‘undocumented’ people across borders, the Baxter Desert Convergence and urban projects
like Reclaim the Streets and squatted Social Centres intersect as struggles over the production of space. This
may present an opportunity for an emancipatory alliance based on diversity. Each project draws attention to
the importance of human movement/mobility, and the necessity to contest capitalist spatial divisions and
abstraction; each also emphasises the possibility (inherent within the social mode of  spatial production), of
creating liberated counter-spaces. Ultimately, each of these forms of collective resistance confront further
difficulties: the problematic relationship between space and time, the local/global trap, and changing spatial
subjectivities. However, through contestation and counter-spaces we may discover a solution to the
confinement and violence wrought by capitalist spatial production. Through intersecting struggles we seek
to reappropriate and reinvent the social production of space; a process described during the Baxter
convergence as ‘disrupting the present to create the future…’
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The feminist “ethic of care” debate and the disability movement
Rita Lahoud
In Feminist Ethics, Moira Gatens states that the ethic of care emphasises differences rather than
similarities between people and also that its focus is on small scale rather than large scale relationships.
Feminists argue that the emphasis on care and compassion poses problems for women of “Political
exclusion … an over-simple … view of female identity … inappropriate analogy between familial and
political relationships (1993: 141).
The ethic of care is viewed as a maternal or female instinct, compared to the ethic of justice
prevalent among males. Care is believed to fulfil a domestic role rather than a public or communitarian one.
It is positive and indeed necessary in a familial capacity but should keep its distance from the political arena:
“The ethic of care merely urges an enlargement of the scope of individual sympathy” (1993: 142).
This said, my personal views on such theoretical debates sketched above concerning the ethic of
care? Before the onset of a series of ridicules including that of the above quote and of the fact that a sober
distinction has already been made regarding the ethic of care and the ethic of justice when in practise, the
actions of such ethics are unlikely to be as easily distinguished as they are made to be in theory or via a
manipulation of language. I am wary of treading ‘carefully’ on this topic so as to not appear to be an over-
protective ‘carer’ of the ethic of care. I want to put forward what is suggested by the word ‘verite’, so I’ll
start where words we play with and manipulate, formulate opinions, judgments and arguments with, begin:
the Concise Oxford English Dictionary.
Care (n) 1) The provision of what is necessary for the health, welfare, maintenance and protection of
someone or something.  2) Serious attention or consideration applied to an action or plan.
Origin: OE Caru (n), carian (v) of Gmc origin (2002: 212).
Justice stems from just, so below are definitions for both: Just (adj) Morally right and fair >
appropriate or deserved > (of an opinion or appraisal) well founded. Origin: ME via Ofr from L. Justus,
from jus ‘law, right’ (2002: 768). Justice (n) 1) Just behaviour or treatment 2) The administration of the law
or authority in maintaining this. Origin: OE iustise “administration of the law” via Ofr from L. justitia, from
Justus (2002: 768).
The disability movement arose because of the ever-present and increasing rate of oppression and
marginalisation disabled people faced in society. The presence of a physical or intellectual disability resulted
in disabled people being forced to give up their un-acquired, yet most fundamental and core human values
extant: recognition and autonomy (compared to the limited extent that non-disabled people are autonomous
and recognised – that’s another matter altogether!).
The movement above all sought recognition and sought to combat the curtailment of their rights,
responsibilities and opportunities in important sectors of society, a few including education, employment
and housing. The movement also attained legislative changes in countries like Australia, Britain and
America – discrimination was outlawed and egalitarian views were upheld as right and just. Yet, when it
comes to the duty of enforcing these laws, somehow, there develops an unbridgeable gap between what is
right and just in theory and what is right and just in practise – offcourse a number of questions surge forward
at this point: the absent ways in which the ethic of justice is applied by predominantly males towards
resolving large-scale political and societal issues resulting in the latter being something which is left eating
the dust on, I can safely say, ALL political agendas … So, not only is the ethic of care allegedly futile in
solid politics, but so is the ethic of justice, although in political theory the latter sounds like a more feasible
façade than the emotional overtones associated with ‘care’, but in reality is just as futile, merely a façade, a
mask, if not more of a caricature reflecting the image of applied ethics in politics.
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What is the number one priority on the political agenda? Where do ethics fit in? What are the most
important things in life? Achieving the objectives of a political agenda discarding ethics, whether of ‘care’
or off ‘justice’ or upholding ethics first and diplomacy second? Is it a battle of political, economical and
personal benefits and the throwing out of moral judgment and moral accountability or morals first at the cost
of throwing out the benefits – on a large, rather than small scale? What deserves to stay and what deserves to
get thrown out and who really gets a say in these matters and who really makes a difference? Are they
people who care about ethics and morals or those who have disowned them the moment they stepped into
decision-making shoes of a brand called power? Those who are wearing these shoes want to ensure they
keep them clean, brand new, and most importantly want to keep them theirs – at all costs, including at the
cost of doing what’s right. It was probably more expensive to get these shoes then it was to get or rather
keep ethics… you can always repay the ethics debt later, it’s interest-free which is a plus. Passion, that
which ignites all movements (otherwise issues would remain stagnant), has sparked this line a rhetorical
interrogation. Is it wrong or right to ask the above questions? Is it ethical? That is beyond this movement’s
viewpoint and for the observer to decide. Isn’t it right to say what you want and do what you feel is right in
reality? So why should it be any different in writing? A movement in writing can create a large-scale social
movement and should not be considered wrong or impossible (look at the Koran or the Bible and the
influences these words have had and still have).
I will go on to illustrate that neither the feminist ethic of care nor the masculine ethic of justice, or any
ethical standards have been applied to do what is right for disabled people (and other minorities in society
for that matter).
The disability rights movement was massive and served to highlight what is irrefutably ‘just’ for disabled
people, and was recognised as doing so, yet, the application of the ethic of justice depends to a heavy degree
on the ethic of care. If one is indifferent, one does not feel it imperative to do what is right. Prior to the
movement, no care or level of protection for the welfare of disabled people was enacted or enforced. Was
this correct? Had nobody decided to push the movement forward, therefore had no ethics of care been
exercised, was justice being exercised? Do people in positions of power want justice for people, especially
those who are vulnerable and tuned out to recognition, autonomy and power? Offcourse not. They would
prefer to divert their care to other, non-ethical matters, and say that care ethics do not belong in politics and
cannot make a large-scale difference. Here, they are profoundly mistaken (and know it), yet conceal
themselves under this gloss, until a lamp of fairness and compassion shines over it to reveal the wrinkles,
scars and blemishes, which they quickly are alert to and then try to redress or treat not because they
suddenly are enlightened by the ethic of care or are fit to exercise justice…. but only to keep their shoes on.
Thus, the ethics of care is applied in the latter capacity!
Although the movement inevitably attained some of its objectives because the treatment of disabled people
was blatantly demonstrated to be wrong and unjust, ALL of its goals and aims are unlikely to be reached in
our world. All people have morals and ethics, those in power and those without it. What is right and just is
already apparent yet is turned a blind eye to, until a movement such as this one exposes or ‘highlights’ what
is already known but for which only trivial changes can be given, leaving the movement hungry for the real
changes which cannot be made, because ethics is not the driving force or politics or anything in the large-
scale world we live in. Is this justice?
What is the point of striving towards justice when even if it were within your grip, you would not know how
to use it? Care and compassion are much more elusive than justice – even if you could contain them, you
could only do so for small-scale projects – it’s a real trick and a lot more fun to be able to use them on a
large-scale basis…and succeed.
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Assuming authority in the West: The campaign and counter-campaign defending Amina
Kieran Longridge
This paper will consider the use of transnational advocacy networks as a strategy for affecting social change.
In particular I will be case studying the campaign to prevent the stoning to death of Amina Lawal under
Sharia state law in Northern Nigeria for having a child out of wedlock. Initially, a joint statement was
released by BAOBAB and Amnesty International’s International Secretariat regarding the criticisms of the
Sharia based penal codes, however the case proliferated by means of an online campaign. As the details of
Amina’s case spread around the world (Amnesty 2002), Amnesty’s name prevailed, but BAOBAB’s did not.
The e-campaign proliferated reaching organisations’, individuals and gaining mass media attention, even
including an Oprah Winfrey campaign to ‘save Amina’.
Recently BAOBAB a Nigerian Women’s Rights NGO and the legal representatives for Amina launched a
counter-campaign requesting that all letter writing and e-petitions cease as they could well result in negative
ramifications (Iman & Medar-Gould: 2003). The trigger for this counter-campaign was another e-campaign
that occurred in April this year stating that Amina was to be stoned to death this June, when in actual fact
her appeal had been adjourned until June 2003. The latter campaign containing incorrect information was
said to have derived from Amnesty’s Spanish section, although Amnesty has stated this was the result of
some confusion (Amnesty, 2003).
Often a gap will exist between a theory in the abstract and the application of a theory when applied to a case
study. The campaign and counter-campaign regarding Amina’s circumstance highlights what has occurred
in this gap, whilst also providing a learning curve regarding the potential for current and future transnational
advocacy networks. Whilst this case highlights network activity and the velocity of web based campaigns, I
will focus on some of the features of transnational advocacy networks that were absent.
The term transnational advocacy network is relatively self-explanatory, but there are certain features that
distinguish these networks from others. As the name suggests, these networks operate beyond nation states
and comprise of people from different nationalities working together on a specific issue or campaign. Some
well-known examples of social movements that featured transnational advocacy networks include the anti-
MAI campaign, Nestle boycott, anti-slavery movement and the anti-apartheid movement (Khagram et al,
2002).
The potential for these transnational advocacy networks ranges from establishing or ‘setting up’ issues to
influencing institutional changes and state behavior. There are certain features that academics ascribe to
these networks including they are voluntary, non-hierarchical, inclusive and involve an open sharing of
information. It is all of these features that separate transnational advocacy networks from transnational
economic or Political networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).
As mentioned earlier I will be looking at what occurred in relation to the framing of the issues by BAOBAB
and Amnesty, particularly the disparity regarding the delivery of the issues and strategic approaches to
campaigning on those issues. As outlined in the joint statement the overarching issues relate to human rights
standards being neglected by use of the death penalty, flogging and amputation under Sharia penalties
(Amnesty, 2002). But specifically to the e-campaign regarding Amina, the message underlying the
campaign was that international pressure would have a positive influence for Amina (Amnesty 2002, 2003).
However, BAOBAB asserts that this perspective was inaccurate because Amina is not facing imminent
death, but a protracted legal process. Also, to date every case that a Nigerian NGO has worked on has been
successful in appeal or is still within the appeal process (Iman & Medar-Gould, 2003).
Information politics in this context refers to the ways that networks bind with each other using
predominately informal methods of communication. Human rights methodology involves “promoting
change by reporting facts” with an emphasis on accuracy, something that Amnesty has built a strong
48
reputation for doing (Keck & Sikkink, 1998: 18-19). Whilst the facts presented by Amnesty were accurate,
there was a shift in focus by dramatising Amina’s case as an individual e-campaign.
In relation to current strategy, BAOBAB has requested that the international audience stop writing and if
people wish to assist them then to do so via funding, exchanging relevant information, knowledge and
experience or assisting with safe-housing (Iman & Medar-Gould, 2003). Some Amnesty Sections are still
urging people to get involved in their letter writing campaign and to join Amnesty. Furthermore, in a good
deal of the Amnesty material relating to this case that I sourced, BAOBAB was not identified by name. This
may well be part of Amnesty’s policy that arises from marketing and membership priorities, however the
outcome of this type of omission is that funds are channeled toward Amnesty instead of directly toward
covering the legal costs relating to Amina’s trial and domestic campaigning on similar trials (Malhotra,
2000).
The contradictions in this case study ring familiarly of issues relating to western-centricity. The first concern
relates to inequality regarding voice and representation within the transnational advocacy network. One of
the theoretical strengths of the transnational advocacy networks is that they do not drown out the diversity of
voices that are involved (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Recent empirical studies back this up by stating that
transnational advocacy networks and international NGO’s are “becoming more globally representative and
are also accounting for the needs and interests of people outside industrialised nations” (Khagram et al,
2002: 9).
Network advocates point out that there will generally be dominant voices within networks and this
dominance often relates to those with more resources, in this instance, Amnesty (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).
As already pointed out, the transnational campaign that proliferated from the Amnesty group’s website did
not identify any other voices, assuming a position of authority, that did in fact drown out the voices of those
directly involved in the campaign. BAOBAB did not react publicly against the first letter writing and e-
petition campaign set up by Amnesty, but in their counter-campaign this April, BAOBAB chose to address
not only the risks associated with campaigns containing incorrect information, but also the issue of
international NGO’s imposing what they perceive as the best strategies on smaller NGO’s (Iman & Medar-
Gould: 2003).
The second point pertains to strategies implemented via transnational networks to stimulate transnational
movement. Amina’s case did penetrate a global consciousness receiving enormous response (Brooks: 2003).
To an extent, due to Amnesty’s brand reputation, the campaign grew quickly based on the assumption that
thorough background research would have occurred including their choice of strategy (Cook, 1996:181).
BAOBAB’s perspective regarding this transnational campaign was that it was set up without any
consultation with those directly involved in helping Amina regarding her case (Iman & Medar-Gould:
2003).
Letter writing and more recently e-petitions are two of the main forms of direct action that Amnesty use for
mass mobilisation. Although BAOBAB do advocate letter writing as a strategic tool when campaigning on
social justice issues, they raise concern when it is automatically applied without considering the
circumstances within the cultural context. In relation to cases similar to Amina’s, BAOBAB argues that
domestic strategies are far more appropriate than the transnational letter writing campaign. Their priority is
to use the institutional structures, particularly the legal system to make necessary long term change given
that Amina’s case is only one in many that will not receive international attention (Iman & Medar-Gould,
2003).
The use of a web campaign does highlight how quickly a transnational advocacy network can develop and
respond to a situation whilst at the same time raising a number of concerns. The framing and emphasis were
not entirely accurate and the letter writing strategy has been regarded by BAOBAB as ineffective. This case
study illustrates the concerns that western-centricity prevail in social justice activism via resource inequality,
representation and cultural appropriateness (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).
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The tensions between north and south NGO’s are well documented. To date there has been little funding
available to southern NGO’s in their own countries and subsequently they has been ongoing resource
transfer from the North to the South which sets up unhealthy power dynamics, whether or not this is
intentional (Malhotra, 2000: 655). Advocates of transnational advocacy networks highlight the essence as an
informal exchanging of information, and this involves working together. If transnational advocacy networks
are operating effectively then the networks can transform into transnational movements that involve joint
mobilisation through collective action of protest or disruption (Khagram, 2002: 9). In the case of Amina,
there was mass mobilisation and protest, however it was imposed instead of being a collaborative action
between the local activists and the highly resourced international NGO.
Although this case study has focused on NGO perspectives and activity, transnational advocacy networks
are not at all exclusive to NGO’s, but they are prominent. To an extent, network theory does overcome the
problem of exclusion when discussing collective action within the context of social justice activism in that it
acknowledges that major participants are located beyond local social movements and NGO’s to include
foundations, media, within governments and so on. However when a transnational campaign is branded as
belonging to a particular organisation the network is not functioning as a social movement due to the
assumption of ownership and authority. This point seems to be particularly problematic given that
transnational advocacy network theorists acknowledge that NGO’s are often highly visible in these
networks, but at the same time NGO’s are to an extent competing for funding for the survival of their
organisation and visibility of branding is a marketing tool (Malhotra, 2000).
This paradox may limit the potential for transnational advocacy networks unless NGO’s are self-reflexive
regarding how a campaign and strategy are built and most importantly who will be benefiting. If NGO’s are
self-reflexive regarding these questions then there is no reason why these networks cannot be beneficial in
building links, sharing knowledge and building pressure campaigns (Keck & Sikkink, 1998: 9).
In raising these issues, I am not arguing a position of pure cultural relativism, but do believe that those
participating in transnational advocacy networks must be very careful not to misappropriate campaigns or
issues out of their cultural context. Particularly important is the role and representation of domestic social
movements and NGO’s which will have necessary knowledge to ensure that the strategies are appropriate.
If anything, the confusion regarding framing and strategy in relation to Amina’s situation around the world
serves as a lesson regarding how transnational advocacy networks, that are principle driven, do have a
responsibility to ensure effective dialogue amongst actors. Her case is not an abstract analysis, but directly
linked to protecting her life and hopefully others that are similarly facing serious human rights violations.
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Peace Movements in Cyprus
Pembe Mentesh
Today, Nicosia in Cyprus remains the world’s last divided capital city. In the last year, its barricades and
checkpoints have provided the backdrop for the island’s largest mobilisation of civilians on each side of the
divide, since partition occurred in 1974.  The peace movements in Cyprus are striving for a united,
democratic Cyprus in the lead up to accession to the European Union. Their role is to challenge the existing
power politics paradigm, revive collective identity, and demonstrate the need for peaceful co-existence if
Cyprus as a whole, is to become a legitimate member of the international community.
A brief historical account of the Cyprus problem will provide a greater understanding of the recent
mobilization by peace movements. The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been operating
since 1964. It is the UN’s longest peacekeeping operation and continues to play a part in maintaining the
status quo. It has not resulted in a non-violent settlement since it began and in 1974 it proved incapable of
dealing with the escalating violence when Turkey intervened to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority,
dividing the island into North and South.  This resulted in the exodus of about 100,000 Turkish Cypriots to
the north and 200,000 Greek Cypriots to the south. While the Republic of Cyprus remained intact south of
the dividing line, in the north the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus established itself in 1983, recognised
only by Turkey. Now, with the Republic of Cyprus about to join the European Union when it takes its next
group of member states in 2004, Cyprus may have a chance for re-unification and co-existence.
Stability in Cyprus has been maintained mostly with military presence, which in turn dictates the political
agenda. According to Jeong, this system of stability is no different from the Cold War order. “Under these
conditions, military power remains as a tools to maintain a hierarchical world order” (Jeong, 2000:15). We
will see later, how and why the peace movements in Cyprus challenge this current political framework. In
this way, they are linked to the global peace movement that opposes war and militarisation.
In 2002, when UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan presented a peace plan to Cyprus, the dormant peace
movements in Cyprus finally found the opportunity to mobilise and take action in support of a solution to
the Cyprus problem. A number of groups (some of them bi-communal) have joined together and are using
minimal resources to get their message across to not only the leaders of both sides, but the international
community. Peace movement groups and organizations such as “Hands Across the Divide”, “Technology
for Peace” and “The 41 Organisations” are all working together, and independently to voice the concerns of
ordinary citizens.
Technology for Peace is a web portal for the latest information about the peace efforts in Cyprus and
relevant links to activist websites. Under the umbrella of Technology for Peace, a number of groups have
been auspiced, and existing ones have joined.  A highlight within Technology for Peace is the “Citizens
Movement for Re-unification and Co-existence”.  For the first time since the Greek and Turkish Cypriots
were divided, this movement aims to raise awareness amongst the Greek Cypriot population, of the struggle
faced by their compatriots in the North. It recognizes that Turkish Cypriots have not been adequately
supported by Greek Cypriots and that  “there exists a great need for a dynamic, effective and visible citizens
movement for re-unification and co-existence within the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community in
Cyprus and abroad” (www.tech4peace.org). The “Citizens Movement for Re-unification and Co-existence”
mobilised with other groups to hold demonstrations on key dates when the two leaders were meeting as part
of the UN peace talks. The demonstrations were in support of re-unification and peaceful co-existence under
the slogan “Ahead for a Common Country.” This marks a turning point in Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot relations, with one side acknowledging the isolation, poverty and marginalisation of the other.
Other initiatives of Technology for Peace include:
• An online petition.
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• The establishment of a platform for NGO’s (some of them bi-communal) to support a solution. They
sent a message of support to the Turkish Cypriots in a lead up to their December 2002
demonstrations.
• Establishing links with similar groups in Germany and Europe.
• Providing the capacity for the internet to be used as the main form of communication between
groups on both sides – not only for collective action but general activities (theatre, concerts) that
promote re-unification.
In the north, the Platform of 41 Organisations is made up of (left wing) political party members, trade
unions, professional and other organizations. They share similar ideals, and also work together in mobilising
for collective action. On January 14, North Cyprus saw the mobilisation of almost 70,000 Turkish Cypriots
(about a third of the population) demonstrating in support of the UN peace plan. This is the largest
mobilisation of Turkish Cypriot citizens since the island was divided.
In the north, Hands Across the Divide, a women’s peace movement, is “framed within an alliance of
women’s organizations called the Women’s Civic Initiative for Peace, who in turn act in concert with a
much larger alliance of progressive groups called ‘The 41 Organisations’” (www.peacewomen.org). And
with Greek Cypriot members in the south, Hands Across the Divide engage in parallel collective action on
either side of the physical divide where joint or bi-communal action is deemed impossible. For example,
demonstrations were held on each side of the island during key dates for the UN peace talks. Women on
both sides with candles, released white doves and white balloons as a form of symbolic action. They carried
placards with the same message in Greek, English and Turkish.
Other initiatives carried out by Hands Across the Divide include:
• A letter writing campaign by member to UN Secretary general Kofi Annan, and the leaders of North
and South Cyprus.
• The sentence for peace campaign whereby sentences for peace, written by Greek Cypriot’s were
collected and given to a Turkish Cypriot poet who will build a statue of peace with the sentences.
• Sending “Henna” to the “Deep State”. When an agreement was not reached in December 2002,
members mailed “henna” (an orange dye) to key figures in North Cyprus and Turkey for maintaining
the status quo. This can be interpreted as symbolic action since henna, apart from being used as hair
dye, can be used to create a dark stain on skin.
As new social movements, the peace movements in Cyprus are defined by their desire for cultural change.
They cut across the fabric of Cypriot society and have as their members, people who share a common aim
regardless of class, gender or ethnicity. “They champion the interests of those who experience social,
political and cultural oppression, whatever their economic circumstances” (Burgmann, 1993:5).
The concept of peace in Cyprus is shaped by the peace movements’ aim for recognition of the cultural ideals
of its members. Without this, the prospects of a solution are diminished. “A social movement is at once a
social conflict and a cultural project. This is as true of dominant movements as it is of dominated
movements. The goal of a social movement is always the realisation of cultural values as well as victory
over a social adversary” (Touraine, 1995:240). So in this sense, when groups such as the “Citizens
Movement for Re-unification and Co-existence” call upon the leaders to agree on a political solution, they
are also contributing to the “development and propagation of the culture and principles of understanding and
co-existence between people irrespective of their ethnic origin, religion, gender…”(www.tech4peace.org).
This aligns with Touraine’s idea that new social movements defend the identity and dignity of those who
experience oppression (Touraine, 1995:247).
Hands Across the Divide call upon the leaders of Cyprus to “safeguard our right of choice to live in an
island free from the threat of armed conflict” (www.peacewomen.org). To this end, the UN plan also calls
for the removal of a substantial amount of military from the island. In this way, the peace movements in
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Cyprus are challenging the status quo and their opposition to the military order characterized above by
Jeong.
Within the framework of peace, Hands Across the Divide are also struggling for gender equality as part of
their demands: “We believe that the Cyprus peace negotiations and political dialogue should also be
informed with women’s perspectives, voices, need and concerns.” “We believe the establishment of a
committee of Cypriot women peace activists should urgently be formed to make recommendations and
provide ideas for the post-conflict period” (Uludag, 2003). Women must have an important role in
determining how the future of Cyprus is shaped. “Gender processes may be regarded as important in
understanding how nationhood and belongingness are retained and reconstituted, particularly through the
role of women as ethnic actors” (Anthias & Lazaridis, 2000:32). Hands Across the Divide are a positive
example of how a social movements within a social movements can hope to achieve the aims of both. Hands
Across the Divide are in a unique situation because they can provide a voice for women in the context of
peace. In terms of new social movement theory, both of these ideals go hand in hand. They preempt the
cultural changes necessary for political and social change.
So how effective have the peace movements in Cyprus been so far? The deadline for reaching an agreement
on the UN peace plan has been and gone. In May 2004, The Republic of Cyprus will join the European
Union but without re-unification, the Turkish Cypriots in the north will experience further isolation and
marginalisation. In the south, Greek Cypriots will not be able to experience the full economic benefits that
would come with an expanded (Turkish Cypriot) workforce. Today, Cyprus is still a divided nation but on
23 April 2003, the border restrictions that separated the people for almost 30 years, were relaxed to allow
movement between north and south. It would be difficult to assess whether or not this is the result of the
demands put forward by the peace movements, and even if it was, does it serve the purpose of kerbing the
movements since partition still exists? Regardless, some would argue that the current changes at the border
would not have occurred without the people’s desire and demand for co-existence and re-unification.
Despite, the paperwork required, the queues, and the checkpoints, more than 800,000 Greek and Turkish
Cypriots have crossed. And a feeling of nostalgia is sweeping the nation.
The notion held (and demonstrated through their policies) by the political elites, that the two communities
cannot co-exist has been disproved: “Despite media campaigns painting hostile images of the other side,
despite repression and persecution against those defending peace, despite state policies against any solution,
the two communities very clearly have shown their wish to live together in a common country in this short
period of time” (Uludag, 2003).
Both sides are aware of the economic benefits of a closer relationship. Re-unification before Cyprus’
accession to the European Union would mean that Turkish Cypriots would be able to participate in the world
economy (which they have been cut off from for 29 years), along with their Greek Cypriot compatriots.
“The sense that they might be cut off from the dynamic economic and cultural space of the union has been
and remains the biggest force for change on the Turkish side of the Green Line” (Woollacot, 2003).
But critics of the UN peace plan, such as Andros Payiatsos argue that the plan is flawed and in reality
reflects the “desire of the ruling classes of Cyprus and Turkey to join the European Union” (Payiatsos,
2003). Despite the perceived benefits of European Union membership, Cyprus, as one of the smaller
member states, will contribute to the expansion and power of the European Union with little to show in
return. The Nice Treaty of 2001, signed by member states, adjusts numbers and shifts power upwards
towards the larger countries (Dunne, 2002).
European Union membership and economic benefits aside, the struggle in Cyprus is just as much, if not
more about recognition. The Turkish Cypriots have been marginalized and isolated from the international
community for 29 years. Likewise, Greek Cypriots have been cut off from their land and have been
restricted to their own side of the Green Line. It is about the desire of both sides to co-exist and roam free in
their own country. The situation in Cyprus can be interpreted as cultural injustice as set out by Fraser and is
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linked to economic injustice, which can be remedied through political-economic changes. Cultural injustice
however, requires “cultural or symbolic change” (Fraser, 1997:15). In this case, the cultural injustice
experienced by Turkish Cypriots has resulted in economic injustices, evidenced by the poverty and
unemployment that has come with isolation and the lack of recognition. Using this position, you could argue
that economic redistribution will automatically follow recognition. In this sense, “peace is most fulfilled in a
place where opportunities for both psychological and material self-realisation are provided…co-operation
can be better maintained in a society that is supportive of economic equity and well-being” (Jeong, 2000:14)
The peace movements in Cyprus, through collective action and various other means are challenging the
political elites on each side of the divide to reach a solution to the 29 year old “Cyprus Problem”. Despite
the continued failure of the UN peace plan for Cyprus, the movements need to maintain the momentum of
the last year and continue to exert their demands consistently and collectively. With border crossings now
permissible, they have the opportunity to increase bi-communal action. Despite the criticisms of the UN
peace plan and European Union membership, the peace movements in Cyprus can at least utilise this as a
framework or starting point to a solution. If economic benefits have roused the dormant peace movements in
Cyprus, the desire for cultural and social change, will ensure their survival and success. This desire is deeply
embedded in any Cypriot who longs for the chance to be free and to be recognised in his or her own country.
“My village has been calling me since the day I left her. On that day, she said ‘You won’t forget me will
you? I’m the place of your childhood memories. I helped shape you as a person. You will return to me one
day. I will wait for you’. This calling from my village, ever present, has now reached a point where I have
no choice but to go back. I am completely under her spell”.
Ibrahim Ozejder, 43, Academic and Journalist, who visited his village on 26 April 2003.
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Global Peace Action against the War on Iraq: The tensions that gave rise to the largest peace
movement in recorded history
Kym McInerney
In February and March of 2003 the world saw the greatest public social protestation in recorded history. The
American lead ‘War on Iraq’ sparked the social participation in consecutive public protests that in February
saw well over 10 million protesters in 300 cities across 60 countries engage in protests around the globe,
over the period of several weeks. In this discussion I will attempt to give an indication of the tensions and
reasons that gave rise to these protests and discuss the social movements’ dynamics inherent within them.
In looking into the reasons for such a large mobilisation of people it is necessary to discuss the multiple
realms of social engagement that make up such a movement from the political arena within and between
nations, the mainstream media coverage of this, the protests and the war, and the social spectrum of people
who made up the global protests. In order to do this the internet was found to be a fantastic source of
information relating to the protests, along with a fantastic source for the various social movements that
participated in the marches. I have attempted to qualitatively evaluate the many different media articles in an
attempt to gain a clearer understanding of the dynamics involved in these global protests.
What has to be looked at initially in this discussion is the sheer number of different countries in which
protests took place. From within America itself and the allied countries of Britain and Australia, to India and
Japan, many European nations, Africa, South America and China, many people have joined together to
protest. Not only the numbers but also the composition of the protestors gives an indication of the
widespread opposition to the war, with people from all areas of society and all ages.
In looking at the reasons and make up of the protestors who have taken part in the peace movement, I
utilised the many resources on the internet and have tried to take from a broad spectrum of media
viewpoints. This included taking from the mainstream media within America, Britain and Australia,
including CNN, The New York Times, The Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald, as well as various
alternative media sources, which included mainly the Guardian, a British based press, and various NGO and
social activism websites. What these media sources revealed was that while the protests where held under
the larger banner of the antiwar protests, they comprised a multitude of issues and agendas, some closely
related to the war on Iraq and others related to a wide variety of social and humanitarian issues. Many of
these issues related to the issue of globalisation and the commodification of human values along with
various individual national issues for the various countries in which protests took place.
On the global level of these issues, slogans and banners around the world such as ‘UN not US’ indicated one
of the most predominant issues that lead the antiwar protests, in that in taking the action of invading Iraq, the
US had blatantly flouted the international community’s decision within the United Nations to pursue further
inspections within Iraq. This driving dynamic of the public outrage at such a blatant act of defiance tied in
for many protestors directly to the growing view of America’s domination of many parts of the globe in
economic, ideological and militaristic terms. Along with this issue of what is seen by many protestors as
American Imperialism, slogans such as ‘No Blood for Oil’, ‘Disarm the US’ and ‘Bush is a terrorist’ are
indicative of the view by much of the protestors of the capitalist agenda of the USA in the pursuit of
resources and dominance in global arenas.
In response to the international antiwar movements the mainstream media was found to be especially
strident in deriding the nations and protestors with an agenda that was inline with the allied political stance.
Just as the USA within the United Nations pushed for the invasion of Iraq based on the threat of weapons of
mass destruction being utilised by the ‘global’ threat of terrorism, the mainstream media used this line to
pursue the influencing of public opinion. With accusations of anti-national sentiments within the allied
nations against the protestors, and complacency of the UN and those countries opposed to military action,
many instances of attempting to influence public opinion can be found. In doing this mainstream media used
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many different levels and angles. One story run by the New York Times showed a picture of American
graves in Norway, headed with the title ‘They died for France, but France has forgotten’, and Rumsfeld
himself accused both France and Germany of being part of an ‘Old Europe’. The singular arguments of the
American government and the mainstream media can be seen as an indication of the problematic nature of
the allied position in the pursuit of the invasion of Iraq.
Within Australia and Britain accusations of being anti-national or ‘against our boys’ were levelled at
protestors by media. Such blanket claims can be seen as an attempt to homogenise the peace movement and
thus enable it to be discredited, but numerous alternative media publications reported and participants
witnessed personally, that within the various protests there were war veterans from different campaigns and
ages within all 3 allied countries.
On the national level I found that many of the protestors’ issues with the antiwar movement related to the
inequities of the social condition within countries, with protestors seeking to highlight issues. In America
protestors took to the streets with such slogans as ‘Healthcare not Warfare’, within Australia, ‘Books not
Bombs’. Also, within Australia, the issue of the governments’ policy on immigration and detention was
highlighted. These examples indicate the level at many people feel the injustice of their governments’
decisions and attempt to bring focus to issues which had lived meaning for the participants. It is not to be
taken that the protestors were not participating purely for these issues without the underlying motivation of
seeking to halt the pursuit of war or global peace, but rather that individuals as participants highlight those
areas in which they are most emotionally involved.
National issues were not only found within the allied countries but also within countries whose governments
both supported and were against the war. In the countries of Germany and France the protests were of a
more peaceful nature in comparison to those within countries such as Spain and Italy, where protestors
clashed violently with police. The violent nature of the clashes within Spain and Italy could be taken to
indicate the extent to which protestors felt obligated to voice strong dissention against their governments’
stance, although the complexity of these issues could not be looked into in great detail within this
discussion.
Despite mainstream medias agenda to discredit the anti-war protests in order to bolster mainstream public
opinion within the allied nations of America, Britain and Australia, it can be seen that rather than the
protests being only about the war on Iraq, they were comprised by a varied range of social movements issues
from the issue of globalisation to the issues of true democratic representation of citizens within the various
nations. The longevity of these movements and their continued support gives a picture of the antiwar
movement as a wide scale active forum in which many issues could find greater recognition and voice.
In the context of social movements’ theory, the protests can be viewed from various perspectives. For some
participants in the initial protests, from a participators point of view, many felt that taking to the streets to
voice their dissention towards the involvement in the war, could well be a means by which governments
would change their stance and back down from entering into military conflict. In looking at the participants’
numbers in the consecutive marches mainly within Australia, it is seen quite clearly that after military action
began, the numbers dropped dramatically from approximately 300,000 in the first protest to only about
50,000 participants in the subsequent marches. This gives a picture of the large majority of protests taking
part in the marches in the hope of effecting direct change through such action. Sadly, once such action
seemed to bring no direct effect the motivation for participation declined.
Even without looking at participant numbers in the Australian marches, within Britain, alternative media had
already started to look at the effects such acts would achieve. In an article in the Guardian by Oliver King
titled ‘Can the march change anything?’ (14.2.03) the question whether social protest would be effective in
causing the British government to withdraw from the war was looked at in the context of similar prior
protests within Britain. King concluded that while such action would not have an immediate effect in
changing the Blair government’s stance, in the past such large movements and particularly the factor of who
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was involved in them did have the long term effect of change within government stance and policy. Thus it
could be seen that while the immediate and direct effects sought by many protestors where not forthcoming
the ongoing effects of such large gatherings when looked at in a recent historical context, and considering
the size of them, could be seen as a large step in the direction of allowing greater public voice in the
generation of national and international policy.
What this also highlights is the agendas of the continuing participants in the peace movement, and their
ongoing motivations to remain a continual voice for the various social and humanitarian issues which they
seek to highlight. From the issues of the fair distribution of global capital and the commodification of human
values, to the right to participate democratically within government decisions, the antiwar marches became a
forum by which these various movements could gain renewed vigour and recognition. Indeed, in
conversations and in media articles, it is becoming apparent that many social movements are gaining direct
participator action and involvement due to the heightened public awareness that the global protests
generated.
In looking at these aspects of the global anti war movement it can be seen that the divergent motivations of
large diverse groups of people found voice and action under the larger umbrella of the protests against the
war on Iraq. In this sense the social movements can be seen as the internetworking and participatory nature
of multiple threads of social activism and discussion, bound together by what in some sense could be seen as
the political opportunity brought about by Americas pursuit of military action.
In conclusion this discussion has looked at, although only in broad terms, the reasons and dynamics that
gave rise to such large scale global protests in response to the war on Iraq by America and its allies. I have
also attempted to look at the dynamics and motivations of the participants within the protests to give a
deeper sense of the divergent yet cohesive aspects of these reasons for their participation and place this in
the context of the ongoing creation and growth of a larger social movement. Within this dynamic the
ongoing pressures of the mainstream medias representation of the social movement and its attempts to
homogenise and disempower it have also been indicated in contrast to the alternative medias, as a source of
contention, and a dynamic force with which the global antiwar movement must contend in it’s ongoing
attempts create social change in the diverse areas which it comprises.
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Argentina and Counter-Globalization Movements
Wendy Nelson
This case study of Argentina will use a primarily Neo-Marxist mode of analysis, additionally drawing upon
dependency theory, to examine both the causes of the economic collapse in Argentina and the spontaneous
popular uprising that ensued.  This paper argues that the Argentinean economic crisis can be directly
attributed to the neo-liberal policies of the Menem government and to the structural adjustment policies of
the IMF.
This paper has three main strands. Firstly it will show how capital from ‘core’ countries (in the form of
financial institutions and transnational corporations) worked along side the state and the indigenous elites to
systematically drain Argentina of funds. Secondly it will examine some of the spontaneous social
movements that have arisen since the apex of the crisis in December 2001.  These movements based in both
urban and regional centres have included “assambleas barriales” (neighbourhood assemblies) unemployed
peoples unions (“piqueteros”) and radical workers organizations.  Finally the achievements of these
movements will be evaluated. Here it is contended that the future of these horizontal, autonomist*
movements is directly linked with the their ability to create a national leadership that can provide a counter-
hegemonic alternative to the neo-liberal project in Argentina [The term autonomist refers to independent
character of the organization.  These movements did not arise from within the traditional vehicles of politics,
such as trade unions or political parties and have refused to engage in creating formal leadership structures].
The Crisis
On the 20th of December 2001 tens of thousands of Argentineans spontaneously took to the streets to
demonstrate against the government of Fernando de la Rua.  The immediate spark to the crisis was the
governments’ decision to freeze all bank accounts and the IMF suspending its bailout package.  The national
economy had been in deep trouble for several months, not least of all because of the government’s decision
to unpeg the peso from the dollar.  As a result of this the peso went through a massive depreciation and the
population sensed that without access to their bank accounts their saving would vanish overnight.  Middle
class professionals poured into the Plaza de Mayo banging pots and demanding the end to all corrupt
politicians, supermarkets were ransacked, banks were pelted with stones and the president was forced to flee
the country.  Argentina over the next 12 days was engulfed in popular protest and was to go through four
heads of governments and default on it’s 95bn dollar debt – the largest default in history.  The 20th of
December 2001 has become know as the “Argentinazo”(Klein, 2002a; Rock, D., 2002; Petras 2002a).
Background to the Argentinazo
Argentina at the turn of century was one of the 10 riches countries in the world.  However despite this brief
belle epoque period Argentina can currently be designated, in the parlance of dependency theory, as a
periphery country (Rock 2002).  Dependency theorists argue that all countries are either highly developed
capitalist core countries, such as US, Germany and Britain or they are under-developed periphery countries.
This pattern of development takes place because the core countries systematically appropriate the natural
resources and surplus of the periphery countries.  This process is achieved by the linkages (such as direct
foreign investment and financial institutions) that capital has with the periphery governments and indigenous
bourgeois or comprador class.  Within dependency theory the middle-classes are seen as inherently corrupt
and unable to bring about progressive changes.  This is a significant break with the classical Marxist
tradition that argues that a bourgeois revolution is the necessary first step in the road towards socialism.
Furthermore within the periphery countries there is an internal pattern of uneven development.  Regional
areas are poorer and have a peasant/agrarian base and are subordinate to the more power and richer
wage/labour metropolis (Giovanni 2002; Hadis 2003).
Rock (2002) notes that Argentina has been marked by a pattern of development that is typical of periphery
countries.  This is manifested geographically, with the capital Buenos Aires being undisputed centre of
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power and wealth and with the regional areas characterized by underemployment and lack of social services.
The middle class have also had a central role in the economic and political development of Argentina.  Since
the anarchist lead general strike of 1902 the middle classes have organized politically to control the working
classes and maintain their power base in the urban areas.  This middle-class mobilization first manifest itself
with the formation of the Radical Party and later with they became key supporters of Peronism.  The
strategy of the Peron government was to buy off the organized working class with cash payments and
expand the middle class with the development of administrative jobs in the urban and the regional centres.
This dependency of the middle class on the state sector was also to be an essential ingredient that allowed
the military dictatorship that came to power in 1976 to rule ruthlessly and without significant opposition
until 1983 (Rock 2002). During this period of military dictatorship the middle class either benefited directly
from the junta’s corrupt relationship with corporations or chose to keep their class position by turning a
blind eye to the almost 30 000 people that were killed during the ‘dirty war’ (Klein 2002a).  Klein (2002a)
asserts that this period of military dictatorship laid the foundations for the neo-liberal policies of the Menem
government to come.  The junta slashed social welfare, opened the economy to transnational corporations
and increased foreign debt from 7bn to 43bn.
Menem was elected in the 1989 election and immediately set about implementing a neo-liberal agenda:
government spending was slashed and formerly public corporations and pension funds were privatised.  In
1991, as the US underwent a dramatic recession, mobile capital took flight to the emerging markets in Latin
America and the Menem government benefited greatly from this.  Thereafter Argentina became a model of
economic liberalism and a showpiece of globalisation closely aligned with the US.  The IMF and the World
Bank were very supportive of the Menem government –especially for his role in privatising the pension
funds. The peso was pegged to the dollar in 1991 with the belief that this would encourage domestic savings
and deal with hyperinflation.  For the first part of the 1990’s the economy did grow and it seemed that
capitalist style development would bring about the promised future and the rigid dichotomies
(developed/underdeveloped; core/periphery) of dependency theory would be transcended.  However this
economic growth was bought at a high price: it was financed by the selling of government assets.  This
privatisation program led to effective loss of government control over capital flows.  This was to be a critical
causal factor in the subsequent collapse of the Argentina economy (Rock 2002, Petras 2002a).
Dependency theory maintains that core countries are able to regulate their foreign reserves by raising
interest rates to draw funds from abroad or controlling exports.  However debtor countries in the periphery
lack this control and balance of payment crises tend to result.  Argentina had a growing balance of payments
crisis since the early 90’s.  The privatisation program bought a massive flux of money, which led to sharp
rise in imports that, was driven by middle-class consumption patterns.  However there was not a comparable
increase in the productivity or the development of an industrial sector.  Despite all the financial reforms
Argentina remained an agrarian economy.  These changes (privatization, trade liberalization and the
contraction of public works) would have profound impact on labour.  Menem bought off union leader ship
and the working class lost their jobs when many industries were privatised – inequality began to soar (Rock
2002, Petras 2002a)
The first big shock to the Argentine economy came in 1994 when there was a sharp increase in US interest
rates and the world bond-market crashed.  Massive amount of capital left Latin America.  However
Argentina survived but it was from this point of that the debt problem became worse.  By 1996 funds from
privatisation were exhausted.  Also during this time the US dollar increased dramatically and all the mobile
capital in the world went to the US.  This was a crisis for all periphery countries that had staked their growth
on attracting foreign investment.  However Argentina still did not let its currency float.  This decision was a
result of pressure from the middle-class that did not want to lose its savings and the IMF continued to back
the system that was getting them into unsustainable debt.  This sharp bend in the downward spiral of the
economy resulted in the collapse of the Menem government.  (Rock 2002)
In October 1997 a new government led by Fernando De La Rua was elected. It was formed out of a coalition
of centre and left parties and was promised 40 billion-dollar loan from the IMF if the government met very
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strict fiscal austerity measures.  However politically and economically the IMF austerity plan would be
disastrous for the already impoverished working class and for the economy.  The plan called for more
spending and for the government to continue to meets its loan repayments.  Spending-cuts lead to more
unemployment, which contributed to the continued depreciation of the peso.  With the currency in free fall
the race began to withdraw savings from bank accounts (Rock 2002).   Rock notes:
Withdrawal from bank deposits reached $500 million per day in Late November, and staggering $1
billion per day in early December 2001.  Political support for De La Rua was completely gone and it
was in these circumstances that Cavallo (the finance minister) instituted the corralito (the freeze on
accounts).  Backing for the De La Ru now vanished completely. (2002, p84)
However the IMF supported the fixed-rate system right up until the December 2001 crisis.  They accept no
blame for this crisis, instead asserting that that poor domestic fiscal mismanagement and an insufficiently
flexible Argentine labour regime were its primary causes.  The IMF was most outraged by the decision of
the Argentine congress in September 2002 to extend the ban on mortgage foreclosures (Rock, 2002).
After the Argentinazo
Immediately following the December 20 uprising there was an explosion of spontaneous leaderless
movements.  These movements included barrio-based people’s assemblies, unemployed people’s unions
“Piquetero” that organized highway blockades and workers organizations.  The mood of the masses was
jubilant: Klein captures some of this feeling:
Most assemblies began, in the face of so much planned misery, to plan something else: joy,
solidarity, another kind of economy.  Soup kitchen were opened, job banks and trading clubs formed.
In the past year, between 130 and 150 factories, bankrupt and abandoned by their owners, have been
taken over by their workers and turned into cooperative or collectives.   At tractor plants,
supermarkets, printing houses, aluminum factories and pizza parlours, decisions about company
policy are now made in open assemblies, and profits are split equally among the workers.  In recent
months, the “fabricas tomadas” (literally taken factories) have begun to network among themselves
and are beginning to plan an informal ‘solidarity economy’: garment workers form an occupied
factory, for example, sew sheets for an occupied health clinic (Klein 2002a).
The December 20 uprising was hugely important to the international anti-globalization movement. For many
in the movement, the uprising was seen as the first nation-wide revolt against neo-liberalism.  However
Klein cautions that ‘one year on there is barely a trace left of the wildly hopeful idea that they [the people]
could run the country’ (Klein 2003b).  The economy is still in deep trouble with official unemployment
recorded at 20%.  Most sections of the working class and the newly impoverished middle class are barely
scraping together the means for surviving (Klein, 2003b).
Klein (2003b) argues that one of the reasons that the popular social movements have not been able to
maintain the momentum that they have consciously rejected the creation of formal leadership and contesting
for state power. This paper will now focus on the ‘piquetero’ movement as it is the largest and most active
of these social movements that arose from the popular dissent against the neo-liberal agenda. An assessment
of the strengths and weakness of the ‘piquetero’ movement will help to illustrate some of the challenges that
face counter-globalization movements.
The piquetero (also known as in Spanish as the MTD) began as mass movement of unemployed people
based in the poor interior and has rapidly spread geographically throughout Argentina.  The agrarian base of
this movement is significant as dependency theorists argue that in periphery countries the revolution classes
are the peasant and the most marginalised.   As early 1996 the MTD were organizing successful blockades
of the national highways in an effort to gain food concessions and temporary work from the state.  However
as unemployment and impoverishment increased as a consequence of the privatisation project of the Menem
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government - the protest steadily became more desperate and militant.  In the months leading up to the
December 2001 Argentinazo, MTD groups numbering over 100 000 people, shut down three hundred
highways.  In the months leading December 2001 over three thousand militants were arrested.  Despite the
police actions the MTD were able to pressure the state into providing thousands of jobs and food parcels
whilst strictly maintaining their independence. These actions drew support and often included local
merchants, public sector employees and health care worker and human rights groups such as the Madres de
Plaza de Mayo.  (Mothers of the Plaza) (Petras, 2002a). Several authors have noted that these actions
provided a vital context for the December 2001 uprising (Petras 2002a; Klein 2002b). Petra (2002a) asserts
that there were three objective conditions that made the MTD possible.  Firstly, the MTD is based within the
unemployed and never-employed young people who face a bleak future and have nothing to lose. Secondly
these impoverished barrios were also strategically located next to the highways.  Thirdly, the MTD were
also successful because they have vigilant about maintaining their independence.  They have avoided
working with the trade union bureaucracy and political parties that have all historically been part of the
corrupt patronage systems of previous governments.  Furthermore the direct action tactics were a key
element in the empowerment of the participants from victims of poverty to organized activists.  Some the of
the demands of the MTD include the funding for more locally administered jobs, the freeing of jailed
activists, public investments in water, roads and a living wage.  Beyond local and immediate demands the
MTD also want an end to the austerity programs and cancellations of all debt repayments (Petras, 2002a).
The general direction of the MTD is decidedly anti-capitalist in its tone.  Emillio Ali, a jailed leader of the
MTD commented in an interview with Naomi Klein:
Unemployment exists everywhere.  I feel close to many social and political movements all over the
world.  And I think that it’s time for us to unite, because the capitalist financial system has show that
its projects doesn’t work – and not just here in Argentina, but all over.  A project for a few is actually
no good for anyone.  It’s time we organized politically on that basis.  The struggle is political – it
goes well beyond asking for a little bit of bread (Klein 2002b)
Petras (2002a) claims that the emergence of the MTD shatters the theory of new social movement writers
who claim that marginal and poor people are unable to challenge the established political power.  The
unemployed workers movements also challenge Marxist orthodoxy that sees only workers who are directly
engaged in the labour process as being capable of challenging capitalism.
Despite the successes of the MTD, Petras and Veltmeyer (2002) contend that the MTD have not realized
their full potential.  Although they have been successful in securing some concessions from the government
they have not been able to develop into a force that is capable of systemic transformation of the type that
leaders such as Emillio Ali desire.  Some of the causes of this failure to provide a viable alternative have
been internal. However Klein (2003b) argues that the biggest barrier is the lack of engagement with formal
organisation and leadership structures.
The MTD has been aggressively autonomist in its organizational strategy and Klein (2003a) argues that this
in the long term will have a detrimental effect on its ability to bring about social change.   She states that:
‘While the parties’ plans verged on scripture, some autonomists turned not having a plan into a religion of
its own: So wary were they of co-optation any proposal to move from protest to policy was immediately
suspect” (p2).  Because of this approach the recent 2003 elections were uncontested by the social
movements who promised so much only a few months before (Klein 2003b).
This issue of the ‘state’ goes to the heart of many theories that surround the debates on the nature of
globalization.  There is a tendency in the literature on globalization to assume that because capitalism has
gone global that the state is no longer relevant.  However Wood (1997) argues that state is essential to
maintaining the conditions for accumulation.  The state has a key role in regulating mobile capital and
controlling the labour force.  Every transnational corporation depends on the state to give it access to its
market.  Wood goes on to assert that the whole point about globalization is that competition is not just about
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competition between companies but competition between regions and countries. The state, she argues, is the
main agent of globalization.
The protestors in Argentina were united by their criticism of the neo-liberal policies of the state.  In
accordance with dependency theory the only way for periphery countries to ‘develop’ in a way that meets
the needs of the people is to disengage with the ‘core’ countries.  It is only then that the vicious cycle of
under-development can be broke.  Across Latin America there is a rising tide of anger at the destruction that
centuries of ‘development’ have bought to the region.  Militant popular protest has emerged in Brazil,
Venezuela and Mexico all demanding an end to the super profits and exploitation.  These movements could
be the basis for a new regional solidarity block that is capable of dislocating from the destructive logic of
capitalism. (Wood 1997; Petras 2002b)
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that the economic collapse of the Argentinean economy in December 2001 was
a direct consequence of the neo-liberal policies of the right-wing Menem government.  By examining the
background to the crisis I was able to show that the conditions for the failure of the neo-liberal project are
based in the unequal and exploitative relationship that periphery countries such as Argentina have with the
more powerful core countries.  This essay also showed that the many popular protest movements that
emerged during and after the economic crisis were united by their anger at the impoverishment that the neo-
liberal project brought.  Finally I provided an analysis of the MTD’s aims and political strategy.  Here I
maintained that although the MTD has widespread popular support and a considerable power base, it has
failed to achieve any real control over social and economic policy.
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Comparative peace movements across the US, UK and Australia
Diane Patruno
Introduction
On 15 April 2003 Australia’s The Age newspaper reported that “over the February 15 weekend, 10 million
people rallied in rolling demonstrations from San Francisco to Berlin, Afghanistan to Cairo, in a new display
of globalisation” (4).  The New York Times described the weekend as “a global daisy chain of largely
peaceful protests (16 February 2003: 1).  This global display of solidarity was symbolic as not only did it
unite activists around the world it also represented a new repertoire of action for the peace movement.
This paper will compare the peace movements across a global stage, specifically, the United States of
America (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. It will identify the similarities of these actions and
explore the differences that occurred in framing the three nations’ actions.
Methodology
Websites were examined that contained details of the group. I also extensively looked at press material,
particularly in the US and UK, in an attempt to better place these movements in the context in which they
operated. This helped to explain why certain framing took place in the US and not in Australia or the UK.
Johnston and Goodman (Week One Reading UTS Online, 2003) purport that to be effective, researchers of
social movements need to work across the divides of both theory and practice. I acknowledge that my
research has been limited by the fact that I am only an active participant in the peace movement in Australia.
I have observed and analysed the US and UK peace movements, however, this analysis is limited by
retrospective research only.  I have had to rely on information gained from other sources in an attempt to
contextualise them.
Similarities of the movements
The peace movement is a universal one as it claims to contest power relations of the human species as a
whole.  It is a movement that focuses on the struggle for people to influence the decisions made by those in
power, decisions that will effect their lives or their environment (Burgmann, 1993: 187).
This universalism was perhaps a key factor in the ability of the movement to mobilise throughout the world.
The marches in particular, were a massive display of solidarity and interestingly, regardless of whether the
city was London, Sydney or New York similar accounts were given by marchers. Richard Williams of The
Guardian in the UK described the march not as a “movement” but as a “feeling”: “A feeling that drove
wave after wave of people in a great river which began to flow” (17 February 2003).  This feeling was
replicated in the US and Australia.
This commonality shows the movement’s ability to transcend boarders. Meyer and Tarrow (1998: 13)
suggest that mass media makes it possible to speed-up the dissemination of contentious politics.  Images
such as the rallies, when broadcast show hundreds of thousands of people marching together around the
world in a massive sign of solidarity.  These images encourage others to act and assists with the action being
legitimised by others contemplating similar activities.
However, in examining the peace movements throughout the world a step needs to be taken back to
determine how such a repertoire could be organised.  Again Meyer and Tarrow (1998) assert that in today’s
society movements that are independent of one another have almost instant access to information about what
other movements are doing (53).  In their paper they focussed on satellite communication, global television
and fax machines, however, it can be argued that the Internet was a great deal more pertinent to today’s
peace movements then any other mode of communication.  Through the Internet actors of movements can
64
learn how to organise an event, download signs, or write a letter of protest to President Bush, Prime Minister
Blair and/or Prime Minister Howard.  The movement is universal. There are no boundaries.
The Internet also offers a way to communicate messages. It allows information to be viewed at the leisure of
the user and is beneficial offering quick, up-to-date, cost effective information about events and
developments of the movement.  For example, most websites have a “Register Here” section. United for
Peace and Justice say that it took them only six weeks to get 350,000 people to rally in New York and Win
Without War said it took four days to set up over 6,800 candlelight vigils in 142 countries the week the war
began.   Its site framed its purpose in a global context stating:  “Beginning in New Zealand, this will be a
rolling wave of candlelight gatherings that will quickly cross the globe.  It’s up to you to make this happen”
(The New York Times, 29 March 2003: 1; MoveOn, Online, 2003).
Thus, the actions of the peace movement became a united, symbolic representation of many diverse groups.
Another similarity of all three peace movements was that they differed. Tarrow (1998) highlights that social
movements are made up of different groups and actors. In the US the organisation United for Peace and
Justice, an umbrella organisation set up to oppose the war brought together over 350 different groups.
Similar groups occurred in Australia via the group The Victorian Peace Network and in the UK with the
Stop the War Coalition.  The effectiveness of this diversification can be seen by the diversity of those that
attended marches.  Womens’ groups, gay and lesbian groups, trade unions, religious organisations, political
parties, students and most importantly people that “belonged” to no particular group were there because they
felt it was “right” (The Age, 17 February 2003).
Framing the movements nationally
So far I have examined the similarities of the global peace movement.  In the next part of this paper I will
attempt to frame the peace movements in a national context.
Tarrow  (1998: 21) discusses forms of contention as “inherited or rare, habitual or unfamiliar, solitary or part
of concerted campaigns.”  These contentions he argues are either already culturally in existence, invented on
the spot – or are blended with new frames of meaning.  The peace movement saw an old repertoire of
marching blended in a global environment to create a new one. The way these marches were framed in the
US, UK and Australia differed and will be further explored.
The US
In the US there was a strong focus on the term “Anti-War” as opposed to peace.  It was emphasised that to
be Anti-War was not to be “Anti-American”.
In relation to framing Tarrow refers to the “us” and “them” in conflict structure (1998: 21). The “us” in the
US movement was the American people, the “them” was represented by President Bush. This is an
important point to make and can be seen in an array of groups that were Anti-Bush such as Bushwatch and
Vote to Impeach.  It was important for the US movement to be seen as representing the American people and
what was right for the nation.
Another way the us was emphasised was through the use of images.  Images of the US flag, the Stars and
Stripes, as well as well known North American icons such as the Statue of Liberty feature predominantly.
These images can be seen in protest photos, in posters produced by various groups such as Patriots for
Peace and Direct Action to Stop the War and even in various organisations emblems such as MoveOn and
Americans Against Bombing.  Numerous websites are also produced in the flag’s colours of red, white and
blue. These sites include Win Without War, Vote No War and Veterans for Common Sense.
The UK
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In the UK there appeared to be a greater Anti-American sentiment of framing.  Although no Union Jack
flags are shown a great deal of material is framed around Prime Minister Blair’s willingness to be led into a
war by the US.  There is an image on one anti-war site that shows a “blood bath” taking place at one
demonstration.  In the picture one demonstrator dressed as Bush baths covered in blood, while another
dressed as Blair gleefully looks on.  It is a haunting image but one that displays Blair as a willing participant
looking on.
The movement in the UK thus uses a different type of patriotism to that of the US focussing on the need for
Blair to keep his nation strong and independent and not be influenced by Bush and American foreign policy.
As an article in the Guardian comments “among nations, there in only America to fear” (25 March 2003).
Interestingly in relation to terminology the word “protest” is used alongside that of marches. People were
less likely to rally.  This may be due to the history of “protests” of the nation.  Meyer and Tarrow (1998: 22)
suggest that over time repertoires can be accepted and seen as mainstream.  The terminology of protest may
be more acceptable in the UK than in Australia or the US.
Australia
It can be said that the peace movement of today learnt from the indigenous movement’s “Peoples’ Walk for
Reconciliation” that took place on 28 May 2000.  Meyer and Tarrow (1998: 22) suggest that over time
repertoires are adopted if they appear to work. The reconciliation walk successfully framed its actions by
appealing to mainstream Australians with terminology of “walk”. Thus the peace movement in Australia had
peace “marches” and the success in its framing was evident by the hundreds of thousands of mainstream
Australians that participated in the action.
Framing also occurred that emphasised Australia as a peace-loving nation.  The message of the peace
movement was framed to represent an invasion of Iraq as “un-Australian.”  It is also interesting to note that
there is little discussion on websites of political parties but rather focus a on Prime Minister Howard as not
listening to the people of Australia (The Age, 17 February 2003).  The message that it would be
undemocratic for Australia to go to war because it represented the opinion of one man as opposed to the
nation he represented was also a recurring theme.
Conclusion
It can thus be seen that the peace movements although similar in many ways differed in terms of what was
focussed at a national level.  Tarrow (1996: 53) made the comment that once it was possible to observe
movements around a nation state however, he noted, that it is less and less possible to do so today. From this
paper I believe his comments to be true.  Although different framing did occur amongst the movements in
the US, UK and Australia the symbolic action of marching as one, holding candlelight vigils as one and
sharing information to mobilise displayed immense solidarity on a global stage.
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Think Globally Act Locally
Ann Reeves
“Whereas conservationist groups focused mainly on local and sectorial issues without embedding them into
a broader approach, environmentalism tends to have a more dramatic and more coherent perception of the
problem (“Save the Earth”).  Even when mobalizing at the local level, environmental actors perceive their
mobalization as part of a worldwide movement according to the slogan “Act locally, think globally” (Rucht,
1999, p.205).
What does it mean to think globally?  The environment is certainly a global issue, and environmental
protection is on the political agenda.  It manifests itself public administration and state policies; there are
advisory boards, public education, and a growing industry in ‘environmentally friendly’ products and
services. It also impacts on our lives in mundane ways, like when we are urged to “reuse, recycle, and
refill”. The environmental movement has grown rapidly over the past twenty years, and the range of issues
the movement tackles has also broadened significantly.  There have been many success stories, and there is
certainly a heightened level of public awareness, but environmental degradation is on the increase.
Globalisation is on the agenda as well, although it appears in a less coherent form.  Do social movements
also need to become global in order to solve global problems?  Greenpeace is perhaps one of the world’s
largest nongovernment organisations (Rucht, 1999), and it is certainly well known internationally.  This then
begs the question; can a ‘multinational protest corporation’ like Greenpeace be an effective social
movement?
Globalisation as a ‘project’ can be best summed up as an “ideological justification of the deployment of neo-
liberal policies privileging corporate rights”(McMichael, 2003 p.1).  Global trade and financial bodies,
whose main aim is to facilitate neo-liberal globalisation, make decisions that impact directly on people
around the world.  Previously, people could hold governments to account for policies that had a negative
impact on their lives, now people need to also look beyond the state to international bodies such as The
World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and The World Bank.  WTO
agreements can also severely restrict a government’s capacity to regulate for the public interest as the WTO
sees environmental and health regulations as a barrier to trade (Woods and Narlikar, 2001).   In addition to
these global governing bodies, some of the competing forces in globalisation are; political leverage (the US
in particular) and corruption on the part of governments, export credit agencies, the persuasive power of
transnational corporations, and market forces lead by flawed economic theories (see Faux and Mishell
2001).  Concomitant global forces have “contributed to greater concentration of income, high rates of
unemployment, widespread poverty and the marginalisation of a growing number of rural and urban poor
around the globe” (Berger, 1994 p.268).
Social movement theory is useful for identifying how movements operate and I believe Greenpeace
International can be placed in the category of new social movements.  Crook et al (1992) note that new
social movements are underpinned by universalist politics rather than that of instrumental concerns. They
are geared toward self-organisation and the use of semi-institutional forms of pressure.  Key activists
question the effectiveness of centralised state apparatus and established elites in regard to the public good,
this means that symbols and actions are instead oriented toward the public.  “New politics spills over into
and fuses with the socio-cultural arena.  The new movements defy the conventional forms and repertoires of
the ‘old’ politics as protests combine with leisure activities and merge into a total counter-cultural Gestalt”
(Crook, Pakulski and Waters, 1992 p.148).  The media also plays a crucial role in the effectiveness of new
social movements.  Mass media provides an arena for spectacle in which drama, symbols, and icons play out
against issues in order to promote collective action.  Compact symbols and icons such as the Rainbow
Warrier and Greenpeace banners are ideal for dissemination through the mass media.
Another distinguishing feature of new social movements is their overwhelmingly middle-class support base.
Burgmann (1993) states that “the new social movements have a fascination for institution-based intellectuals
because they are partly comprised of people like themselves”. [And goes on to say that] “new social
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movements are a voguish academic concern, partly because they reflect the interests and reinforce the
political efficacy of the concerned and educated new class of professionals” (Burgmann: 1993, pp.12-13).
Although, Offe (1985) asserts that unlike working class politics or old middle class politics, new class
politics “is typically the politics of a class, but not on behalf of a class (Offe 1985, p.833).  Generally, new
social movements are characterised by activists and supporters who have a high level of education,
economic security, and are often employed in personal-service occupations.  In addition to this, members
include those who could be best described as ‘flexible’ such as students, retired professionals, unemployed,
or marginally employed young people.
Greenpeace’s concerns are not confined solely to nation.  Rather, the campaigns they organise move
between the international, national, and the local as each interlocking ‘level of action’ provides particular
actors, agendas, and institutions, and each level can be characterised by ‘external’ opportunities and
‘internal’ dynamics (Lahusen, 1999).  As such, campaigns are thematically focused and bring together a
range of activists and organisations that are working on similar issues, which in turn fosters alliance and
network building.  Greenpeace has been described as “a highly centralised and hierarchical ‘multinational
protest corporation’ (Lahusen, 1999, p.192).  Their apparent professionalism can be attributed to a great
extent to the movement’s organisational structure.  Campaigns are approved by the International Council
which is Greenpeace’s governing body, it is composed of one delegate from each national office, although,
only nine of the thirty are allowed to vote.  Annual meetings decide issues and strategies in relation to
campaigns.
“Non-violent action by wet suits is complemented by the ‘elite campaigning’ of the dry suits, who lobby
governments, industry and public interest groups, and participate in international conferences and
committees.  In all aspects, Greenpeace sets the inner circle of professional activists and strategists apart
from the broad constituency of about 3.7 million supporters in its 30 countries, because it is not so much
interested in the coordination of worldwide mass actions, as in the optimization of campaign efficiency,
organizational invulnerability and the authority of professional advocacy” (Lahusen,1999, pp.192-193).
Greenpeace’s organisational framework differentiates between the centralised definition of policy and the
decentralised organisation of public information, membership drives, and campaign work.
McChesney (1998) notes that “the rise to dominance of the global commercial media system is more than an
economic matter; it also has clear implications for media content, politics and culture” (McChesney, 1998,
p.27).  The vertical and horizontal integration of international media has implications for social movements
as it constrains campaigning activities, and access to the international news circuit is a crucial aspect of a
campaign’s success.  Social movements can increase opportunities for campaigning by coordinating media
releases with other events of similar importance such as conferences, conflicts etc (Lahusen, 1999) Media
coverage is crucial for public information, image building, and also to encourage political motivation.
Greenpeace are renowned for their carefully staged theatrics for the benefit of the media and this style of
activism have certainly been a major factor in increasing their popularity.
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McCarthy (1999) notes that “movements are composed of a set of constituent elements, including activists,
who devote extensive effort; constituents of groups that provide financial and other support; and adherents,
people who support the goals of a movement but are not active” (McCarthy, 1999, p.244).  Social
movements like Greenpeace rely heavily on the support of their members and volunteers.  Considering only
a select few activists engage in international campaigns, what sort of connection do the 3.7 million
Greanpeace supporters have with the movement as a whole?  Perhaps, a kind of collective identity based on
shared values.  As Finlayson (2001) states “in communities over a certain size, face-to-face interaction with
all the other members is not possible and a sense of commonality inevitably requires projection into the
imaginary” (Finlayson, 2001, p.287).  McCarthy (1999) points out that some of the processes of
globalisation could provide the basis for transnational identities, which may then develop into activist
identities.  Although, he also points out that these identities are more likely to be strengthened if
transnational contact and communication takes place.  The millions of other supporters whose
transnationalism is lived out in a more vicarious way, may develop a “deepened appreciation for
transnational solidarity”(McCarthy, 1999, p.248) at best, or at worst maintain relatively weak ties.
“Apparently grass-roots activism is increasingly being replaced by a jet set of NGO diplomats and
professional activists who bring some of the exotic flair of the politically engaged ‘global village’ onto our
TV screens” (Lahusen, 1999, p.189).
Greenpeace is able to move between different fields of action, local, national and international.  Lahusen
(1999) seems to attribute much of this efficacy to the organisational structure and the professionally
organised campaign strategies.  This type of activism certainly does raise public awareness and in some
instances the campaigns achieve real results.  While it might be an effective strategy to mirror other global
forces, it does little to challenge the existing mode of thinking that underpins them.
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Developing an Electronic Repertoire of Contention
Brett Rolfe
Perhaps someday, as more people go online, then maybe these actions will create a
tradition, create codes so people won’t have to reinvent what to do. (Dominguez 2000, p.
394)
Online Collective Action
While the emergence of the Internet has had a significant effect on many aspects of society, one area of
startling growth in recent years has been online collective action (OCA). OCA is the result of ‘extending the
philosophy of activism and direct action into the “virtual” world of electronic information exchange and
communication.’ (Electrohippies 1999). Known variously as virtual activism, net protest, hacktivism, and
cyberjamming, OCA is growing and evolving at ‘a dizzying pace’ (Lasn 2000, p. 132).
Groups practicing OCA deploy a range of tactics including ‘cyberpetitions’, ‘virtual protests’, ‘virtual sit-
ins’, and ‘gripe sites’ (Lasn 2000, pp. 132-133). In a comprehensive review of OCA, Meikle suggests that
‘the whole repertoire of tactics developed throughout the twentieth century, from the Suffragettes to Civil
Rights, from Greenpeace to ACT UP, from Gandhi to Greenham Common, have found their digital
analogues, as social activism moves into cyberspace’ (Meikle 2002, pp. 24-25).
However, not all OCA tactics are purely derivative of those used by existing social movements. Others have
included the development of an ‘electronic monument’ and use of specially constructed software to block
access to websites, ‘creating a disturbance’ (Dominguez 1999, p. 387). At this time, little research has been
done to explain how this array of tactics has been developed and continues to evolve. This short paper
examines several possible factors, and tentatively proposes a model for the innovation and diffusion of
OCA.
Repertoires of Contention
An important concept in addressing this question is the ‘repertoire of contention’, a term used to describe
‘the whole set of means [a group] has for making claims of different kinds on different individuals or
groups’ (Tilly 1986, p. 4). Not only does this repertoire provide an array of possible tactics, it also limits
activists, as ‘people generally turn to familiar routines and innovate within them, even when in principle
some unfamiliar form of action would serve their interests much better’ (p. 4). While more useful as ‘a
suggestive metaphor than a precise analytic tool’ (Traugott 1995, p. 3), the concept of a repertoire provides a
framework for examining the development of tactics within social movements.
The notion of repertoire exists initially at the level of a specific group, where it describes the available
means of contention for that group. However, as ‘similar groups generally have similar repertoires, we can
speak more loosely of a general repertoire that is available for contention to the population of a time and
place’ (Tilly 1986, p. 4). Tarrow has also expanded on the concept in a way that is particularly relevant to
OCA. He describes the ‘modular’ nature of certain elements of repertoire, manifest in the ‘capacity of a
form of collective action to be used by a variety of social actors, against a variety of targets, either alone, or
in combination with other forms’ (Tarrow 1998, p. 33).
The notion of repertoire can be extended into the area of OCA giving rise to a ‘repertoire of electronic
contention’ (Costanza-Chock 2003, p. 1). This term will be used here to describe both the specific repertoire
of an individual activist group practicing OCA, as well as the total collection of online tactics deployed
within the digital space by various groups. In examining the development of this repertoire of electronic
contention, it is necessary to examine how online collective action is ‘diffused, coordinated and sustained’
(Tarrow 1998, p. 21).
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Innovation within Social Movements
In examining social movements generally, Tarrow has suggested that innovation is the role of leaders, who
‘invent, adapt and combine various forms of collective action to stimulate support from people who might
otherwise stay at home’ (1998, p. 19). While this adequately accounts for many historical events, Tarrow
acknowledges that more recent movements ‘often appear in the absence of well-defined organisations or
leaders’ (p. 21).
Two alternative hypotheses put forward have been ‘innovation at the margins’ (Tarrow 1998, p. 114) and
‘moments of madness’ (Zolberg cited in Tarrow 1995). Diametrically opposed in many ways, these
approaches propose that innovation comes either from limited creativity around the current repertoire, or
from large leaps during times of crisis. Regardless of the source of innovation, it is suggested that following
innovation, the repertoire evolves ‘through the absorption of the innovations that work and the rejection of
the ones that do not’ (Tarrow 1995, p. 116).
Innovation at the Margins
The most accepted account of change proposes that contenders ‘generally innovate at the perimeter of the
existing repertoire rather than breaking entirely with old ways’ (Tilly 1995, p. 28). In reviewing repertoire
change within a range of movements, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly comment that rarely ‘were the innovative
forms of action adopted by these parties truly new’, instead suggesting that changes were ‘creative
modifications or extensions of familiar routines’ (2001, p. 49).
In examining OCA, Meikle found similarly that ‘many online campaigns are continuations of existing
struggles for justice and so inevitably continue to use the approaches honed offline’ (2002, p. 24). In this
way, the electronic repertoire of contention is being constructed through translation of elements of a more
general repertoire into the online space. Following Tilly, Meikle notes that adherence to existing repertoire
appears to occur even when the tactics are problematic. The potentially flawed tactic of email petitions
‘proliferates because it’s an easy idea to come to grips with, because it’s familiar’ (p. 25).
This notion echoes the media theory of McLuhan, who suggested that ‘[w]hen faced with a totally new
situation, we tend always to attach ourselves to the objects, to the flavor of the most recent past. We look at
the present through a rear-view mirror. We march backwards into the future’ (McLuhan and Fiore 1967, pp.
73-74). Meikle adopts this stance, seeing the generation of a derivative repertoire as ‘an inevitable
consequence of the way in which we adopt technological change’ (2002, p. 24). It is for this reason, he
suggests, that ‘there’s very little evidence of entirely new tactics developed specifically to exploit the unique
properties of the Net’ (p. 24).
While there is merit in this approach when explaining the actions of established social movements with
well-defined repertoires, it becomes problematic given the nature of the Internet itself. Castells critiques this
‘backing into the future’, suggesting that ‘[u]nlike the mass media of the McLuhan Galaxy, [digital media]
have technologically and culturally embedded properties of interactivity and individualization’ (1996, p.
358). Another analysis of the application of McLuhan’s media theory to digital technology suggests that
‘given the amorphous and chameleon character of virtual media, there may be a case for jettisoning the term
“medium” altogether when considering the “matrix” that includes the Web and Internet’ (Horrocks 2000, p.
55). Acknowledging this, it is perhaps necessary to look at ‘moments of madness’ to more thoroughly
understand the development of the electronic repertoire of contention.
Moments of Madness
Several of the scholars who have discussed ‘innovation at the margins’ have also suggested that repertoires
evolve in moments of crisis, that innovation results from struggle (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2000, p. 49;
Tilly 1995, p. 26). Tarrow sees this process as a part of a cyclic model, where ‘new forms of collective
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action develop within the experimental context of cycles of protest’ (1995, p. 94). The most successful,
transferable tactics are then adopted as part of the movements repertoire ‘even during quieter times’ (p. 94).
This approach is particularly strained in the digital space where ‘the speed at which information can be
disseminated affects the global diffusion of protest dramatically’ (Ayers 1999, p. 137). In an environment
where tactics are shared between groups with a variety of agendas around the globe, can ‘moments of
madness’ and ‘quieter times’ really be said to exist in any meaningful global sense?
In examining politically oriented movements, Tarrow has acknowledged that while many innovations in
repertoire seem to first appear during ‘great events’, they are often ‘first developed at the interstices of the
day-to-day practice of contentious politics’ (1998, p. 45). This would suggest that the belief in innovation
due to ‘moments of madness’ may say more about the visibility of tactics that the site of innovation. In order
to locate the origin of tactics, it may be necessary to follow those tactics back to their source.
Diffusion of Innovation
To locate the source of innovation, it is necessary to realise that tactics are shared within and between
movements through diffusion – ‘the process by which an innovation (any new idea, activity or technology)
spreads through the population’ (Giugni cited in Ayers 1999, p. 134).  Obviously, this process is affected by
the available media, as discussed by Tarrow, who observed an increased capacity for diffusion as a result of
the print media (1998, p. 46).
Extending on this in the wake of digital technology, Ayers uses the term ‘cyber-diffusion’ to describe ‘the
rapid, computer-generated dissemination of information around the world, without concern for geographic
location’ (1999, p. 133). This ability to diffuse innovation by high speed, digital, global means makes the
Internet ‘one of the most potent meme-replicating mediums ever invented’ (Lasn 2000, p. 132).
This rapid cyber-diffusion makes innovation a problematic subject of study for OCA as ideas can spread in
ways that are complex, instantaneous and difficult to trace. One example that has been well documented,
allowing an analysis of its diffusion is a piece of software known as FloodNet. This tool facilitates ‘virtual
sit-ins’ that disrupt the behaviour of target websites, and was developed and later distributed by a group
called the Electronic Disturbance Theatre (EDT) (Meikle 2000, pp. 140-156). One of the members of EDT,
Ricardo Dominguez, provides an account of the cyber-diffusion of FloodNet;
We uploaded the [FloodNet] Disturbance Developers Kit at one minute after midnight in
celebration of the sixth year of the Zapatista uprising. And twenty minutes after we
uploaded it here at Fakeshop.com, here in Williamsburg, Queer Nation did an action, a
virtual sit-in, against GODHATESFAGS.com in Canada. A week later, the International
Animal Liberation network did two actions against pharmaceuticals in Switzerland that
went quite well. And then soon after that anti-arms activists in the UK did actions against
arms dealer websites in the UK. (Dominguez 2002, p. 391)
In asking how the innovations that expand the electronic repertoire of contention are generated, it is
necessary to examine the nature of groups such as EDT.
Innovative Hothouses
EDT is a group of four online activists who operate as a digital collective, staging activism in support of the
Zapatista cause. Dominguez, who was instrumental in founding the group, had come from the Critical Art
Ensemble (CAE), a similar small collective supporting a number of causes including AIDS awareness. The
digital focus of CAE was inspired by the ‘Panther Moderns’, a fictitious group of cyber-terrorists in William
Gibson’s ‘Neuromancer’ (1986, p. 75). CAE saw this as the prototype of an ‘activist electronic community’
that needed to emerge (Dominguez 2000, p. 383).
73
The key attributes of organisations such as EDT and CAE are a high level of critical awareness, technical
expertise in various fields, small organisational structures, an innovative and cooperative mindset, and a
flexible ‘rolling agenda’ (Meikle 2002, p. 120). These traits allow organisations to act as ‘hothouses’ for
innovation that can then be diffused to the broader activist community – who may be less skilled or more
specifically engaged.
Dominguez also feels that the germinal state of the OCA space drives this activity. In analysing the use of
the term ‘hacktivism’, he describes it as empty, but suggests that ‘empty terms do allow a certain kind of
energetic invention, because people try to fill them’ (Dominguez cited in Meikle 2002, p. 162).
As incubators for innovation, EDT and CAE are part of an expanding network. While defining themselves
as anything from a ‘design art collectives’ to a ‘cultural corporations’, similar activity and attitudes can be
seen in the work of ®™ark (pronounced ‘artmark’), etoy.CORPORATION, hell.com, Kaliber10000 and
others.
Driving radical innovation in the OCA space, some of these groups even ensure the modularity of tactics,
and share them in ways that maximise diffusion. In distributing FloodNet, EDT intended that ‘other cells,
other groups would begin to emerge, not necessarily following the rules that we had set up’ (Dominguez
2000, p. 391).
In addition to the rapid nature of cyber-diffusion, the degree of innovation in these tactics is often
overshadowed by the way in which they are framed. This framing is often a conscious attempt to draw on
acceptance of the existing repertoire, even when the resulting metaphors are strained. In choosing to call
FloodNet a tool for ‘virtual sit-ins’, Domingues was drawing on the established repertoire of non-violent
activism. ‘If I said “virtual sit-in”, it had a kind of pedagogical usefulness that the term I would prefer –
“electronic civil disobedience” – did not have’ (Dominguez cited in Meikle 2002, p. 26). Despite these
problematic factors, these ‘innovative hothouses’ appear to act as incubators for innovation that can then be
diffused to more established movement groups.
A Tentative Model
In summary then, the development of an online repertoire of contention can be seen as the result of three
discrete processes. The first is the translation to the digital space of elements of the offline repertoire by
established social movement organisations. Second is radical innovation by small, less cause-driven groups
with critical and technical expertise. Finally, these innovations are then shared between organisations rapidly
and globally through the process of cyber-diffusion. Given the discussion, it is reasonable to suggest that as
the field of OCA becomes more established, a fourth process will emerge more prominently in which
organisations modify the existing electronic repertoire by ‘innovating at the margins’.
As well as the implications for OCA, this model raises questions as to the impact of these processes for
offline collective action. Will a reversal occur that sees certain online tactics translated into the physical
world? Are the speed and range of cyber-diffusion making it an effective tool for sharing offline tactics as
well as online ones? While these questions will no doubt be addressed over time, the first important step is
to acknowledge the novelty and power of the processes that are shaping the nature of activism in the
increasingly significant digital realm.
We’ve learned from Gandhi certain gestures for the streets that are now ingrained in us.
What do we do? We march, we sit. But we can also create other protocols that will be
understood just as simply, a certain notion of electronic civil disobedience. (Dominguez
2000, p. 394)
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Boycotts: How to 'no' the enemy
Joyce Semaan
Disclaimer: There are views posited in this paper that may make the reader uncomfortable at least, enraged
at most.  While not apologising for these comments (they are based in fact and can be supported), I am
sensitive to their provocative nature and the possible repercussions.  Being a social activist on the issue at
hand (Palestine), these opinions are so deeply entwined in my politics that I found I was unable (and
unwilling) to separate myself from them in writing this paper.
 Introduction
Like our streets, telegraph poles, building exteriors and other public spaces, the market place is constantly
being used as an arena to raise political issues, express social and political views and enforce responsibility
on manufacturers or governments.  This phenomenon has been dubbed “political consumerism” (Stolle, et al,
2003) and denotes the boycotting – or buycotting – of products and services by individuals based on political
and moral values.  Consumers understand the power of protest in refusing to patronise certain companies or
whole nation states whose policies and practices are deemed immoral, unjust or exploitative.  Even the most
disenfranchised individual has consumer power and therefore a voice.
Boycotts fit the definition of a social movement being enacted by individuals, not sanctioned by institutions
for the purpose of effecting change on some level.
History has shown time and again that consumer boycotts have succeeded in remedying social injustices: the
1960s boycott of the Montgomery Bus lines by black civil rights activists and the international boycotts
which brought the apartheid government of South Africa to its knees in the 1980s are two notable examples.
Both of these examples are famous for their success but this could not have been achieved without
widespread involvement and persistence over a long period.  What motivates the individual to make such a
commitment will be discussed in further detail.
Although there are dozens, maybe even hundreds of boycotts current today, my focus will be on the various
campaigns targeting Israel and the United States.  Without comprehensively detailing the facts, Israel has a
long history of human rights abuses and other illegal actions30 since even before its inception in 1948 (prior
to this date the aggressions were perpetrated by Zionist Jews).  Other states have been bombed for offences
much less grievous than these (consider Iraq) but Israel has never been brought to account as it is heavily
sanctioned by the United States.31  The example of South Africa is one that boycotters of the Israeli regime
are looking to with the intention of achieving the same result: justice.
A Definition Of Consumer Boycotts
Consumer boycotts are defined by Monroe Friedman, Ph. D, (1999) as:
“an attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives by urging
individual consumers to refrain from making selected purchases in the
marketplace.” (p. 4)
From this, three salient characteristics of the boycott are sourced.  First, that it applies to individual
consumers, rather than organisations or governments (not ignoring institutional involvement in past
                                                 
30 Israel has failed to implement dozens of UN resolutions, is in violation of several articles of the Geneva convention and
illegally occupies and is colonising land that is not its own.
31 Among other actions of United States protection and support, Israel is the largest recipient of US foreign aid, getting $3 Billion
in aid every year  – a third of  the total  foreign aid issued by the US annually.
[http://www.palestinemonitor.org/factsheet/economist_tallies_swelling_cost.htm]
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boycotts); secondly, that it defines the goal of boycotts to achieve non-economic objectives via economic
transactions; and finally that it prescribes a selective, focussed application of boycotts. (Friedman, 1999, p.
5)
As a form of collective action, boycotts stand apart for two reasons: 1) they are recognised as the most
effective technique for consumer movements and 2) they have played a crucial role in social justice
movements in the past. (Friedman, 1999, p. 3)
Consumer boycotts vary as defined by the desired outcome of boycotters32.  An expressive boycott allows
the boycotter to show displeasure with the boycott target.  An instrumental boycott seeks to achieve a
tangible outcome by attempting to force change of the disputed actions or policies of the target company or
country.  Most commonly, boycotts are a mixture of the two (Klein and John, 2001).  From these
classifications follows an analysis of the motivations (or lack thereof) for participating in boycotts.
Motivations For Boycotting
Like most, if not all, social movements, success can only be obtained by engaging mass mobilisation.  But
since involvement is not compulsory, the individual needs to be convinced to move beyond complacency
and inaction.
The boycott of a consumer product may represent a significant sacrifice to the would-be boycotter.  Often,
the target of the boycott is not impacting directly on the life of the individual but a social responsibility to
express an objection anyway may be too niggling to ignore.  Moral objection alone, however, may be
insufficient to motivate the consumer to boycott, and other factors are taken into consideration as well
(Sankar et al, 2001).
Firstly, the individual may have a strong preference for the particular product and therefore may be loathe to
sacrifice it unless there are suitable substitutes available.  If these cannot be found, chances of the boycott
being popular are slim.
Unwilling to provide financial support to Israel through the purchase of Coca Cola33 but failing to find a
suitable substitute alternative, Tawfik Mathlouthi created his own product, Mecca Cola (Tagliabue, 2002).
No hiding Mecca Cola’s political status in the market place, its purchase constitutes a buycott.  The slogan
on labels of Mecca Cola products, “No more drinking stupid, drink with commitment”, is a blatant challenge
to consumers to start making political statements with their purchases.
Secondly, there needs to be a perception of widespread involvement in a boycott and an assessment of the
likelihood of success, the basis of social dilemma theory.  Social dilemmas require individual sacrifice in the
short term for the benefit of all individuals in the long run.  For the devoted few, participation in a boycott is
done without question regardless of any personal costs incurred.  Most people though are not so passionate
about the issue at hand and must enter into deliberation over the costs of personal sacrifice versus ultimate
benefits.  This introduces the notion of human beings as ‘rational calculators’ (Nash, 2000), a (somewhat
archaic) component of the Resource Mobilisation Theory, discussed further on.
Here, message framing plays an important role in stimulating motivation.  If the individual can understand
that the cost of NOT participating in a boycott is ultimately greater than the cost of involvement, and there is
an immediate perception of success, the social dilemma is reduced and greater mobilisation is likely (Klein
et al, 2001).
                                                 
32 While there are other variations on consumer boycotts, they fall outside the scope of this paper and therefore are not detailed
here.
33 Among other examples of Coca Cola’s support of Israel, in 1997 the Government of Israel Economic Mission honoured Coca-
Cola at the Israel Trade Award Dinner for its continued support of Israel for the last 30 years and for refusing ro abide by the Arab
League boycott of Israel. [http://www.inminds.co.uk/boycott-coca-cola.html]
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Boycotts and Social Movement Theory
Following the above analysis, relevance of social movement theory begins to emerge although this is a
hindsight application, probably always the case.  There are two theories of social movements that contain
elements which seem applicable to boycotts, Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) and New Social
Movement Theory.  However, as RMT has a very limited application to modern boycotts (with the
exception of the ‘rational calculator’ concept described earlier), only the latter theory will be discussed in
greater detail.
New Social Movement Theory (NSMT) was developed to describe the new types of social movements
prevailing in post-industrial society.  This explains the increasing trend for goals of social movements,
including boycotts, shifting from economic and class struggles to more altruistic ideals such as justice and
human rights, indicative of the larger upheavals of the social and economic fabric of post-industrial society.
This exposes one limitation of NSMT though as examples of the new boycotts abide in non-post-industrial
society also.  Further, the issue of collective identity (with culture) does not feature for boycotts as it is
largely an anonymous endeavour.
The (Arab) boycott of Israeli and US goods
Boycott movements are quickly growing in size in almost every Arab country, in a massive and increasing
show of solidarity with their Palestinian brethren and in angry response to their governments’ complacency
in the situation.  They have waged what they call their own ‘economic war’ (Fisk, 2002).
Israeli goods mostly are not imported but many American brand products are.  These are at the focus of the
boycotts with the more highly visible names such as Coca Cola, McDonalds34, Starbucks35 and Marlboro36
bearing most of the impact37.  Even those franchises claiming they do not provide financial support for Israel
are being placed under attack for their cultural connection with the United States.
These campaigns are being coordinated between Arab countries and the message is being spread in a variety
of manners: sit-ins, leafleting, pickets but also in some instances headlines in newspapers.  The Internet has
been of massive import in disseminating information on products to be avoided.
Historically, the Arab League of Nations held an official position of boycott of Israel however more recent
events which seemed to suggest efforts towards a resolution, particularly the 1993 Oslo peace accords,
resulted in an easing of boycotts.  Since that time, many Arab nations have entered into a heavy dependence
on trade relations with the United States that to re-engage in a boycott of Israel, thereby sacrificing US
trade38, would be far too detrimental to the economy.
                                                 
34 Among other examples of support of Israel, McDonalds chairman and CEO Jack M. Greenberg is an honorary director of the
American-Israel Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Inc., of Metropolitan Chicago. [http://www.inminds.co.uk/boycott-
mcdonalds.html]
35 Starbucks CEO, Howard Shultz, is believed to be “an active Zionist”, and has stated that the occupied territories should be
described as ‘disputed’.  His anti-Palestinian comments have angered many Arabs and supporters of Palestine. [Fisk article]
36 Marlboro cigarettes are manufactured by the American tobacco company, Philip Morris.  It is widely known that the lobbying
power of tobacco companies in the United States is enormous.
37 There is evidence that these boycotts have had an impact on the bottom line of these companies in the region.  Refer to
Carmichael (2002).
38 The Arab League of Nations boycott of Israel was outlawed by the United States in 1977 with the signing of anti-boycott
legislation by Jimmy Carter.  This legislation made it illegal for any American company to engage in a boycott not sanctioned by
the United States.
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Boycotters in the Arab nations realise their actions alone will not have a significant impact on American
companies.  The real fear for the American companies, they say, is for the boycotts to spread, as indeed they
have39.
Democracy is a prided feature of progressive society.  Critics of the Israeli boycotts deem them counter to
the nature of democracy as they rule out dialogue.  It can be argued that, in the case of Israel, there currently
is no dialogue, only the Israeli monologue and therefore no democratic process.  Engaging in a boycott of
goods that support Israel sets the dialogue, gives its opponents a voice where currently the Israeli narrative
saturates the media, and a situation closer to democracy emerges.
The academic boycott of Israel40
In May 2002, two British professors, Steven Rose and Hillary Rose, instigated a boycott of Israeli
academics, which has since garnered support globally, as a means of protest for the increased aggression of
Israel in the occupied Palestinian territories, particularly in the towns of Jenin and Ramallah.  As it became
sadly evident that the worsening situation was not going to be satisfactorily resolved by governments or the
United Nations, they chose to address the situation themselves, taking their cue from similar action during
the boycotts of South Africa in the 1980s.41  For how could normal relations continue, they argued, in such
extraordinary circumstances?  Indeed, this is the crux of all nature of boycotts.
While boycotts are punitive in nature, the intention of boycott advocates is to resume normal relations once
the outcome is achieved.  However, in the meantime, massive and long-lasting damage could be incurred:
the current backwardness of the academics in South Africa can probably be directly attributed to the boycott
of its academics (Alexander, 1995).  Is this a reason to reject the call to boycott?  While the boycott
threatens to damage Israel’s progress in academia, this can not be more objectionable than the current
experience of academics in Palestine who suffer perpetual disruption under occupation.42
Other arguments posed by critics of the academic boycott (of whom there are many and they are vocal)
include that it is unwarranted as comparisons with South Africa fail since Israel is not an apartheid regime,
and many Israeli academics opposed to the occupation will be innocent victims.  Strong counter arguments
exist for each criticism of the boycott and there will probably never be a general consensus; thus is the
nature of social movements – if everyone agreed, they’d be rendered unnecessary.
The academic boycott is a drastic measure but advocates must consider it appropriate in such exceptional
circumstances as Palestinians find themselves in today.  If for no other reason, proponents of the academic
boycott claim it exposes the Israeli project as “unacceptable, non-negotiable and immoral” (Taraki, 2002).
Conclusion
Boycotts are a popular tool for protest by social actors and are so widespread and numerous that they have
been dubbed an epidemic.  Individuals have realised the power they have to express their view with every
single purchase.  A boycott allows non-citizens to pass on a message to governments they take issue with
when the vote is not available to them.  It is clear that the economy is a significant driving force in our
capitalist, globalised world and social issues can have a significant effect on bottom line profits.
                                                 
39 There are two notable examples of global boycott campaigns of Israel, in the UK (www.bigcampaign.org.uk ) and in Norway
(www.boikottisrael.no)
40 While an academic boycott obviously differs from consumer boycotts both by definition and in action, they both seek to exert
pressure and force change on the offending institution, manufacturer of nation state, as the case may be.
41 The comprehensive international boycott of apartheid South Africa included a boycott of its academics, too.  Such a celebrated
success is formulating the strategies for effectiveness in the case of Palestine.
42 In the Palestinian university of Bir Zeit: not a single day since March 2001 has gone by where access to the university has been
unfettered, but rather blocked by tanks and soldiers; the academic year is severely behind schedule thanks to massive, continuing
disruption; since the occupation in 1967, thousands of students and staff have been arrested, tortured and deported for voicing
opposition; and travel abroad for study or research is virtually impossible.  Refer to Taraki (2002).
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However, as a tool for social change, they are more difficult to orchestrate than other methods of collective
action (such as protests and rallies) since generally several conditions are required and must be maintained
over a long period to achieve success.  Most importantly as a motivation for engagement in a boycott, the
potential boycotter needs to make an assessment regarding whether the cost of the boycott today is worth the
outcome in the event of success in the future.
There are at least several consumer boycott campaigns running currently with the target being Israel for its
gross human rights violations and the US for its unconditional support of the Israeli regime.  Boycotters are
hoping to exert enough pressure on the Israeli government to enforce change, analogous to the example of
boycotts on apartheid South Africa.
The academic boycott of Israel has drawn wide criticism, as well as support, but whether or not it is ethical,
one thing is certain: it has mobilised public opinion and has drawn attention to the situation.  At least people
are talking about it, on both sides of the argument.
As with other forms of collective action, it is only with persistence and dedication that a boycott can achieve
success but its capacity to do so is well documented.
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Fascists & Sex Workers: Challenges for Feminist & Collective Action Researchers
Jo Thomson
“We have met the enemy and they are us” (Walt Kelly)
Can we effectively research any topics where we have little comprehension or acceptance of the basis for
differing viewpoints? Whilst fascists and sex workers, have little in common, they are good examples of the
problems and challenges they may present for their researchers. Left action researchers into right wing
movements may face similar conflicts as some puritanical feminist researchers into sex workers. Both
concern the problems researchers face when researching subjects whose activities or politics directly
challenge their own values or ideology. For collective action researchers, racist activists involved in fascist
movements, the Ku Klux Klan or Neo-Nazi groups, are one example and what Diani and Eyerman (1992:
217) call ‘distasteful’ movements. That is they are ‘distasteful’ to the researcher because the researcher does
not agree with or finds objectionable the movements' politics or activities. Although there are many activist
feminist researchers who are not of this mindset, there are also some whose views on sex workers and
pornography similarly create conflicts as they deny the possibility that sex workers could legitimately report
to enjoy their work and instead attribute a false consciousness to the women.
This presentation will examine both issues as a way of highlighting some of the methodological limitations
of both 'feminist methodology' and theories on collective action research.
Firstly an assumption I make in this paper is that there is no single ‘feminist research method’. But rather I
want to emphasize plurality as Reinharz, does in her 1992 book on feminist methodology entitled Feminist
Methods in Social Research. Feminist researchers, Reinharz (1992: 4) tells us, have used all existing
methods as well as invented a few new ones. Secondly my analysis of the sex worker ‘false consciousness’
debate for feminists writing on methodology focuses on a recent “anti sex work equals anti feminist debate”
on the Australian feminist online discussion group, ausfem – polnet. Thirdly I apologise for singling out
Jeffreys when in fact there are other feminist researches who also reject sex workers claims to enjoy their
work.
Reinharz (1992) tells us that feminists may use a range of research methods including depth semi structured
interviews, feminist ethnography or multimethod including observation, participation, archival analysis and
interviewing, survey research, experimental psychology, action research, content analysis and oral history.
Common to all feminist methods, though is what Mackinnon (1989 in Jeffreys: 1997: 128) calls the
principle of “women’s truth telling about their experiences”. Which Jeffrey’s (1993: 38) says is part of the
“important feminist principle that women should be believed, a principle set up in opposition to the routine
disbelief of women practised by psychoanalysis and the justice system” (also Janelle in ausfem – polnet:
20/05/03).
The feminist method of believing all women is, some argue the single principle which separates feminist
methodology from other research theories. And whilst the very notion of ‘truth’ itself has been de stabilised
by theories of post structuralism and post modernism, this does not, I believe, equate to any researcher
having the right to deny or refuse an individual’s truth simply because it is uncomfortable for them because
it is outside their ideological framework. To do so not only makes the research process untenable, I ague, but
also together with many others including Cox, Kinnell and Sargent, is actually anti feminist. As Elena on the
recent online debate asked “are we witnessing a colonisation of women’s experiences by academics who
have biased agendas?” This issue goes beyond the methodological question of whether we can we speak for
the Other to I think a more serious question concerning academic researches, displaying an almost Touraine
like arrogance, believing they bring true consciousness to the oppressed.
During the recent ausfem – polnet ‘anti sex work equals anti feminist’ debate, Janelle (20/05/03) admits to
having “always felt uncomfortable with the methods used by anti sex work feminists to justify disbelieving
all positive experiences of sex workers, whilst quoting and believing the negative experiences of sex
workers”. She singles out vocal anti porn and anti sex work feminist writer and researcher Jeffreys, for
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attributing a false consciousness to sex workers who claim to enjoy their work. In her 1997 book The Idea of
Prostitution, Jeffreys at least acknowledges the difficulty of researching in areas where “some women make
truth claims that feminist theorists find problematic”. However, even so, she maintains her position and
justifies her attributing a false consciousness to sex workers who claim to enjoy their work, by rejecting the
liberal notion of ‘choice’. She (1997: 129) argues the “rhetoric of choice” used by contemporary defenders
of prostitution to make it seem “acceptable”, is actually ‘deeply problematic from a feminist perspective”
because it conceals male rights over women. Janelle (ausfem – polnet: 20/05/03) goes on to say that Jeffreys
relies on Sykes & Matza’s 1957 claim that when women sex workers use the language of ‘choice’ they are
merely engaging in “neutralising techniques” to “create rationalisations to survive their marginal condition”.
Whatever justifications Jeffreys makes in her 1997 book for attributing a false consciousness to some
women, she doesn’t in her earlier 1993 book Lesbian Heresy, offer O’Sullivan or Patton the same moral
high ground. Instead she criticises both, in their dismissal of women's sex abuse claims as untrue, for
abandoning the feminist principle (which she herself later abandons) that women should be believed.
I think this sex worker issue powerfully illustrates how our ideological frameworks limit our vision,
particularly of uncomfortable truths. Tempting as it is to ignore these uncomfortable truths and as easy as
Jeffreys makes it seem to justify positing alternate ones, does not I argue hide the fact that not only is it bad
research practice to deny individuals their truth but it is also anti feminist and in the case of sex workers
actually puts them at further risk.  So in Marx’s spirit of praxis and feminist scholar Judith Butlers
pragmatism, I side with Cox, Sargent and Kinnell in adopting a theoretical position that can maximise real
political benefits. Which in the case of sex workers translates to improving their daily struggle through
decriminalisation and health and safety measures. Rather than adopting an abolitionist position like Jeffreys
and others which Kinnell (20/05/03) argues is “cruel, dangerous and demeaning to sex workers” and which
bolsters sexist law enforcement and endangers their health and safety.
The second issue I want to examine around this idea of the way a researches ideology affects or limits the
research process and its outcomes concerns the problems which left wing collective action researchers face
when researching right wing movements or what Diani and Eyerman (1992: 217) call ‘distasteful’
movements. That is they are ‘distasteful’ to the researcher because the researcher does not agree with or
finds objectionable the movements' politics or activities. Not unlike how anti sex work feminist researchers
disagree with the act of prostitution so much that they cannot believe anything positive about it at all.
Interestingly in the three studies on racist activists that I looked at by Billig, Ezekiel and feminist researcher
Blee's, I did not find as in Jeffreys, a rejection of the participants claims as untrue. ‘Distasteful’ movements
cover the spectrum from left to right including fascism Neo Nazi groups religious cults and even the US
abortion movement. Given the scope of this paper, however, I’m limiting my analysis to racist activists
involved in fascism, the Ku Klux Klan and Neo-Nazi groups.
Esseveld and Eyerman devote chapter nine of their 1992 book Studying Collective Action, to the often-
overlooked issue of studying what they call ‘distasteful’ movements. Given the objectionable nature of the
ideas and activities being studied, they see the problem as how to create some distance between the
researcher and her subject. This idea of creating distance presents an immediate problem for Touraine and
Melucci’s methodology as it challenges their principle of creating so close a relationship between researcher
and the subject that the researcher becomes an actor in the movement.
They suggest theory and research methods to create this distance or space. However most research methods
require some level of interaction between the researcher and the researched. Esseveld and Eyerman (1992)
consider so called objective quantitative methods to be of limited use and even the questionnaire isn’t very
applicable, they argue, for social movements generally and especially distasteful ones as they actually
challenge their prescribed a priori categories and classifications. Billig in his 1978 study of UK Fascists,
didn’t use traditional questionnaires either, arguing they didn’t pick up on the nuances of individual
language and to what extent the members had incorporated the official language into their own conversation
which he said, is of particular importance with a fringe political group.
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Esseveld and Eyerman (1992: 220) cite Adorno, Fromm, Bell, Abel, Billig, Luker and Orfali as having
developed the alternative idea of using theory to create space between the researcher and the goals expressed
by the movement. Abel's (1966: 4 in Diani and Eyermen: 1992: 221) analysis of Nazism, which involved
both historical analysis and almost 700 autobiographies of Nazi members, was a particularly good example
of creating space through theory.
Esseveld and Eyerman (1992: 221) acknowledge a contractual arrangement, emphasised by Melucci, is
adequate for the “general relations” between the researcher and the subject but admit its limitations for
dealing with the deeper emotional level particularly present when researching ‘distasteful’ social
movements.
Billig employed a social psychological methodology in his study of the UK fascist party, The National Front
in the late 60’s and 70’s. The detachment/involvement dichotomy was a methodological focus and he
rejected the myth of the researcher being able to leave his or her revulsion and fear at home and to pursue
scientific objectivity. Billig (1978: 105) conducted a quantitative value/content analysis of two extreme right
wing magazines over a year and a half and his overall approach was diachronic in that it examined patterns
occurring over time. As such he was critical of earlier studies for failing to historically contextualise a
movements ideology.
Billig interviewed only eleven members of the National Front and we can speculate that his silence over
why so few, in fact speaks volumes about the difficulties researchers face in gaining the trust and confidence
of racist activists to be able to interview them. Interviews, Billig believed, enabled him to examine the
personal motivations and personal preoccupations of individual members and to see how far the propaganda
had penetrated into their thoughts. His remark (1978: 192) that an “examination of the particular should
proceed to an examination of the general” contrasts with both Melucci and Touraine's methodology for
collective action which focuses on the group, believing the “meaning of collective action will [not] be the
sum of the representations of individual actors” (Melucci: 1996: 387).
Individual biographies were limited Billig believed because they didn’t tell you about what happened to
individual members when they joined the group. Billig admitted the methodological limitations of social
psychology prevented him from dealing with the difference between the individual beliefs of members and
the official ideology of a movement. His theoretical frameworks, which emphasised division rather than
harmony, reflected his assumption that you cannot reduce the study of fascism to the study of a single
personality type. Similarly he stated that you could not rely on theoretical perspectives which assume the
values of the individual members match the official propaganda.
Another issue confronting left wing collective action researchers of racist activists concerns the problem of
gaining access and the temptation of going covert. Erikson (1967) and Cassell (1980) in Diani and Eyerman
(1992) identify the problem with adopting a covert role as the risk it poses to the authenticity of the
relationship between the researcher and subject. Eyerman and Esseveld cite Billig as proof that a mask can
be worn for a long time, which is interesting, because no where in Billig did I read that he had been covert
during his study. Maybe he was being cover about his covertness. American researcher Ezekiel (1995) was
not covert but was open and honest with his Detroit neo Nazi participants about who he was (a left Jewish
university professor) and about his aim to research those ‘whose lives seem strange to others and to explain
the sense of their lives”.
His seven-year study of young members of a Detroit Neo-Nazi group is somewhat more enlightening about
some of the emotional issues a left wing researcher faces when researching a right wing racist group. He
says (1995) “during those repeated interactions, I became aware that warmth was increasing between us,
despite my identifying as a Jew and a progressive”. Their greetings; remarks etc showed him that he was
beginning to matter to them. Which naturally, he says, then led to the next difficulty for a researcher of
wanting to help them, “to turn their lives off that awful trajectory”.
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Ezekiel’s (1995) method involved semi structured interviews across the movements hierarchy, observation
of leaders face to face and phone conversations with members, attending movement gatherings and
assemblies and cross burnings where he talked to participants, listened to their conversations with one
another and listened with them to the speeches of the leaders.
In her study of women racist activists, American researcher Blee (1996) criticises most racist scholarship as
sexist because of its gendered presentation of the committed racist as male. “Women racists, she says, “exist
in shadow, lurking behind husbands and boyfriends”. Blee (1996) singles out Ezekiel (1995) for this
comment, “I say sense of himself because this is a men’s movement…In my seven years around the
movement I heard many speeches but never one by a woman. I never saw a woman in a leadership role.
Women were servants and nurturers”. What Ezekiel obviously forgot was that most of the men he
interviewed weren’t leaders either and that didn’t seem to matter. In denying the women racists, their voice,
simply because they were playing traditional roles, Ezekiel devalues woman’s experiences and renders them
invisible.
Blee (1995) goes on to criticise Ezekiel’s (1995: 244) treatment of ‘Rosanna, Raymond’s girlfriend’ whom
we don’t get to know, in the narrative but appears “directionless, manipulated, and victimised”. Ezekiel’s
study like all sexist research says, “women's attitudes, actions, and motivations are derivative, incidental,
and not worthy of scholarly consideration. What is important about organized racism is knowable by
studying men” (Blee: 1996). This view of woman as apolitical, dependent on her father, husband or
boyfriend for her politics, ideology is consistent with the historical sexist treatment of women.
Blee's (1996) methodology includes life history narratives and in-depth interviews. She began by reading a
year worth of newsletters, speeches, and formal propaganda, which informed her sampling method. Some
interviews she set up easily over the phone whilst others were too suspicious and hostile to strangers to do
this and so she used a host of informal indirect means for making contact. She admitted that gathering
information was “extremely difficult given racist activists tended to be secretive, dishonest and intimidating
to researchers”
To overcome the limitations of standard interviews, questionnaires, and propaganda analysis, Blee (1996)
used a life history approach which meant “respondents [were] less likely to present group dogma as personal
sentiment”. Melucci (1996) also includes biographical narrative in his methodology. But to prevent
researchers objectifying the biographical narrative, Melucci (1996: 387) cautions us to pay attention to the
“the particular relational setting in which the narrative is produced, the quality of the effective link with the
interviewer, and the narrators particular relationship with his/her memory”, which he says are “all important
dimensions in the construction of a narrative”.
All research is social, political and ethical. And a researchers personal ideology is imprinted on every
research study. Of central concern to methodological debate across all research disciplines is the relationship
between the researcher and the researched. This relationship is particularly problematised for collective
action researchers of ‘distasteful’ movements and for some puritanical feminists researching sex workers. I
hope my analysis of those two distinct issues of sex workers and racist activists, has highlighted some of the
particular difficulties that feminist and collective action researchers face when researching subjects that
confront and challenge their ideology. I conclude that yes we can research topics where we have little
comprehension or acceptance of the basis for differing viewpoints but it does require reconsideration of our
methodology.
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